In spite of numerous chances and a majority in the meantime: Werder Bremen did not want to score the redeeming goal against Karlsruhe. The team at the beginning failed due to a lack of courage in building up the game, writes our tactical analyst Tobias Escher – and the poor quality of the deals.
Markus Anfang has earned the reputation of an offensively thinking coach. The coach prefers a 4: 3 win than a disdainful 1: 0 victory. At his last station, in Darmstadt, his team only played 0-0 once. In Cologne not a single game ended goalless under his aegis. Bremen’s 0-0 draw against Karlsruher SC does not fit into the coach’s vita. At SV Werder Bremen the new ideas of the trainer are not yet fully fruitful.
Werder Bremen and the known mechanisms in 4-3-3
Markus Anfang also relied on his favorite 4-3-3 system against Karlsruhe. Again, many of the tactical principles that were used in the first games of this season were evident. The full-backs did not stay on the wing all the time, but often moved to the center. Together with sixth Christian Groß, you ensured a majority here. Werder Bremen built from a clear order: the full-backs moved in, the other players held their positions.
In the further course of the attack, the Bremen loosened their order. The offensive players often exchanged positions. Left winger Romano Schmid often moved into the center. Nicolai Rapp and Niklas Schmidt then dynamically occupied the wing. The winger often started behind the opposing defense, while the central players dodged the wing.
Pressing from Karlsruher SC dictates the game against Werder Bremen
In the early stages came Werder Bremen rarely to use the attacking winger in the opposing half. The Karlsruhe team dictated the game with their high pressing. Coach Christian Eichner set up his team in a 4-2-3-1 system. The four foremost actors disturbed Bremen early on.
It was noticeable how high right winger Lucas Cueto acted in the pressing. He moved on the same level as striker Philipp Hofmann to approach the Bremen central defender. Cueto disturbed Marco Friedl from the side. Karlsruhe steered the build-up away from Friedl’s side to the opposite wing. Since Cueto often acted centrally, Karlsruhe’s right wing was orphaned. Werder Bremen but did not capitalize on it. They rarely played a half-high ball on left-back Anthony Jung; the newcomer from Brondby was mostly central anyway. Karlsruhe pressing was extremely effective: Whenever they ran up the Bremen team, they hardly found their way into the opposing half.
The graphic shows Karlsruhe pressing against Werder’s build-up. Cueto moved in to disturb Friedl. Jung was released as a result, but either moved too far into the center or did not get the passport. Karlsruhe was able to paralyze Werder’s play structure with their man-to-man pressing.
© DeichStube
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Werder Bremen against Karlsruher SC: Good chances, bad utilization
Werder were lucky in two ways: First, Karlsruhe’s offensive plan was far less sophisticated than their defensive plan. With double passes they wanted to crack Werder over the wings, striker Hofmann should be fed with crosses. Werder Bremen defended, however, disciplined on the wings and hardly allowed any chances.
Second, Karlsruhe could not hold out the high pressing for more than ninety minutes. As soon as they pulled back in 4-2-3-1, Friedl and Milos Veljkovic were able to carry the game into the opposing half. In these quiet build-up moments, Werder’s system worked: The ball came over the indented full-backs into the last third, where Werder Bremen Picked up speed.
The Bremer advanced particularly often on the left wing into the last third. Here the players created overpayments, here Romano Schmid’s flexible style of play paid off. It helped that Karlsruhe was more open on this side than on the opposite. Werder Bremen came more and more towards the opposing goal.
Werder Bremen’s exploitation of chances is the problem
When Karlsruhe’s Marvin Wanitzek saw the yellow-red card in the 57th minute, everything was actually ready for a Bremen attack. When they were outnumbered, Karlsruhe could no longer play to their greatest strength, the high pressing. Instead, they retreated to their own penalty area in 4-4-1, only occasionally dashed forward.
and Werder Bremen? They did not succeed in constricting the opponent in their own penalty area. There was (once again) the lack of courage to play the decisive pass in the opposing penalty area. Even the thin squad came into play: the beginning could not bring about any personnel or tactical changes, because he simply lacked the players.
Yet: Werder Bremen had enough chances to decide the game. The expected goals value measures the probability with which shots on goal could have been a goal. In an average second division game, Werders would have had to lead 19 deals to 2.3 goals. In other words: If the odds were normal, Bremen would have won the game 2-0.
But as Lothar Matthäus once said so beautifully: Would, would, bicycle chain! Werder’s inadequate exploitation of chances and their lack of esprit in excess ensure that the beginning has to experience a 0-0 for the first time in more than a year. If the coach’s vita has its way, this 0-0 should remain the last for a long time. (tbs)
