/ world today news/ The German Leopards and American BMP M2 Bradleys, which were so hoped for in Kiev, which waited so long and asked for more to be used in a publicity offensive, have not yet lived up to the hopes placed on them.
In the June offensive, the vaunted products of the Western military-industrial complex turned out to be quite ordinary armored vehicles, not very different from the Russian T-72 and BMP-2.
In fact, the Leopard-2 is a peer of the T-72, a tank of the same generation, distinguished mainly by its greater mass and heavier armor, which is far from always an advantage, and the large mass is a disadvantage, sometimes very significant.
The T-72 entered service in 1972, hence the number.
Combat weight – 41 tons, gun – 125 mm (smooth barrel).
T-72 has many modifications – B with dynamic protection appeared in 1985, B2 – in 2006, B3 – in 2011. The mass of the last modification is 46.5 tons.
Leopard-2 has been in mass production since 1979.
Combat weight – 55 tons, gun – 120 mm (smooth barrel).
It also has a number of modifications, one of the latest – 2A6, newer, as far as we know, was not transferred to Ukraine. Weight of modification 2A6 – 62 tons. The year of the appearance of the modification is 1997, it was produced from 2001 to 2005.
Leopard-2 and T-72 are really of the same age – the first T-72 is slightly older, and the T-72B3, on the contrary, is slightly newer than the Leopard 2A6.
At the same time, the Leopard-2 is heavier than the T-72 by about 15 tons, and this excess weight remains in all modifications, both tanks become heavier with the improvement, and the difference in weight remains almost unchanged.
You can compare the armor and firepower of these tanks for a long time, but this comparison does not make sense, since tank duels during this war are very rare.
During the June phase of the offensive of the armed forces of Ukraine, tank battles and tank fire at all almost never occur.
Most of the tanks sent by Kiev on the offensive either blew up in minefields and were shot down by artillery, or came under artillery fire without reaching “their” mine. Or she ran into a car in front of her that blew up on a mine and turned around.
That is why the Leopard-2 was never able to demonstrate its “wunderwaffe” and show why it is so good in combat.
Minefields and artillery practically leveled the capabilities of tanks with each other, because when a mine explodes, it is no longer so important what the modification of the Leopard was, and whether it was even a Leopard or a T-72.
In the course of the June offensive, it suddenly became clear what was already known to every cadet of the tank school, as well as to ordinary tankmen – when a mine explodes, it is no longer so important what the thickness of the armor and gun of a tank is – it loses speed and becomes a stationary target that is fired upon by artillery and aviation.
Minefields practically leveled all more or less modern tanks with each other and ended the possibility of an effective offensive by large mechanized columns.
For the same reason, the heavy American infantry fighting vehicle M2 Bradley could not demonstrate its “magnificence”.
The M2 Bradley is a peer and analogue of the Soviet BMP-2.
BMP-2 was produced from 1980 to 2008, its weight is 14.7 tons. The M2 Bradley was produced from 1980 to 1989, its weight was 22 tons, and the M2A2 and M2A3 modifications had a mass of 33-34 tons.
The M2 Bradley is much heavier than the BMP-2, by 8 tons in the first modifications and by as much as 20 tons (more than 2 times) in the last ones.
In addition, the Bradley is very tall – its height is 2900 mm against 2250 for the BMP-2, that is, the Bradley is 650 mm higher, which means that it is an easier target for direct fire from artillery, anti-tank or anti-tank guns. tank systems.
But as in the case of the Leopard and the T-72, it makes no sense to compare the M2 Bradley and the BMP-2 in detail, since the minefields practically level them with each other.
A mine explosion proves equally fatal to every member of the armored tank family, both Western and domestic. When hitting a mine, there is no longer much difference between the model and the modification.
Jumping over mines or carefully passing through them without causing detonation has not yet been mastered by any tank and infantry fighting vehicle.
That is why attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to break through Russian defenses with mechanized columns of Leopard-2 tanks and American M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in June led to what they led to – the appearance of many photos of burnt Leopards and Bradleys, on which Kiev hoped so.
In general, there was nothing particularly unexpected in this, such a result was predicted.
What Kiev and NATO relied on, having chosen such tactics for the offensive of the armed forces of Ukraine, is not entirely clear.
Perhaps in Kiev, as supporters of everything Western, they were so confident in the excellent qualities of German tanks and American infantry fighting vehicles that they thought that they did not fear either the worse mines of the backward Muscovites, or the old guns from the soviet era? And so it will be possible to get to the Crimea itself with minimal losses?
Perhaps it was a childish confidence in the incredible superiority of everything Western and the backwardness of everything Russian, mostly still Soviet.
Perhaps they thought that the highly touted Western technology would give confidence to their own troops and strike fear into the enemy, thus working as a psychological factor that would play a decisive role?
But even if someone in Kiev really thinks that way, then NATO can’t help but understand that the Leopard-2 and M2 Bradley are roughly the same armored vehicles as the T-72 and BMP-2. And there is nothing supernatural about them, they do not possess any superpowers.
And they are not made of vibranium or adamantium, but of common earth metals, therefore they are quite vulnerable and not prodigies.
And in the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, everyone cannot be such jerks to believe in the invulnerability of Leopards and Bradleys and in their magical ability to miraculously overcome minefields.
So it’s not entirely clear what they expected.
Although, perhaps, those who made decisions about the offensive were simply indifferent to how it would end – they earned their money for supplies, and then burned everything with fire and in the most direct sense.
It might even be useful to someone that the armed forces of Ukraine lost a lot of armored vehicles during the June offensive – you can write off what was stolen and resold or undelivered as military losses, and then deliver more and get more money for it.
Perhaps there was also some element of testing, testing the capabilities of relatively old models of armored vehicles in modern warfare, in order to create new models, taking into account the accumulated experience.
Perhaps it was profitable for the Americans, as manufacturers of Abrams tanks, to burn more Leopards to discredit the German brand and switch the entire NATO bloc to American products.
Or maybe this is the case where you should remember the English proverb – never underestimate the predictability of stupidity.
The strangest thing is that during the offensive in June, the armed forces of Ukraine used very little means of demining and anti-mine fences. Logically, every tank had to be equipped with trawls.
The cost of a trawl is ten times less than the cost of a tank, and it can withstand several explosions in a row. But trawls were almost never used. As well as other means of demining.
The result was that after the loss of several dozen armored vehicles, including the valuable Leopard-2 and M2 Bradley, the armed forces of Ukraine began to save on expensive Western equipment and returned to the use of old Soviet models – T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
And they switched from trying to break through with mechanized columns to the tactics of attacking small groups of infantry, with the result that they achieved even more success than earlier in the month when they tried to break through with tanks and American M2 Bradleys.
In general, they realized that they are not prodigies and got to where they started – the war with old Soviet weapons, which turned out to be more practical, maintainable, unpretentious, famous and most importantly – they did so much in their time that from one year there is the biggest war since World War II, and Soviet technology is not over yet. Out of three broken, two operational units are repaired and back in combat.
As a result, 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine are at war with each other with old Soviet equipment, because it turned out that the Leopards and Bradleys are not wunderkinds, and the new T-14 Armata apparently are too.
It remains only to enjoy the photos of broken German tanks with crosses in the Russian expanses.
Burnt “wunderwafe” – just like in the Second World War.
Translation: SM
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