Ukrainian Counter-Offensive: Three Decisive Factors for Success in the Conflict

Three factors will be decisive for whether the Ukrainians succeed in upcoming counter-offensives, or whether we move towards a deadlocked, long-term conflict.

Debate

This is a debate post. The entry was written by an external contributor, and quality assured by BT’s debate department. Opinions and analyzes are the writer’s own.

A shift in initiative is on the battlefield in Ukraine. At the same time, a long-feared dam collapse is occurring in southern Ukraine. During the summer, the Ukrainians will try to force Russia out of certain Russian-occupied areas.

The Ukrainians want to create military strategic dilemmas so that Russia will have to prioritize its resources to control individual areas such as the Krym peninsula in the south and the Donbas in the east of the country.

A Ukrainian offensive i Zaporizhzhya will fundamentally change the calculations on the Russian side. A successful offensive here will split Russia’s land bridge between Crimea and Donbas.

This will create challenges for Russian supplies and cause problems in transporting soldiers and military material to southern Ukraine. It would also improve the Ukrainians’ position to destroy Russian military infrastructure and hit troop concentrations in these areas.

Russia gets less operational flexibility, and geographical proximity would also mean that the Ukrainians would be able to threaten Russian positions in Crimea.

The important one Kertsjbroen between Crimea and Russia will increasingly be exposed to missile attacks. This will lay the foundation for taking back the peninsula or creating a favorable negotiating position in the longer term.

It is important for Ukraine that the expected offensive regains territories, but equally important that this achieves an operational, strategic and political effect beyond this. That is to say: The Ukrainians are seeking to change the conditions for the further progress of the war.

We can expect Russia to respond by escalating by creating crises. The dam collapse was probably carried out by Russia with the aim of disrupting the counter-offensive by forcing Ukraine to deal with a disaster.

This will also facilitate Russian defense of the front line bounded by Zaporizhzhya and Donbas – and deprive Ukraine of opportunities in Kherson. At the nuclear power plant, a new such crisis could potentially arise.

We must expect that Ukraine will continue the counteroffensive. For the Ukrainians, being the aggressor would lead to increased losses in exchange for territorial recovery. At the same time, such victories create belief that it is possible to win a limited or full victory.

If the Ukrainians fail in such advances, it will be a powerful reality check. Large amounts of material and personnel will be used up and must be rebuilt. Ukraine’s partners will increasingly ask whether the liberation of territories is possible.

Russia has not succeeded in taking territories in Ukraine outside Donbas since the full-scale invasion lost momentum in March 2022. They have suffered very high losses since last fall.

According to British intelligence Russia has now lost the initiative in Donbas. Russia is only capable of minor tactical attacks and reacting to Ukrainian moves. Russia is occupying defensive positions along the front line, including in Crimea and in Donbas.

If the Ukrainians succeeddepends on three factors:

1. Ukrainian fighting ability and operational acumen

An important element will be the ability to surprise. The Ukrainians displayed operational prudence when they drove the Russian forces out of Kharkiv and Kherson. The Ukrainians now face a large and complicated operation that few armies have shown they can master.

Over time, the Ukrainians have set up a number of new departments, partly made up of veterans and experienced soldiers, but probably mainly of newly mobilized personnel.

What is new for these is that they are now trained in cooperation with partner countries, and that they are equipped to a significant extent with Western weapon systems. The personnel in the units have also been shielded from the battle for Bakhmut.

How good and well-trained are the newly established Ukrainian units, and is there enough material and ammunition in place?

2. Russian response and ability for flexible defensive operations

Although the Russian side is largely depleted of offensive combat power, Russia has prepared several layers of defensive lines, and conducted extensive minelaying.

Russia has according to the British research institute RUSI proved more competent here. The ongoing attacks from the Ukrainian side seek to find weaknesses along the Russian defense lines.

Moscow can also react by mobilizing more personnel, which could eventually have a military effect.

3. Luck and chance

This includes, among other things, weather conditions and other uncontrollable factors. War implies uncertainty.

The arms deliveries to Ukraine are important because they play into the most important factor in whether the Ukrainians succeed or not.

Western technology strengthens Ukrainian combat capability through increased quality, and is also a force multiplier that can better cooperate between different combat units.

A counteroffensive will last a long time and have different phases. The Ukrainians are awaiting full launch until they are reasonably confident that they have sufficient combat capability – enough weapons, ammunition and joint training – to have a realistic chance of success. They know very well that a lot depends on the counter-offensive.

In a scenario where Ukraine fails, and exhausts its offensive possibilities, the probability of a long and more static conflict increases, with subsequent political tug-of-war in Europe.

The Ukrainians want to create such major operational and strategic problems that Russia permanently loses its ability to fight on the battlefield in Ukraine. They are facing an actor who is willing to escalate by creating crises and threatening nuclear weapons.

This will cause the Ukrainians to weaken over time the basis for Russian control over Ukrainian areas, and open up new Ukrainian counter-offensives. It’s a lot to hope for, but not at all impossible.

Military victories could also create political friction in Moscow, take the focus off the war and play in Ukraine’s favor.

Europe goes one exciting and important time ahead. Ukraine’s partners will interpret the development of the counter-offensive as an indication of whether the Ukrainians are able to continue their liberation, or whether the war is entering a more deadlocked track.

During the autumn we will probably have the answer. The offensive will be decisive for further strategy both in Moscow and in western capitals.