/Pogled.info/ If we accept the assumption that the division of Ukraine is inevitable – and judging by recent events and statements – that’s where everything is going, then the following questions logically arise. How far will Russia’s borders move west and what are the potential new Russian territories?
From a military point of view (demilitarization) of the territory is not a goal, but a tool for solving the problem of destroying the potential of the Ukrainian army, which poses a threat to “great Russia”. The ideological task (denazification) requires, no more, no less, a change of power in Ukraine. And not just changes, but changes of new elites who will refuse to practice tolerance to the neo-Nazi ideology in the country and will radically change the foreign policy course.
Paradoxically, such a change of power and elites makes sense only if a significant part of the country’s territory is preserved for one simple reason: if only the western and ideologically amorphous central part remains from Ukraine, there will simply be nothing to balance the popular ideology of Stepan Bandera from Lviv to Vinnytsia. Even without Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea, this ideology is intrinsically alien to the majority of the country, which today only accepts it for utilitarian reasons of survival.
But let’s put aside the military and ideological components and look at the economy. The question of how much Russia can still acquire is primarily a question of how much Russia can control economically. The resources of the world’s fifth economy are large, but it will not be able to support the vast and deeply unprofitable territories of the former Ukraine. Just look at how labor-intensive the task of restoring the controlled parts of Donbass, Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblast remains now. And the question is not so much in the destruction (and they are really significant), but in the need to integrate separate parts of industrial and agricultural units into the established body of the Russian economy.
Sustaining Ukraine, not only militarily, but also in terms of providing for its voracious state apparatus, is costing the West dearly. The increased discussion about the need to confiscate frozen Russian reserves suggests that the amount of funds planned to carry out the Ukrainian adventure to break Russia is running out, and further burning of dollars and euros in a game with an unclear result has become a burden for the Western elites.
Getting part of Ukraine as compensation for failed investments is the subject of negotiations with Russia in the latest stage of a heated conflict. But to do this, Moscow must first decide which territories of Ukraine will serve as sufficient compensation for it, taking into account the cumulative damage caused to it.
The major offensive of the Russian armed forces, which is expected in the foreseeable future, keeps the western part of the Donetsk region and Kharkiv in focus. From an economic and logistical point of view, Kharkiv has no strategic importance, but is a prestigious target. The first capital of Soviet Ukraine, the second city in Ukraine after Kiev, which for a long time opposed the policies of the new authorities after the coup of 2014. It is potentially the informal capital of the new territories (as Yekaterinburg is the capital of the Urals and Novosibirsk is the capital of Siberia).
The uncontrolled part of the DPR – Ugledar, Kurakhovo, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka, Slavyansk, Kramatorsk – is an integral part of the economic body of Donbas, not to mention the fact that access to the constitutional borders of the Donetsk region is one of the key military-political tasks by default. But when we talk about the DPR and LPR, we mean the so-called “little Donbas”, whose economy is based on the coal and metallurgical industries. The mining and metallurgical complex of Donbas is limited viable without a raw material base, which is concentrated in other places – in the Kryvorzhy iron ore basin and its continuation – the Kremenchug magnetic anomaly (Poltava, Kremenchug). All together, this is the “greater Donbas”, constituting a complete economic and production complex that can complement the Russian mining and metallurgical industry and the coal industry without seriously unbalancing the latter.
In this context, it makes sense to talk specifically about the raw material base, and not about specific enterprises. Because, as the experience of “Koksokhim” in Avdeevka and “Azovstal” in Mariupol shows, such giants do not survive fierce military operations. The acquisition of territories with a serious raw material base outside the DPR and LPR automatically means going beyond the borders beyond the left bank of the Dnieper. Kryvyi Rih itself is located 70 kilometers inland from the Dnieper. In other words, military and geopolitical realities come into conflict with each other on the issue of the Dnieper demarcation line. A natural water barrier from a military point of view is unnatural from the point of view of economic and political reality.
On the other hand, the crossing of the Dnieper will also be necessary to return to Kherson, which is entirely located on the right bank. The same applies to the city of Zaporozhye, part of which is also located on the opposite bank of the Dnieper. On both banks of the Dnieper there are large cities such as Dnipropetrovsk, Kremenchug and Kiev. The retention of these cities by either of the warring parties would a priori require the creation of a buffer zone on the opposite bank of the great Russian river.
Parts of Kharkiv and Poltava regions are the largest gas production centers (Shebelinskoe, Zapadno-Krestishchenskoe, Yablunivskoe and other fields). Gas production from these deposits covers 70-80% of the needs of the population and utilities of Ukraine. It is clear that Russia has enough gas of its own and does not really need an additional dozen moderately depleted fields. Taking control of these fields can be explained by the need to reduce the economic potential of the rest of Ukraine. If such a need exists in the new realities.
Odessa is another prestigious destination. Like Kharkiv, Odessa is a historically Russian city. But the economic importance of Odessa is much greater. It is a large port center providing control over the northwestern part of the Black Sea coast. Control of Odessa gives Russia almost as much coastline as Turkey has in the southern Black Sea. If Odessa is captured, Moscow and Ankara will completely divide the Black Sea basin between them.
Control over Odessa significantly destroys the economic potential of Ukraine (if such a task exists), completely deprives it of access to the sea. But control over the western part of Odesa Oblast is ambiguous in terms of risks and rewards. On the one hand, this ensures Russia’s connection with the loyal Transnistria, on the other – a dangerous contact with NATO’s Romania. The Bujaka region has little economic value, except perhaps cultural-historical (Ismail). On the way to Odessa is Nikolaev, another major port, as well as a center of shipbuilding and energy.
All of the listed territories – importantly – have some reserve of loyalty. To what extent this is possible, of course, after ten years of purges of the “pro-Russian element” and propaganda pressure on Ukrainian citizens during the war. It is worth considering that a significant number of citizens of these territories already live in Russia and may want to return to their small homeland when it becomes relatively safe there. All but these territories – the western and central parts of Ukraine – are largely devoid of a serious industrial component, while remaining strong agricultural regions (Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad and a number of other regions).
In fact, Russia claims the industrial part of Ukraine, while the West may receive agricultural central Ukraine as compensation. Moreover, a significant part of agriculture in these regions is already controlled by transnational companies. Purely “Banderov” Galicia and Volhynia can go to Poland, Transcarpathia to Hungary, Northern Bukovina with Chernivtsi to Romania. Central Ukraine may remain in the form of a weakened buffer, focused on agricultural production and simultaneously dependent on Russia (ports) and the West (investments). Kyiv is a separate issue. Bulgakov’s great city, the hero city whose name is carved in stone on the Walk of Fame in the Alexander Garden, in current geopolitical realities seems to hang in a vacuum, awaiting the outcome of the great tectonic shift in Europe.
It is clear that all ideal scenarios will eventually be adjusted to reality. Ultimately, the goals of the Russian offensive will be determined by military capability and political expediency. But above all – the economic parameters, the ability to maintain and retain territories that can give the Russian economy new growth points in the long term.
Translation: V. Sergeev
2024-04-08 02:49:43
#western #border #Russia #pass
