/ world today news/ Acceptance of Finland into NATO turns the Baltic into an “internal lake” of the Alliance
It is very likely that April 4, 2023 will be a landmark date in the history of at least the Russian Baltic Fleet.
On this day, even in the darkest years of the Cold War, neutral and almost friendly Finland not only officially became one of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, fiercely hostile to Moscow. And accordingly – a new and fairly powerful combatant enemy of Russia in the western strategic direction.
Another worse. From that day forward, the military planning process at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces will have to take into account the fact that with Finland’s entry into NATO, more than 80 percent of the Baltic Sea coast has come under complete enemy control. Already openly (though without diplomatic formalities) entered the war with us. True, for now – only in Ukraine. But how long is that “just”?
For the Russian admirals, after April 4, the deployment in the Baltic theater of hostilities ceased to exist in this form.
The Russian Federation reliably controls only a little more than 7% of the Baltic Sea coastline. In addition, the coastline is torn in two between Kronstadt and Baltiysk. Which are separated by a vast, strictly controlled and, if desired, easily shot by a well-armed enemy, a space approximately 550 nautical miles long. Or – at least 30-40 hours of fast-paced traffic in the tar hell for any modern battleship.
This means that in the event of a serious escalation of the situation in these waters, we will have to forget about any maneuvers of a naval convoy and its dispersion between the two remaining naval bases.
For exits into the open sea further from the border of Russia’s territorial waters, and therefore the borders of the ground “umbrella” of the internal air defense system – also.
Especially since Latvia recently announced its desire to accelerate the process of acquiring from the United States the most advanced anti-ship cruise missiles Naval Strike Missile (NSM) with a range of up to 185 kilometers.
The installation of such complexes on the coast of the republic, according to the commander of the Armed Forces of Latvia, Lieutenant General Leonid Kalninish, will mean that “the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad is no longer a problem for the security of the republic.”
Another 48 such missiles and with the same purpose of establishing a surface blockade of the Baltic Fleet have long been ordered by Poland. And in general, the rapid implementation of such plans means that the surface ships of the Baltic Fleet, in the event of war, will most likely remain until death where the outbreak of hostilities finds them. That is, in their own places. Transformed into ordinary floating batteries.
But not in the artillery ones (like, say, the battleship “Marat” in Kronstadt during the Great Patriotic War). And in the rockets. Some of which, however, have a “Caliber” capable of hitting even Warsaw, even Berlin, even Brussels, directly from the piers. But that doesn’t change the essence of the matter. The Baltic Sea itself as a whole will not be ours.
So for Russia, the big “window to Europe”, which, starting with Peter the Great, the Russians cut for centuries with hardship, sweat and blood, as of April 4, 2023 narrowed to the size of a small “window”.
And it will narrow even further when Helsinki’s course predictably follows that of the hitherto formally neutral Stockholm with its 3,218 kilometers of coastline.
Thus, the prophecy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Edgars Rinkevičs, on May 13, 2022, expressed in an interview with the Financial Times, that “the Baltic Sea is becoming an internal sea of NATO”, has already become an ominous military-political reality for Moscow. In fact, there is nothing to dispute it. What could this mean for the development and renewal plans of the Baltic Fleet?
To begin with the current balance of power in the Baltics. In short: even before April 4, in these latitudes, NATO’s superiority in naval composition over the forces of the Baltic Fleet was not simply enormous. It was total!
In this regard, I suggest not to talk about submarines at all. So that we do not get completely upset, sobbing over the only Baltic submarine B-806 Dmitrov, last seen at sea in September 2021. Let’s focus only on the ratio of surface squadrons.
Namely: until this week, the alliance had a total (in the fleets of Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Lithuania and Latvia) of 17 frigates, 29 corvettes and patrol ships. Therefore, since last Tuesday, 8 more patrol vessels and 6 minesweepers of the Finnish Navy have been added to this list. Almost certainly 11 Swedish corvettes are on their way.
What do we have against this armada? The only old, ancient destroyer “Resistant” (project 956 of the “Sarich” type), last left the base alone in March 2015. Two patrol ships from the nearby sea zone – “Yaroslav the Wise” and “Neustrashimiya” (both projects 11540 of the type “Hawk”). Both – in completely worn technical condition. And therefore in endless repairs at the Yantar plant in Kaliningrad.
In addition, Neustrashimius will soon celebrate the tenth anniversary of its undivided and almost useless parking next to the plant wall.
Of the surface ships, the most real combat power of the Baltic Fleet is, oddly enough, almost the smallest of them in terms of displacement. Namely, the relatively new small missile ships of project 22800 (Karakurt type) Odintsovo, Sovetsk, Mytishti and project 21631 (Buyan-M type) Zelen Dol, Grad and Serpukhov.
All these combat units have on board eight high-precision, long-range Kalibr-NK cruise missiles, which have become famous throughout the world. The range of their flight, as shown by the military events in Syria, is enough to hit any point in Europe directly from the pier, even in Baltiysk, even in Kronstadt.
And this is perhaps the only circumstance that, I am sure, makes the West not in a hurry to belittle the combat capabilities of the Baltic surface ships in general.
However, we have four more relatively new corvettes of the fourth generation of project 22380: “Guard”, “Sense”, “Brave” and “Resistant”. The main caliber of these very good ships in general is the Uranus anti-ship missile system. And this is especially important, it seems to me, to note in our further conversation. Why?
Because if, as we assumed, the exit from the two Russian naval bases in the event of the start of large-scale military operations in Europe will almost certainly be tightly blocked, there will simply be no worthy targets for the Uranians of the four corvettes.
The X-35 (3M24) missiles on these ships are designed to conduct a sea battle with a surface opponent with a displacement of up to 5,000 tons at a distance of up to 260 kilometers. But to participate in such a battle, it is necessary to at least go out to sea. Which, as already mentioned, our corvettes in such situations may not succeed.
What then? To begin with, it is necessary to recognize the new reality that has developed in the Baltic Sea. And then draw the right conclusions.
In my opinion, one of them is. Since everything has developed as it has, and we are impatient for rapid reinforcements in the Baltic, we will have to accept, unfortunately, that the oldest of the Russian fleets is no longer de facto. A flotilla at best. In terms of the total combat power of the ship’s composition, it is approximately equal to the Caspian.
And the second. It is very possible that all four Strazh-class corvettes will be previously transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. Where the situation is becoming increasingly heated and the lack of warships is no less acute than in the Baltic.
Since no one can block Sevastopol in the Black Sea yet, there will always be work for the anti-ship “Uran” in these parts. And in the Mediterranean too.
Translation: SM
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