Home » today » News » The START-3/New START Treaty: Does it make sense to follow the quantitative limits? – 2024-02-12 15:25:23

The START-3/New START Treaty: Does it make sense to follow the quantitative limits? – 2024-02-12 15:25:23

/ world today news/ The large-scale deployment of de facto American strategic thermonuclear weapons at European airports gives Moscow complete freedom of action.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called the US decision to return nuclear weapons to the UK a destabilizing step, stressing that Moscow had “categorically warned” Washington about it:

“On the subject of the hypothetical return of US tactical nuclear weapons to British soil, I would like to warn in the strongest possible terms against this destabilizing step.”

These are B61-12 warheads with a power of up to 50 kilotons, which is three times more than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In June 2022

The BBC also reported plans to deploy 54 F-35 fighter jets in the nuclear-capable F-35A version to a US base in the UK over the next few years.

Meanwhile, thermonuclear bombs B61-12 can be classified as tactical nuclear weapons only conditionally, since in reality, especially considering the deployment of aircraft carriers in close proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation, we are talking about a military configuration that directly threatens the existence of the Russian Federation.

Moreover, the warhead power of 50 kilotons reported in the media by no means exhausts its combat characteristics and is in fact much higher: the B61 is a bomb with a variable charge power, called the “Wide Charge Variant” (FUFO, Full Fuzing Option) or “Dial-a-yield”.

On mods 3, 4, and 10, the power can be set to 0.3, 1.5, 5, 10, 60, 80, or 170 kilotons. Strategic versions (B61 7th modification) can carry four charge options with a maximum of 340 kilotons.

A new modification of the B61, developed as early as the 1960s, would be the first American tactical bomb with variable charge power. According to some experts, the B61-12 will be Washington’s most dangerous nuclear weapon.

Meanwhile, the true strategic weight of these weapons confuses all the cards about what to do with the existing Russian-American START-3 treaty, which, although suspended by the Russian side, is being respected in terms of its quantitative parameters.

At a recent meeting, the Russian State Duma unanimously passed a law suspending Russia’s participation in the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (START, START-3). At the same time, in a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that the decision to suspend its participation in the START treaty is reversible.

Moscow called on Washington to “show political will and make conscientious efforts to achieve a comprehensive de-escalation and create conditions for resuming the full functioning of the treaty.”

Despite the decision to suspend New START, for the duration of its validity, the Russian side will continue to observe the quantitative limits provided for by the treaty, and will also “continue to participate in the exchange of notifications with Washington on intercontinental ballistic missile launches.” ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

But the mass deployment in Europe, in the closest approaches to the borders of the Russian Federation, of supposedly tactical American nuclear weapons, which are not taken into account in the START-3 Treaty, completely violates the strategic balance that the countries maintain even within the framework of the suspended contract.

The deployment of new capabilities to strike the enemy is by no means limited to the transfer of 54 US F-35As to Britain.

Similar combat machines are already in service with the Air Force of Norway and the Netherlands, contracts for the delivery of 64 F-35As for Finland and 32 for Poland are being implemented. Similar aircraft were also ordered for the German Luftwaffe.

It should also be taken into account the fact that the range of these aircraft is significantly increased due to the jump airports located, as a rule, only a few tens of kilometers from the borders of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

A typical example is the Polish airbase Lask near Warsaw, where NATO attack aircraft from the Netherlands, Italy and other countries are regularly on combat duty. The same is true of Finland’s airports, which are a stone’s throw from Russia’s largest industrial and military centers.

In addition, despite the official non-nuclear status of most NATO countries, they regularly participate in the alliance’s exercises for the joint use of nuclear weapons. And with the right materiel in place, the F-35A will undoubtedly be ready to engage in nuclear strikes.

Thus, up to 300 attack aircraft of this type can be deployed in the foreground in immediate readiness for a nuclear attack on Russian territory. Not to mention several hundred more US F-35A aircraft that can be sent to Europe in a matter of days and hours.

As a result, a situation arises in which further compliance by the Russian side with the quantitative parameters of the START-3 Treaty is completely meaningless.

The adversary is actually making a evasive maneuver to gain a decisive advantage in the potential for a nuclear first strike at the expense of forces and means that are not considered at all in this treaty and which in the West are incorrectly called tactical weapons.

It remains to be explained why Western strategists bet on the F-35A. The fact is that this aircraft in conventional combat technique proved to be ineffective.

The full complement of standard bombs and rockets does not fit in the internal bomb bays. And hanging them on external pylons practically destroys the stealth effect of the aircraft due to the large number of ammunition that does not support STEALTH technology.

With a thermonuclear bomb, everything is different – it is optimized for placement in the internal compartment, which is why an aircraft equipped with nuclear equipment remains undetectable and thus particularly dangerous for air defense systems.

In fact, for Russia, this is a direct threat of a strategic scale, giving Moscow every reason to take adequate but asymmetric countermeasures, which automatically implies a complete rejection of the actual implementation of START-3.

Considering the fact that the Russian Federation has deviated seriously (for at least 10 years) from the American level of development of classic strategic weapons, Washington has much more reason to fear such a development than Moscow.

Translation: SM

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