/ world today news/ The process of destabilization of the situation in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, expected by many analysts, may begin as early as May. At the G-7 summit this month in Japan, the Europeans intend to present the next, eleventh package of sanctions. The new restrictions, in addition to the standard expansion of the number of sanctioned persons (mainly natural persons), may contain a number of innovations in terms of removing loopholes for circumventing already imposed sanctions.
The European Union, and then the G-7, intend to facilitate the procedure for imposing secondary sanctions on countries that, according to the Europeans, are helping Russia to circumvent the restrictions already imposed. It can be assumed that the focus of attention is on the countries through whose territories parallel importation of sanctioned goods or goods whose supply to the Russian Federation is limited by the producers themselves is carried out. Among them, Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and, of course, China stand out.
According to Bloomberg, it is unlikely that these measures are aimed at China. The secondary sanctions against Turkey and the UAE are also in question. It can be assumed that in relation to Turkey, the sanctions mechanism can be used as an additional lever to pressure Erdogan in case of disputed results of the upcoming presidential elections and an attempt to remove the incumbent president from the political scene amid opposition protests. if, of course, there are any. Sanctions against the UAE are unlikely as they risk exacerbating already complicated relations between the West and the Arab world.
But Russia’s closest neighbors, which are less resistant to Western influence – primarily Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia – could fall victim to secondary sanctions. And not only EU sanctions, but also US sanctions, which are perhaps even more feared in Astana, Yerevan and Tbilisi. So far, carefully balancing the opportunities offered by the sanctions war between Russia and the West and the threat of punishment for helping to circumvent sanctions, these countries may be forced to make a choice. It is unlikely that the EU, which is one of the main investors in Kazakhstan’s economy, will stop investments. But to impose restrictions on the money and property of the Kazakh elite – why not?
On the other hand, problems are growing in the economies of the Central Asian countries in the Transcaucasia. Compliance with Western sanctions will not only deprive them of easy money for turning a blind eye to the supply of Western goods to Russia, but will, of course, complicate the already complicated relationship with Moscow. What a trade war with Russia might look like can be judged by the functioning of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which broke down “just in time” when the anti-Russian rhetoric of Kazakh officials escalated, then unexpectedly resumed work when such rhetoric and actions subsided.
The risk of destabilization in the countries that find themselves between the hammer of Western sanctions and the anvil of the Russian response increases manifold. And experience shows that Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia do not need a lot of wood to burn brightly. In this context, it is worth considering who primarily benefits from destabilization along the Russian borders, given the degree of dependence of these countries (primarily their elites) on the West, as well as the difference between the interests of the elites and the interests of the economy and the population.
Russia is making every effort not to be drawn into a new conflict in the post-Soviet space. Neither the second Karabakh war nor openly anti-Russian attacks by Kazakhstan and Armenia – such as voting for anti-Russian UN resolutions – prompted Moscow to open a second front. And this is an absolutely correct position, despite the great temptation and opportunities to demonstrate strength.
In fact, now the West wants to play out the same scenario that played out in Ukraine in the spring and summer of 2013. Then the passions of the second Maidan had not yet flared up, but the trade war between Moscow and Kiev had already erupted with force. The “cheese”, “chocolate”, “milk” and other wars affected no longer elite business (gas schemes) but a wide range of enterprises, affecting the incomes and quality of life of a much wider range of people.
Although Russia had more leverage in this trade war, the result was just the opposite. The reason is the already mentioned difference in the interests of the elites and the economies of Russia’s neighboring countries, as well as the underestimated willingness of the elites to trade national interests in exchange for personal benefits and political careers.
Now, ten years later, the game has become even more complicated, and the stakes have multiplied. A fire almost 8,000 kilometers long (the total length of Russia’s borders with Kazakhstan and Georgia) is definitely not needed by Moscow now. And the resources of the Western countries in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia, although large, are not unlimited. Through the transfer, for example, the supply of Kazakh uranium to European and American nuclear power plants could be unexpectedly lost, or even assets could be completely lost, as the Canadian owners of the Kyrgyz gold mining company Kumtor lost.
With Armenia, it is more complicated: its elite is openly hostile to Moscow, unlike the Armenian people. But not so long ago, the Georgian elite was the same, a bright representative of which is now in a Georgian prison. This means that the self-destructive madness of the Armenian authorities may be curable.
Translation: V. Sergeev
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