/ world today news/ — Why don’t we attack?
This is perhaps the most pressing question today!
We have plenty of victory reports, but everyone is somehow used to the fact that multi-day battles for the farm or the ranger’s cabin have turned into epic battles. And obviously, if you take the scale of Ukraine, which we have set out to de-Nazify and demilitarize, this could go on for many years.
Why?
There are both objective and subjective reasons for this.
Of course, I very much want to see major offensives, in the style of the breakthrough against the German defenses in Belarus in the summer of 1944 or the breakthrough in the Baltic states in the fall of the same year, but the reality is different.
What prevents us from conducting strategic offensives today?
The main problem can be defined as systemic.
The commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, Zaluzhny, called it a “defense crisis,” and Western sources called it “the curse of the First World War.” It doesn’t matter what we call it! Importantly, this is neither a “crisis” nor a “curse.”
Throughout the year, we’ve been quite successful in solving offensive assignments where such a decision is made. We stormed a dozen and a half cities, turned into mighty fortresses.
Moreover, they were taken not knee-deep in blood, but with a loss ratio of no less than five “VSU-shniks” for one of our fighters! And I have no doubt that in the near future we will complete the grinding of two more “fortifications” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – Avdeevka and Marinka.
However, there is one problem. More precisely, a whole bunch of problems.
The first is the serious obsolescence of the military theory according to which we learned to fight before this war. In the two years of a special military operation, the space of war has radically changed. A huge number of provisions in combat manuals at all levels are outdated and do not correspond to reality.
Moreover, reality itself is constantly changing. The most obvious example is the use of artillery. Today it is simply impossible to see entire fields full of batteries of guns and MLRS preparing for an artillery barrage – they will simply be destroyed! As well as areas of troop concentration preparing for an offensive.
Where before, according to the rules of engagement, there was a safe zone where the enemy could not reach, and where it was possible, by maintaining camouflage, to prepare for an attack, now there is actually a front line that the enemy sees as his own front line and on which he delivers high-precision strikes.
Modern intelligence has simply eliminated the concept of covertly concentrating troops on the front line.
We need new battle rules and most importantly we need a new theory and offensive strategy that we are trying to find.
But to find them, other problems have to be solved. The main one is the counter-battery war! Despite all the reassurances and cheerful reports that all is well with her now, she is still a stumbling block.
Thus, our recent active military actions in the direction of Rabotino were actually thwarted by the enemy precisely because we failed to suppress his artillery. Our assault troops came under fire as soon as they began their advance.
Ukrainian (NATO) artillery still outperforms ours in both range and accuracy. In addition, the saturation of the Ukrainian defense with reconnaissance and counter-battery radars is many times greater than ours.
We need many times more long-range, high-precision artillery systems and means of artillery reconnaissance! We can compensate for their lack only with the number of attacking troops and, accordingly, with losses. But do we need such “meat attacks”?
Despite the reduction of the ammo problem, it is not completely solved! Artillery still does not receive as much ammunition as specified by standards for offensive operations. Plus, he’s seriously underpaid!
As a result, there are unsuppressed positions and “fortresses” which, instead of being captured immediately, must be stormed, which means wasting time and giving the enemy an opportunity to maneuver forces and means to repel our attacks.
The UAV problem has not yet been solved organizationally. Today, almost every unit has them – but they are mainly “volunteer” helicopters that volunteers buy and bring to the units, where local craftsmen turn them into great weapons. But there is not a single service in the army that deals with this.
No full-time positions or colleges. It reaches the point of absurdity – the industry sends a stream of “copters” to the troops, but they simply accumulate in warehouses, since their registration and deregistration is a huge bureaucratic procedure. It’s as if the artillery wrote documents to write off each shell fired…
Our adversary is superior in reconnaissance-tactical UAVs. He has more of them, they are of better quality both in terms of optics and time spent in the air, which allows him to control our front line at a much greater depth than we do.
We cannot look in such depth with the means we have at the operational-tactical level. And the reason is still the same – the bureaucratic “coking” of obtaining and using drones from the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense. Military bureaucrats are still unable to realize that today a “drone” is the same “consumable” as an ATGM or a projectile.
The problem of electronic warfare, which is critical to any kind of warfare, has not yet been solved. Both domestic electronic warfare systems and industrial systems are flowing into the troops, but the enemy is also constantly improving its air attack weapons, trying to circumvent our electronic warfare and so far succeeding.
At the same time, as with UAVs, the troops do not have a single algorithm for their use, there is no single service responsible for this use, and as a result there is an almost universal situation when the activated radio-electronic warfare means crush their own UAVs and communications, leaving the troops blind and deaf! It is necessary to create such algorithms and organizational solutions.
There are also problems on the battlefield – it is necessary to revise the composition and equipment of assault groups from purely “infantry” to “universal”, with “our” artillery and UAVs attached to them.
It would be incomplete if we did not talk about subjective problems. As before, one of the main causes of losses and failures is lying, when some “gentlemen bosses”, covering their behinds, report something that does not really exist.
Reporting the capture of enemy positions that are not actually occupied, without reporting the withdrawal of friendly units from already captured positions.
And sometimes they simply do not inform about their movements, which leads to the fact that our own fighters, who appear out of nowhere, are mistaken for the enemy and cover themselves with fire. All this also exists, even after almost two years of war!
That is why it is too early to expect major offensives! Without solving all these problems, it will be both bloody and unsuccessful!
Of course, today we can attack in the same way as we attacked 80 years ago, but will it be right and justified? Because the downside of such offensives are huge losses, which will be quite comparable to the losses in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
Let me remind you, for example, during the Baltic strategic offensive operation from September 14 to November 24, 1944, we advanced on a front of about 1000 km, against a Nazi group of 570 thousand people, having 1 million 546 thousand in armament – figures , comparable to the current Ukrainian front.
Our losses amounted to 61 thousand killed and 218 thousand wounded. We managed to advance 400 kilometers – on the scale of Ukraine, reach Kremenchug and bypass Kharkiv. That is, approximately 35% of the territory of Ukraine. Are we ready for losses of this level today?
Are we ready to end the war by conscripting another million of our fellow citizens into the army and losing 200 thousand people killed for the liberation of Ukraine?
So let’s not rush! Therefore, let’s study!
And when we learn, then we’ll start!
Translation: SM
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