/View.info/ From January 1, 2024, five new countries became full members of the BRICS interstate association – Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Ethiopia. The chairmanship of the organization passed to Russia, which intends to make every effort to increase the effectiveness of this organization, which is hardly possible without mitigating the contradictions, primarily between China and India (Bharat).
The strong interest of Western colonialists in New Delhi is well known. Thus, according to a study by the British Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR), by the middle of the century, India will overtake Japan and Germany in terms of GDP, becoming the third largest economy in the world. Despite all the conventionality of this kind of “Western-centric” calculations, they nevertheless emphasize a certain tendency.
In the context of difficult India-China relations developing since the beginning of 2020, India’s economic growth indirectly, if not directly, contributes to New Delhi’s interest in promoting an international initiative that competes with China’s famous Belt and Road Initiative. one road’, as well as with the International North-South Transport Corridor (IMEC).
The project for a “broad” connection between the Indian subcontinent and Europe and the Maghreb was developed with the active participation of the Biden administration and includes the participation of some countries of the Middle and Middle East, including the new BRICS members – the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as the belligerent Israel .
At the same time, it does not include the participation of Pakistan, Iran and Russia. According to available information, no later than mid-February 2024, the first round of negotiations between the ten countries participating in the IMEC project should be held for its implementation.
On the eastern “flank”, Indian planners and staff officers are developing options for a military-political response in the event of a war between China and Taiwan, as reported by Bloomberg in early September.
In particular, according to the post: “India’s Chief of Defense Staff Anil Chauhan has ordered a study on the impact of any war over Taiwan involving the United States and its allies. That is, what could India do in response,” and he set such a task, “after the United States repeatedly raised this topic in contacts with India.”
One option envisages that in the event of a conflict, India could become a logistics hub for countries opposed to Beijing: to repair and maintain their ships and aircraft, deliver food, fuel, medical products, etc.
In considering a more extreme scenario, one would have to assess the potential of India’s direct intervention along its “northern borders”, with the prospect of forming a “new theater of operations” for China. There are no refutations of this information.
Let’s recall that along with the US, Australia and Japan, India has officially been a member of the quadrilateral “Security Dialogue” (QUAD) since 2007, within the framework of which exercises were held in Sydney harbor in August last year with the participation of frigate of the Indian Navy.
Beijing criticizes the QUAD format, considering it a tool for confrontation with China. In recent decades, Washington and New Delhi have signed a number of agreements on military cooperation, regulating various aspects of it, including issues of technology transfer, organizing joint development and production of weapons, etc.
In June 2023, the defense ministries of two countries launched a joint project to strengthen cooperation in the defense industry, which will strengthen “cooperation in the defense industry and reveal new innovations in technology and production.”
According to the Pentagon, the project is aimed at creating new jobs in both countries, “promoting peace, security and prosperity” and “providing the armed forces of both countries with the necessary capabilities.”
Joint exercises between India and the US in November 2022 (in the Himalayas) and September 2023 (in Alaska) can also serve as an indicator of strengthening military cooperation, which means an unequivocal signal to Beijing.
Almost 65% of the total length of the 3,400 km Sino-Indian border is the subject of a long-standing dispute between Beijing and New Delhi.
Thus, since the 1960s, the Indian side has been disputing Chinese ownership of the Aksai Chin area (with an area of over 34,000 square kilometers) at the junction of the borders of China, India and Pakistan.
On Indian maps it is part of Ladakh province. In turn, China disputes the neighboring country’s sovereignty over approximately 70% of the territory of the vast northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, claiming almost 90 thousand square km.
Pro-Maoist and separatist groups have long been active in the eastern and northeastern parts of India, whose support from the Chinese side is unlikely to be completely stopped (1). At the same time, India has been home to a “Tibetan government-in-exile” since the late 1950s.
According to some observers, in addition to territorial disputes, an important factor of conflict in bilateral relations is the active rapprochement between India and the United States and the strengthening of the position of nationalists from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party after the 2019 elections.
Accordingly, the topic of the threat of “encirclement” of the Celestial Empire with the “probable involvement of India” is very popular in the PRC. Recent elections to legislative assemblies in four states show the strong chances of Narendra Modi’s supporters for success during the national parliamentary election campaign planned for spring.
Realizing the importance of maintaining stable relations on the ground, after the next round of talks in mid-August, India and China pledged to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control, which is a de facto border legally recognized in a number of agreements.
It was also agreed on the need to resolve the disputed issues as soon as possible and “to maintain the dynamics of dialogue and negotiations through military and diplomatic channels”. A little earlier, New Delhi condemned Beijing for its continued practice of issuing special visas to residents of the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
In October 2022, it was reported that the Indian command began to purchase reconnaissance drones and tracking systems deployed along the border, and a little over a year ago new incidents occurred, accompanied by mutual accusations.
The Indian Foreign Ministry did not go unnoticed by the recent publication of a geographical map of China that includes almost all areas disputed with India: “… we reject these claims as they have no basis. Such steps from the Chinese side only complicate the resolution of the border issue.
According to the British study in question, “…as demographic pressures in the PRC begin to intensify, we will see the US overtake China again at some point in the 2050s, and India will become the world’s largest economy in the 2080s”.
This means that China’s tenure as the world’s largest economy is expected to be unusually short. It will also have implications for global geopolitics, as there will potentially be three superpowers instead of the current two.”
It is said that the highest rates of economic growth in the South Asian country will be observed in the late 2020s – the second half of the 2030s. Then, according to forecasts, they will slow down a bit, but will still be higher than those in China.
Thus, India-China relations are still far from a true partnership that cannot influence the activities of the SCO and BRICS. The settlement of the existing contradictions is long overdue, but it will become possible above all with the right political determination of the parties.
Partnership relations between the Russian Federation and China and India, including within the framework of macro-regional integration formats, remain a strategic factor limiting the level of conflict between New Delhi and Beijing.
This was fully facilitated by the recent visit to Russia by Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who was also received by President Vladimir Putin.
Along with issues of trade and economic cooperation, complicated by Western sanctions pressure, negotiators turned their attention to political dialogue, the conflict in Ukraine and the geopolitical agenda.
The President of the Russian Federation has invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for an official visit and this visit is already being prepared. As the Press Trust of India agency specifies, “at the negotiations in Moscow, among the key issues, the expansion of BRICS and the cooperation of multilateral platforms such as the UN and the SCO were discussed.”
Bilateral issues naturally strengthen the regulatory role of the Russian Federation in the context of the far from conflict-free relations between Beijing and New Delhi.
Notes
(1) Interestingly, as early as the early 1970s, Pakistan and the PRC proposed to build a transit oil pipeline from the port of Barisal in East Pakistan (since December 1971 the Republic of Bangladesh) through northeastern India to the central industrial region of the PRC (Chengju-Chongqing) .
Delhi has conditioned its agreement to this project on renouncing Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh and ending aid to Maoist groups and ethnic separatists in that region. Beijing did not agree to this and the idea was postponed: to this day, its implementation rests on the same conditions of the Indian side, which do not receive a positive response in Beijing.
Translation: SM
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