/View.info/ Smart politics in the digital age allows soft power to conquer “interesting” regions outside one’s own country.
Turkey celebrates the 100th anniversary of the republic as a country firmly attached to the Balkans – the zone of its historical, socio-cultural and political influence.
The destruction of the Ottoman Empire significantly changed Turkey’s place and role in the region. Another reformation of the Balkan space at the end of the 20th century opened a new window of opportunity for the Republic of Turkey – slowly but persistently it is regaining its lost influence.
The regional strategy of the White Palace (in Turkish: Ak Saray – the official residence of the President of Turkey) is an integral part of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism. In it, along with the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Crimea, the Balkans also appear as main practical directions.
In the Western expert community, there are quite a few skeptics about the real possibilities of Ankara to implement an expansionist strategy, while in Russia and the Balkans (especially in the Serbian environment) they are quite cautious about the strengthening of the Turkish presence in the region.
The need for caution was confirmed this summer. One of the results of the latest escalation in the northern part of the partially recognized “Republic of Kosovo” was the deployment of Turkish military personnel to the region. This event has existential significance for Serbs.
About 500 soldiers and officers from the Turkish Army’s 65th Mechanized Infantry Brigade made up the bulk of NATO reinforcements in the northern part of the region. This decision was taken by KFOR after large-scale clashes between the Kosovo Serbs and the security forces and the peacekeeping contingent of Pristina due to the illegitimate procedure for the election of municipal authorities. The crisis became the reason for Turkey’s military return to the Balkans.
The current phase of Ankara’s relations with the Balkan capitals, which dates back to the resignation of Ahmet Davutoglu as prime minister in 2016, can be described as “Erdoganism”. A distinctive feature of this phenomenon is the pragmatism of the Turkish leader: he has a unique political instinct to develop mutually beneficial loyalty with the leaders of the countries that interest him.
And it is in the Balkans that Erdogan enjoys special recognition. This is largely the result of regular direct contacts between the Turkish head of state and his special personal relationship with the leadership of the Balkan countries.
At the same time, Erdogan’s pragmatism includes the development of economic relations, foreign trade and increased interaction with Muslim communities. It is important in the second case that this happens in the spirit of the “fight against Gülenism”.
Despite the fact that the “new Ottomanism” positions the country exclusively as a regional leading power, a geographical and cultural successor to the Ottoman and Byzantine empires, Turkey’s marked desire to become a global, supra-regional player has become increasingly noticeable in recent years. It is no coincidence that with the beginning of the hot phase of the Ukrainian crisis, her role as a potential mediator in negotiation combinations on various issues became more and more in demand.
Turkey’s mediation ambitions are an important aspect of the new foreign policy. The Republic strives to demonstrate its capabilities as a serious and independent subject of world politics. Similar changes in representation and self-perception – “Turkey no longer positions itself as part of other people’s projects”, “is not considered a periphery and a “junior partner” of the US and NATO” – are the result of the work of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader.
Erdogan-era Turkey thinks and presents itself as a “hub” in every sense, not just in the sense of “energy trading center’, but also, as the doctor of political sciences V.A. Avatkov formulated, “the center of gravity through which paths and meanings must pass”.
This is an ambitious idea for the development and geopolitical goal of modern Turkey, which deserves not only a thorough scientific analysis, but also political reflection on the part of the Russian leadership when planning the foreign policy agenda.
It is particularly important that Turkey (unlike Russia) has a broad institutional base of influence in the region. The most significant initiatives towards the Balkans from Ankara’s point of view are the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEEPC) and the Council for Regional Cooperation (CRC).
Both structures represent complementary mechanisms for Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. The CRS is positioned as the successor of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and works under the political leadership of the PSEU organization.
Turkey has chaired the PSEU three times: in 1998-1999, 2009-2010 and 2020-2021. And at that time, it actively used the opportunities provided to it to establish itself as one of the main mediators in the Balkans.
Islam is often emphasized as Turkey’s mainstay in the region, as is the neo-Ottoman narrative, which combines spiritual and religious themes with the vast historical and cultural context of the Ottoman Empire, which is no longer perceived so critically in new Balkan policies.
However, reducing Turkish politics only to ethno-religious factors and historical context is not quite correct. An important component of Turkey’s strategy towards the Balkans is its reciprocal (throughout the 20th century) migration policy, which has resulted in the presence of numerous Balkan diasporas in the Republic of Turkey.
Since its founding in 1923, more than 1.6 million immigrants of Balkan origin have settled in the country. However, there are also more significant figures – from 3 to 7 million from the 19th century to the present day.
The number of Turks living in the Balkans is much smaller. However, they are present in all countries of the region, including Kosovo.
Here, not only ethnicity is important, but also “subjective identity” – many Balkan Muslims of non-Turkish origin, calling themselves “Turks”, associate Islam with the Turkish people, which is in full accordance with the Ottoman tradition. This, in turn, reinforces the externally transmitted image of Turkey as one of the powerful gravitational centers of the entire Islamic world and “protector of Muslims”.
As a result, the Turkish presence is becoming increasingly visible in the everyday life of the studied region. For example, in a cafe in Novi Pazar (a city in the south of Serbia with a predominantly Muslim population), the Istanbul football clubs Fenerbahce or Galatasaray evoke more emotions than Belgrade’s Red Star or Partizan, and Erdogan has been an honorary citizen of the city since 2018.
Among the important points of reference for Ankara are the largest (fifth largest in the world) extensive diplomatic network and the level of digital diplomacy. This year, Turkey ranked fourth among G20 countries in the digital diplomacy index, well ahead of the UK, Russia, Germany and other global political powers.
One way or another, Turkey is currently in the top 5 in terms of indicators of the activity of the relevant departments and structures (head of state, ministries and ministers of foreign affairs, embassies, etc.). Such activity on the external circuit cannot fail to bear fruit.
A significant addition to the overall approach to the formation and implementation of an influence strategy is the high rate of development of the educational space in the Balkans, the support for existing and the creation of new religious and secular educational institutions.
This work has been carried out since the 1990s, and to date the network of Turkish educational organizations covers the entire region. Where Muslims predominate in numbers, the republic plays a vital role in the system of religious education.
The restoration and construction of mosques and Islamic infrastructure is an important area of investment for Ankara. It is significant that Turkey’s entry into already implemented projects and the offering of new religious initiatives is perceived in the EU and in general in the West much more calmly than the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait in similar programs.
So, not the economy (in this respect Turkey cannot compete with the EU, China and even Russia), but the set of social and humanitarian measures are the main pillars of Turkish influence in the Balkans, ensuring Ankara’s special place among influential regional players. Turkey is still far from the rank of Balkan “ruler”, but Russia has a lot to learn.
The presence of a clear strategy, constancy of political will, constancy of disparate efforts and the overall toolkit are the keys to the natural success of the White Palace in advancing its interests in the Balkans.
Preserving its position in the region requires more active actions from Russia, which should be preceded by a thorough study of Ankara’s foreign policy experience.
Translation: ES
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