/View.info/ In the second half of 1944, Japan’s position on the fronts of the Pacific War continued to deteriorate. However, the Japanese still had the strength to resist. The Japanese government assumed that after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union could come to the aid of the Allies and oppose Japan.
In the event that the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East in 1945, Japan had no choice but to surrender and the Japanese government decided to resort to active diplomacy. Attempts were made to conclude a compromise peace with China, the United States and Great Britain, but these were unsuccessful.
So the idea was born to try to use the USSR to organize a truce in the war in the Pacific. According to the Japanese government, the very fact of the USSR’s participation in the negotiations for the end of the war would exclude its entry into the war against Japan. And Japanese diplomacy began to make an effort to create the appearance of a willingness to “open new page” in Japanese-Soviet relations.
Japanese historians claim that the Japanese government until the end of the war knew nothing about the agreements reached in Yalta about the participation of the USSR in the defeat of Japan. However, there are indications that Japanese intelligence had information about these arrangements.
In 1985, the memoirs of Yuriko Onodera, a cryptographer at the Japanese mission in Stockholm, were published in Japan, who claimed that the contents of the secret agreements for Japan reached at Yalta were promptly passed on to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
In February 1945, Emperor Hirohito and Prince Fumimaro Konoe, who had served three times as Prime Minister, warned of the high probability that the USSR would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Western Allies.
On February 15, Japanese intelligence chiefs informed participants of a meeting of the Supreme War Control Council that “The Soviet Union Intends to Secure Its Voice in the Decision of the Future of East Asia.” There was a warning that by spring the USSR might end the neutrality pact and join the Allies in the war against Japan.
The next day, Minister Shigemitsu spoke to Emperor Hirohito about this: “Nazi Germany’s days are numbered. The Yalta Conference reaffirmed the unity of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. He advises Hirohito not to rely on the Neutrality Pact.
General Tojo also warned the Japanese monarch about the possibility of the USSR taking action against Japan. However, the Emperor believed that in any case efforts to enlist the USSR as a mediator in reaching an armistice with the United States should not be abandoned.
In the spring of 1945, the Japanese government repeatedly took diplomatic steps to involve the USSR in separate armistice negotiations between Japan on the one hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other. At the same time, Tokyo is counting on Washington and London accepting compromise peace terms in which Japan retains Korea and Taiwan. An assistant in this should have been … Stalin.
To yes “interested” the Soviet leadership, the Japanese Foreign Ministry developed a list of concessions to the USSR, among which was the concession of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The Japanese wanted to “pay back” the USSR with its own territories.
However, remaining true to the promise made to the Allies, on April 5, 1945, the Soviet government formally announced to the Japanese government that it would denounce the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of April 13, 1941.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry then began to advocate persistently the acceptance of any demands that the USSR might make as a condition of maintaining its neutrality. An important purpose of involving the USSR in diplomatic “truce” maneuvers was to embarrass the Soviet Union with the United States and Great Britain, destroying their alliance.
The document “General principles of measures in the event of the capitulation of Germany”, adopted on April 20, 1945 by the Supreme Council for the direction of the war, set the task: “To endeavor to divide the United States, England, and the USSR by skillful action, propaganda, and undermining the determination of the United States and England to wage war.”
Realizing this, the Soviet government avoided any negotiations with the Japanese government and informed the leaders of the Allied Powers about the maneuvers of Japanese diplomats. And from the end of March 1945, the Soviet High Command began to transfer its armed forces to the Far East. In mid-April, officials of the military attaché of the Japanese embassy in Moscow reported to Tokyo: “Every day, 12 to 15 trains pass on the Trans-Siberian railway line … At the moment, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan is inevitable.”
Attempts at negotiations with the Soviet Union intensified significantly after the surrender of Germany. On May 15, at a meeting of the Supreme War Management Council, it was decided to seek the beginning of formal Japanese-Soviet negotiations. The Japanese leadership demonstratively canceled all Japanese-German agreements and instructed the press to support the Japanese government’s diplomatic moves toward the USSR.
However, the situation was not in Japan’s favor. The Soviet government continued to avoid Japanese attempts to involve the USSR in formal negotiations.
However, the Japanese government and command still had hopes of worsening Soviet-American and Soviet-British relations. Japanese leaders consoled themselves with the hope that eventually the Soviet leadership would realize the benefits to themselves of prolonging the war between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, in which the two sides only weakened each other.
The task was to use every opportunity to find some kind of agreement with Moscow. At the same time, the decision adopted on June 6 states: “The Empire must firmly adhere to the course of prolonged war, regardless of any casualties. This cannot fail to cause significant fluctuations in the enemy’s determination to continue the war until the end of this year.“
Japan’s “peace diplomacy” towards the USSR was aimed at avoiding surrender, preserving the existing regime in the country, and continuing the war until the US and Great Britain made concessions in determining the terms of the armistice.
On July 10, 1945, Shigenori Togo, who had replaced Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister, proposed sending a member of the Imperial Family, former Prime Minister Konoe, to Moscow as the Emperor’s special emissary. On June 12, Konoe’s trip to Moscow was officially sanctioned by Emperor Hirohito, and Togo sent a telegram to Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow instructing him to visit V.M. Molotov and raised the question of Tokyo’s desire to send a special Japanese representative to the Soviet Union.
The generals of Japan were decidedly against surrender, which was taken into account in the drafting of the Emperor’s message to be delivered to Moscow. It was drawn up broadly around the Emperor’s wish “to end the war as soon as possible”.
It was noted that in view of the demands of the United States and Great Britain for unconditional surrender, Japan was forced to fight the war to the end, which would lead to “increasing bloodshed” . In the message, the emperor “expresses the wish that peace be restored as soon as possible for the benefit of humanity”. What is special about the emperor’s message is that it is not addressed to anyone.
The approval of Konoe’s arrival in Moscow as a special envoy of the Japanese emperor marked the beginning of official negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo, and Stalin saw fit to avoid any contact with official Japanese representatives.
The last attempt to involve the USSR in “mediation”, to prevent it from entering the war was done by the Japanese leadership after the publication of the Potsdam Declaration on the terms of Japan’s surrender to the US, Great Britain and China.
The lack of a Soviet signature on the declaration actually prevented Japanese leaders from accepting it immediately and allowed them to maintain the hope that the war could continue. After the publication of the declaration and the discussion of its text at the meeting of the High Council for the Direction of the War, Togo sent a telegram to Ambassador Sato on July 27: “The position taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the Potsdam General Declaration will influence our actions hereafter.” The ambassador is urgently tasked with finding out “what steps will the Soviet Union take against the Japanese Empire’.
On July 28, 1945, the Japanese government rejected the Potsdam Declaration, declaring its intention to “continue to move forward to successfully end the war.” After that, the Japanese government’s diplomatic moves no longer mattered to Stalin. In strict accordance with the promise made in the Crimea, exactly three months after the capitulation of Germany, the government of the USSR on August 8 declared war on Japan.
Translation: ES
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