For Heinrich Heine, the world situation was still clear: “The land belongs to the French and Russians, / The sea belongs to the British, / But we have undisputed rule in the air realm of the dream /.” 180 years and the invention of the air force later is here The question of rule in the air realm of the dream arises as to rule in the real air realm. And it may not give NATO nightmares, but it does give it worries. That’s why they recently practiced combating Russian air defenses in the skies over Greece, as someone who traveled with them quotes HE DOES-Reporter told the exercise’s press officer: “If the Russians can do anything, it’s air defense.” A typical example of the Russians’ aggressive intentions, because “access denial” is something NATO, which is used to access, doesn’t like at all. The choice of words corresponds accordingly HE DOES-Article: It’s about avoiding “attacks” from Russian S-300 and S-400 missile systems. Because “we” naturally defend, even when we attack. In retrospect, it turns out to be practical that two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, resisted US pressure and purchased these Russian systems; you can study them up close.
But the Russians can do more than just air defense; They can do a lot of other things too. The Kiel “Institute for the World Economy” has presented a comprehensive report on the disparity in conventional armaments between the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other under the title “Fit for war in Decades”. Accordingly, the effort to collect the “peace dividend” has led to a situation in the Bundeswehr in which it would “very quickly lose all combat value in a war of attrition against equal opponents such as in Ukraine.” Armament spending at the current level is “unsuitable for eliminating the imbalances that have occurred since 2004 (…) within a reasonable time horizon.” Russia will manage to re-produce the Bundeswehr’s entire stockpile of heavy weapons from 2021 in three to seven months, depending on the type of weapon. If the Federal Republic of Germany continues to equip itself at the current pace, it could take until 2066 until the Bundeswehr’s tank stocks are back to the 2004 level.
One could now draw two conclusions from this: either that a military rivalry with Russia would exceed the strength of the Federal Republic of Germany. But of course the state does not believe in an “Institute for the World Economy” for such an argument. Rather, for the opposite: the “plea for a long-term German and European arms strategy” through a substantial and permanent increase in arms spending in the regular military budget, not in any special funds. This, the authors promise, would also be “easier to convey to society” and, above all, it would create planning security for the defense industry, because in this industry too it is the case that “demand creates capacity” – because of a silly idea No investments would be made in special funds. However, in order to stimulate the “demand” for armaments, the threat situation must be modeled accordingly: “The (European, RL) continent” and the “entire Western alliance” are threatened with “a serious strategic disadvantage over the next few decades.”
Last prize question: Why is an “Institute for the World Economy” actually concerned with modeling an armament strategy for decades? The French socialist Jean Jaurès gave the answer in a famous comparison: The “world economy” – he still spoke of capitalism – contains war like a cloud contains rain.
