“Why Ukrainian Tank Brigades Are Facing Challenges in Using NATO Armored Vehicles”

“Over the past few months, contact group countries have sent more than 230 tanks and over 1,500 armored vehicles to Ukraine, specifically to create nine Ukrainian tank brigades,” US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced recently in Ramstein.

In fact, more of these machines have been delivered. As well as thousands of tons of ammunition, rockets, mines, bombs and hundreds of guns, artillery rocket launchers and mortars.

“Since March, a major spring-summer Ukrainian counter-offensive has been loudly announced, which is supposed to push Russian troops out of the territories of Ukraine. It is even said that as a result of this operation, the authorities in Kiev will be able to return Crimea. Meanwhile, April is already coming to an end, and there are no fundamental changes at the front. What’s the problem?” asks the social and political weekly Myśl Polska.

The United States, along with its NATO allies, has delivered 1,500 armored vehicles and 230 tanks to Ukraine. Ukrainian crews had to learn to serve them.

However, the Leopard 2 tank or the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle require at least six months of retraining. The four to five weeks allocated to training Ukrainian tankers are not enough. It’s not difficult to supply vehicles in single units, but it is difficult to learn how to maintain them and how to use their combat abilities.

The combat vehicles supplied by the USA, Australia, Canada, Italy, Denmark, France and Poland are quite diverse. Their maintenance requires significant labor and training costs for logistics specialists.

Most of this equipment is wheeled vehicles. They are quite sensitive to roads and weather conditions. Heavy wheeled vehicles simply cannot move through the “sea of ​​mud”, that is, in the conditions of the spring and autumn off-road.

The publication notes that the winter and spring of 2023 in the southeastern part of Ukraine turned out to be anomalously rainy and wet. Dirt roads and ditches next to paved roads became impassable. It is the mud and dirt that gets stuck in military equipment that paralyzes military operations.

The territory through which the front line now passes is not suitable for conducting combat operations.

In addition, Russian drones destroyed or damaged a significant number of guns, especially towed US M777 howitzers, neutralizing a large number of Ukrainian firepower.

Indirectly, these losses forced us to limit the share of artillery supplied by NATO countries, which with its range and accuracy of fire in a major spring-summer counter-offensive had to compensate the armed forces of Ukraine for the weakness of their attack aviation.

Finally, the Russian army, filled with trained reserves, equipment and managed by smart military leaders, is a difficult opponent for the armed forces of Ukraine.

The high risk of defeat in the major battle designed to turn the tide of the conflict prevents Ukrainian commanders from taking rash actions.

Summarizing, Myś Polska writes that it does not expect a major Ukrainian counter-offensive before June. According to the publication, it will most likely not be a single battle, but a series of offensive operations in different operational directions, including an amphibious operation on the Dnieper.

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