A message is circulating in our press with reference to interlocutors in the Main Directorate of Intelligence that today Ukrainian kamikaze drones attacked a Russian military facility in Mordovia for the second time, where the 590 separate radio engineering unit of military unit 84680 is located, and where the over-the-horizon radar station operates under designation 29B6 “Container”, which has a declared range of detection of air targets up to 3000 kilometers.
Against this background, it may seem paradoxical that our UAVs fly even to such a missile facility, which is designed to detect air targets at a distance of up to 3,000 kilometers. And at the same time – that the Defense Forces of Ukraine targeted such a military object of the enemy, which is located at a very significant distance from the current line of combat.
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Placement of over-the-horizon radar 29B6 “Container”, satellite image from Maxar Technologies
To clarify the picture, we will give the following details. To begin with, it doesn’t even make sense to calculate how much the Rashist radar 29B6 “Container” costs in theory, because another parameter is suitable to emphasize the scarcity of this type of equipment – how many years it took to manufacture and put on combat duty such a radar station.
There is publicly available data that the development and production of the 29B6 “Container” took place from 1995 to 2000, and from 2002 to 2012, the station was tested and, accordingly, brought up to the necessary condition. And in fact, only in 2012 did the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation officially announce that the 29B6 “Container” over-the-horizon radar was put on “research and combat duty”, “full-fledged” combat duty of this station, according to Russian propagandists, started only in 2019.
The receiving part of the over-the-horizon radar 29B6 “Container”, photo from open sources
Not only is this essentially the most powerful radar at the disposal of the Russian Federation, it currently exists only in a single copy. As of the same 2012, there were reports of plans by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to place the second station 29B6 “Container” in the Far East, with the deadline for putting it on combat duty in 2018. But in 2020, this deadline shifted to the right, to 2024.
That is, once again – in the case of the first (and currently the only) copy of the 29B6 “Container”, which was already twice attacked by our UAVs, the period from the beginning of development to the transition to full-fledged combat duty took almost 15 years. And this is against the background of the fact that there are obvious problems with the construction of a second such station.
Scheme of the structure of the over-the-horizon radar 29B6 “Container”, archival image from open sources
If we talk specifically about the characteristics of the 29B6 “Container”, then the picture will become even more interesting. To begin with, the Russian propagandists themselves in one of the publications of the 2020 model admitted that this station has a “dead zone” of observation of approximately 900 kilometers, which is why they said it was moved so deep into the territory of the Russian Federation, as far as Mordovia.
If this figure about the “dead zone” of 900 kilometers is true, it may hint at how the Russians could “sleep through” the flight of our drones to strike the “Container”.
Over-the-horizon surveillance sector of the 29B6 “Container” radar, image from open sources
In their publications, Russian propagandists were also “confused in the evidence” regarding the maximum detection range of the 29B6 “Container” and for what purposes this radar is “sharpened”. According to one of the versions – up to 2,000 kilometers inclusive, with the purpose of detecting ballistic and cruise missiles, according to the other – up to 2,800 kilometers, with the ability to detect even F-35-type aircraft.
But from this “scattering” of data, it can be directly deduced that the 29B6 “Container” is capable of conducting constant monitoring of the airspace of Ukraine in the interests of the Russian army. Therefore, it is important to strike and disable this enemy object precisely in order to improve the protection of Ukrainian skies.
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