Home » News » Will the US and Iran clash in the Red Sea? – 2024-02-22 22:26:11

Will the US and Iran clash in the Red Sea? – 2024-02-22 22:26:11

/ world today news/ The arrival of 2024 marks a new stage in the escalation of the conflict in the Red Sea. On January 1, Tehran announced that the Iranian destroyer Alborz would be sent to the Red Sea.

The first week of 2024 marks a new stage in the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East. The terrorist organization ISIS, banned in the Russian Federation, claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Iran on the fourth anniversary of the death of the legendary IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani.

For its part, the United States admitted that the influential pro-Iranian leader Abu Taqua had died at their hands in Iraq, after which Iraqi Prime Minister Al Sudani demanded the withdrawal of American troops.

Against this background, the confrontation between the US Navy and Iran-allied Shiite rebels who control northern Yemen has intensified in the Red Sea. All this leads to the fact that the probability of a clash between the naval forces of Iran and the United States in the Red Sea is increasing sharply.

Similar assessments of what is happening appear in the media and expert commentary, the essence of which boils down to the fact that Iran is behind the actions of the Houthis, thereby making its move in the Middle East conflict. In reality, obviously, everything is much more complicated.

The Houthis do enjoy Iran’s political support, but they cannot be called someone’s puppets, like the regimes in Saigon or Kiev with their total dependence on the US. The Houthis represent an independent geopolitical factor, the activation of which is connected with the general “awakening” of the Global South against the background of obvious signs of the weakening of American hegemony.

In a sense, the current Houthi attacks in the Red Sea can be compared to the uprising in Niger, where not only the military, but also the majority of the population are tired of living in deep poverty and under neo-colonial pressures against the background of absolutely real opportunities for increased prosperity.

On the other hand, the actions of the Yemeni rebels are guided above all by the logic of their own interests. They control the Yemeni capital Sana’a and the surrounding areas, which form the historical core of the Yemeni statehood and are home to the largest part of Yemen’s population.

A significant part of the command staff of the Yemeni army, the backbone of which was made up of immigrants from the northern part of the country, is in the service of the Houthis. The Houthis control northern Yemen but are seeking to take control of the entire country.

In turn, their opponents are pushing for the federalization of Yemen and the granting of broad powers to the southern regions of the country, where the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was previously located, with which the Houthis strongly disagree.

In this context, it is important to understand the motives and objectives of the Houthis attacking “Israeli-related” ships. In addition to purely ideological goals – to help the Palestinians and stop Israel’s operation in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis are also guided by completely rational motives.

They achieved a significant military result after eight years of fighting. They failed to take control of Aden and South Yemen, but kept the country’s capital and most of North Yemen under their control. They withstood the confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which had unlimited finances and great military-technical capabilities.

Now, clearly, the time has come for the Houthis to translate military gains into tangible political results. At the same time, it is important to understand that the main opponent of the Houthis, the Saudi-backed President Hadi, relies heavily on Islamist groups ideologically close to the Hamas movement.

Therefore, by attacking ships “connected to Israel” in the Red Sea, the Houthis solve, first of all, the issue of expanding the number of their supporters and reducing the political base of their opponents directly in Yemen.

Iran’s entry into the conflict, however, raises the stakes in this confrontation sharply. The internal contradictions of the Arabian Peninsula, which can be solved within the framework of BRICS, which includes Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are filled with a completely different content due to the military presence of the United States and the coalition led by them.

Muslims can in principle agree among themselves, but finding a compromise in a conflict involving Western “crusaders” will be almost impossible.

Iran’s entry into the war is not as desired by the West as it may seem. Of course, certain radical circles in the USA and especially in Great Britain would be interested in such a development of events. However, the open confrontation between the US and Iran is dangerous for the West because of the unpredictability of its consequences.

Iran may have limited means to attack the United States directly, but the exact nomenclature of what Iran has at its disposal is difficult to reliably describe. But in any case, Israel will suffer, which will become a serious problem for the Western strategy in the Middle East, for which the Jewish state is the cornerstone.

The issue here is not Israel’s strength, but the balance of power. Its defeat in the military conflict and its radical weakening will open a “green light” for Turkey’s energy ambitions to develop the Mediterranean shelf.

A destabilization of the global oil market is more than likely, leading to an energy crisis that will affect the United States itself. The result of a US war with Iran will be a complete reshaping of the region, and the specific contours of these changes are very difficult to predict.

In any case, the risk of a weakening of the US is high, which means that America is likely to worsen its position in the global confrontation with China. This is the main reason why the question of war with Iran will be raised by the US only in the most exceptional, extreme case.

Translation: ES

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