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Paula Astih wrote in Asharq Al-Awsat:
When Hezbollah, and its successor Iran, decided on October 8, 2023, to turn the southern front of Lebanon into a front of aid and support for Gaza, according to the “Unity of Arenas” strategy, which says that all forces are linked to Tehran. it will automatically move to support any attack on any of them. .
Today, after rumors of their decision to separate Gaza and Lebanon by agreeing to a cease-fire, the forces that have avoided publicly criticizing this policy in the past reluctant to consider the party’s commitment to this strategy before as a “strategic mistake. .”
Improve conditions
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who had supported Hamas and Hezbollah after the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” recently pointed out the need to “separate the paths and stop using the south as an area conflict to support Gaza or the West Bank,” criticizing Iran’s use of Lebanon to “connect pathways to improve the conditions for negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue.”
As for the “Amal” movement, Hezbollah’s closest ally, which was involved, albeit symbolically, in the support war, information indicates that it did not support the “unity of the battlefields”, but after the beginning of the conflicts in the south. , he joined the war “in defense of Lebanon.”
The representatives and leaders of the movement avoid talking about this issue, because the “Shiite duo” wants to express one position related to the current war.
Lebanon is not interested in it
Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Gebran Bassil, an ally of Hezbollah since 2006, was the first to describe Hezbollah’s commitment to the “unity of the squares” strategy as a “strategic mistake ingenious,” because it is “to advantage. other countries and not for the benefit of Lebanon.”
A member of the “Strong Lebanon” bloc, Jimmy Jabbour, says that “the strategy of uniting the territories was implemented only when Hezbollah showed solidarity with Gaza and opened the front of support, which saw we from the beginning were not interested in Lebanon. e, and as it became clear later that our position was correct, everyone deserted from here. powers, connecting with him here. The battle,” indicating in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that everything that happened “required a radical rethinking of the military strategy immediately after the end of the battle,” saying: ” It is time for an internal dialogue that will make weapons serve Lebanon. The state and its institutions are the decision makers, and the Lebanese army will be the backbone and foundation in defending Lebanon.
By settlement or force
The Lebanese Forces party is considered the most prominent opponent of the “unity of the squares,” and indeed the existence of “Hezbollah” as an armed party. Ghada Ayoub, a member of the “Strong Republic” bloc, believes that “Iran adopted the strategy of ‘area unity’ because it wanted to be a strong player engaging five Arab countries through its arms , starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas. Al-Aqsa) On October 8, only two areas moved to support Hamas in Gaza, starting from Lebanon and Yemen. Thus, the strategy of unifying the areas was disrupted. Iran was created and fell as soon as the Syrian regime refused to enter into this. war for issues related to the presence of Russia on its territory and other issues, as well as Iraq, knowing that Iran, despite this strategy, was not spared from direct strikes on the His land and threats only if he keeps his policy. “
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ghada Ayoub believes that “this strategy ends either through settlement with Iran or by force,” indicating that the opposition axis has come to be “a vocal or political axis, not a military axis,” in protest of the relationship with Israel until the Middle East picture is crystallized.
Your course is the belt of fire
Regarding the Director of the Middle East Institute of Strategic Affairs, Dr. Sami Nader, he explains “the strategy of territorial unity that was implemented at the beginning of the war on Gaza, and which included Yemen and of course (Hezbollah) to participate, which the South Lebanese Front announced as a support and support front, Iran decided to stop, not publicly, because it was against the main Israeli military strike, and it continues forward with it this strategy has been very costly, especially for Hezbollah, which is the cornerstone of the so-called Ring of Fire created by Iran to surround Israel. Politically called (the unity of the squares).
Nader pointed out in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “he has finally started to trim Hezbollah’s nails, almost finished it by removing its military capabilities, and this is an ongoing issue ,” explains that “not only have Iran and its proxies decided to stop working on the strategy of annexing the fields, but they are now call for a cease and desist military operations to save what can be saved”.
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2024-11-24 04:47:00
How might the “unity of squares” strategy perpetuate cycles of violence and instability in Lebanon, given its historical context of sectarian tensions and external interference?
## Open-Ended Discussion Questions:
**I. The Concept of “Unity of Squares”**:
1. What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of the “unity of squares” strategy for a country like Lebanon?
2. Do you believe there should be a separation between internal Lebanese affairs and external conflicts like the war in Gaza? Why or why not?
3. How does the concept of “unity of squares” affect Lebanon’s sovereignty and ability to act independently in regional affairs?
**II. Lebanon’s Reaction to Hezbollah’s Role:**
1. The article mentions a “shift” in opinions regarding Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict. What might be the reasons behind this change in perspective?
2. How do you perceive the different positions taken by Lebanese political factions like the Amal movement, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Lebanese Forces on Hezbollah’s actions?
3. What are the potential implications of this internal debate within Lebanon on its future relationship with other actors in the region, such as Israel and Iran?
**III. The Future of Lebanon’s Security**:
1. What are the potential long-term consequences of Hezbollah’s involvement in conflicts outside Lebanon for the country’s security and stability?
2. How can Lebanon balance its complex relationships with regional powers while ensuring its own security and independence?
3. What role should the Lebanese army play in ensuring the country’s security in the context of regional instability?
**IV. International Implications**:
1. How does the situation in Lebanon connect to broader regional and international power dynamics involving Iran, Israel, and other players?
2. What role should international actors play in promoting stability and dialog in Lebanon and the Middle East?
3. Do you believe the recent events in Lebanon have changed the way the international community views the “unity of squares” strategy? How?
These questions encourage thoughtful analysis of the article, promoting discussion and debate on complex issues regarding Lebanon’s political landscape, regional security, and international relations.