Where and how it can be determined how the conflict will develop, the possible advance of Russian troops west of Kremennaya and Svatovo will not be decisive
The main focus right now is on the battles for Bahmut. At the same time, as experts have repeatedly stated, they are more informational, political and psychological than military, Ukrainian agency Strana.UA writes.
From a military point of view, neither the capture of Bakhmut nor neighboring Seversk will be of strategic importance (unless a large group of Ukrainian troops is surrounded there, which seems unlikely for now). Also, the eventual advance of Russian troops west of Kremennaya and Svatovo will not have a decisive effect on the course of the war. Even if this results in them returning to the front lines on Oskol (which, again, isn’t very likely in the short term).
From a purely military point of view, all this will mean only a movement of the front line to new lines, beyond which positional battles can last for many months.
Of key importance to the war will be the outcome of the battles in a completely different direction.
Namely, in the southern section of the front, 150 kilometers long from Vugledar in the Donetsk region to Vasilevka in Zaporozhye.
It is here that Ukraine, as both media and experts have repeatedly stated, can prepare a large-scale offensive to cut off the land corridor to Crimea reaching the Sea of Azov. The discussion is not whether Ukraine will attack here, but when and how the Armed Forces of Ukraine will do it.
The direction of the strike may be different – perhaps to Melitopol, perhaps in the Donetsk region to the Azov coast and Mariupol, perhaps in several directions at the same time.
But in any case, if the offensive is successful, its results will be of strategic importance.
First, a grouping of Russian troops in the Kherson region on the left bank of the Dnieper will actually be surrounded. She will have to quickly leave for Crimea. Thus, Russian troops will be pushed from the entire coast of mainland Ukraine (except for part of the Azov coast in the Donetsk region), and the armed forces of Ukraine will approach the border with Crimea.
Second, and more importantly, it will mean that hostilities will be transferred to the territory of Crimea. And it will be much more difficult for Russian troops to defend it than on the current front line. All communications will be attacked by the armed forces of Ukraine, including the Crimean bridge, which in this case will have the fate of the Antovsky bridge near Kherson (at least the GLSDB bombs promised by the Americans will be delivered there to the Azov coast), but with a significant difference – a pontoon passage through the Kerch Strait, unlike the Dnieper, will not work. And the only possible means of supply will be the sea route and ferries, which will hardly be sufficient for a successful defense of the peninsula.
It is widely believed that in the event of an attack on Crimea, Russia could launch a nuclear strike. Now, however, they believe in this threat much less than last year, after the Russian Federation announced the annexation of part of the territory of Ukraine, but then retreated from Kherson practically without a fight and did not issue an ultimatum to stop the offensive of the armed forces of Ukraine with the threat of using nuclear weapons (it is believed that because of the negative position of China and threatening hints from the West).
And these same factors that have so far prevented the realization of nuclear threats may work in the future, although, of course, Crimea is many times more important to the Russian Federation than Kherson.
In this regard, the conspiracy theories that appear from time to time that an exchange is allegedly being prepared – the Russians are leaving Zaporozhye and the Kherson region, and Ukraine is withdrawing from some cities of the Donetsk region, are even less consistent than the rumors that this is a certain “agreement” followed by a cessation of hostilities (which, as we see, has by no means happened).
The retreat of the Russians from the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, with a probability close to 100%, will not mean the beginning of negotiations, but that Crimea will become the new battlefield. It is also an extremely uncomfortable battlefield for Russia.
What are the possible options for the actions of the Russian Federation to prevent a breakthrough on the southern front?
First, it could be a pre-emptive offensive in this sector in Zaporozhye and Donetsk region (or an attempt to break through the front west and southwest of Donetsk to enter the rear and flank of Ukrainian troops in Zaporozhye region) to significantly shift the line of hostilities from the land corridor to Crimea.
Second, an offensive in another strategically important direction in order to withdraw there the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (for example, an offensive against Kiev or Kharkiv).
Thirdly, the preparation of a multi-layered defense in the southern direction and on the outskirts of Crimea.
There is a lot of talk about a possible large-scale offensive of Russian troops in the near future (including the advance in the Zaporizhia direction). However, it is impossible to say for sure whether the Russian command actually has such plans and, most importantly, whether it has the appropriate capabilities. Russian troops are conducting offensive actions in one of the sections to the south.
Translation: BLIC
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