The common opinion today is that Vladimir Putin was catastrophically wrong. He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops, but they did not. This was written by Brett Stevens of nytimes.com in his analysis, quoted by “Labor“.
He thought he would quickly overthrow Vladimir Zelensky’s government, but it did not happen. He thought he would split NATO, but he united. He thought he had protected his economy from sanctions, but he ruined it. He thought the Chinese would help him, but they hedged their bets. He thought that his modernized army would make Ukrainian forces minced, but Ukrainians did minced meat, at least on some fronts.
Errors in Putin’s accounts raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who is this one who advises him? Has he lost touch with reality? Is it physically bad? Is it mentally ill? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He has no control over his emotions and something is wrong with him.” the Nazis did with Warsaw and what Putin himself did with Grozny.
Several analysts have compared Putin to a rat in a corner, more dangerous now that he is no longer in control. They want to give him a sure way out of the difficulty he has created for himself. Hence the almost universal contempt for Joe Biden, who said in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man can’t stay in power.”
Conventional wisdom seems plausible. The benefits of the West’s strategy to support Ukraine’s defense can be seen. And it is concluded that the best way out is for Putin to find some way out of this situation: additional annexation of Ukrainian territory, Ukraine’s promise of neutrality and lifting some of the sanctions.
But what if this common opinion is wrong? If the West is again a toy in Putin’s hands? This opportunity was offered in the powerful memory of Carlotta Gal of the Times with her experience, reflecting the siege of Grozny by Russia during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early stages of the war, motivated Chechen fighters destroyed a Russian armored brigade and stunned Moscow. The Russians regrouped and destroyed Grozny from afar, using artillery and air force.
Russia is acting on the same book today. When Western military analysts say Putin cannot win militarily in Ukraine, they do mean that he cannot win purely. But since when has Putin played clean? “There is a whole next stage in Putin’s book that is well known to the Chechens,” Gal wrote. “When Russian troops gained control of the field in Chechnya, they crushed any subsequent disagreement with arrests and filtration camps and by empowering their local protégés and collaborators.”
Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine and that from the very beginning his real goals were energy resources in eastern Ukraine, which contained the second largest known reserves of natural gas in Europe (after those in Norway). ).
Combine this with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (where there are huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of the vast shale gas field), and Putin’s attempts to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline. and the form of Putin’s ambitions becomes clear. He is less interested in uniting the Russian-speaking world than in securing Russia’s energy dominance.
“Under the guise of invasion, Putin is committing a massive robbery,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what will remain of Ukraine, mostly landlocked, it is likely to become a prosperous situation for the West, which will help relocate Ukrainian refugees to new homes outside Russian control. In time, a figure like Viktor Orban could take over Ukraine’s presidency and mimic the political style of a strong man whom Putin prefers to be his neighbor.
If this analysis is correct, then Putin does not seem to be the loser who is wrong in his accounts and as his critics portray him.
It also makes sense in his strategy to target civilians. This is simply a way to compensate for the incompetence of Russian troops, and the mass killings of civilians are putting enormous pressure on Zelensky to agree to the things Putin has demanded of him all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any possibility of de-escalation, especially after becoming convinced that the mentally unstable Putin is ready to use nuclear weapons.
In Russia, the war is already serving Putin’s political goals. Many of the professional middle class, and these are the people who are most sympathetic to dissidents like Alexei Navalny, go into self-imposed exile. The remnants of the free press are closed, probably forever. As for the Russian army, there is more likely to be a well-directed purge from top to bottom than a large-scale revolution from below. Russia’s new energy wealth may ultimately help it shake off the grip of sanctions.
This alternative analysis of Putin’s representatives may be wrong. But on the other hand, in war, politics, and life, it is always wiser to treat your adversary like a cunning fox rather than a mad fool.
Source: “Labor“, translated by Pavel Pavlov
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