/View.info/ When using the term strategy, people usually imagine wise generals poring over maps in the headquarters of opposing armies. This is only partly true
Military strategy is only a part of a general (grand) strategy, and a part of an auxiliary (subordinate) one. And the issue is not only that the war is precisely the last and not the most desired argument of the politicians.
Since both politics and war are non-zero-sum games, most often war results in the loss of both parties participating in it (both the formal winner and the formal loser), less often one side wins (more often the third a non-combatant country is reaping the fruits of victory or towards its end), I don’t remember a single case where the war ended in a general victory for the participants (that is, the post-war world being better for both sides), although this is theoretically possible.
As you can see, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the “war” system gives a disappointing result. A war is easier to lose than to win, even on the battlefield. That is why politicians see war as a coercive step when all other ways to achieve a solution to the problem have been exhausted without result.
Armies are maintained as a means, first and foremost, of avoiding war and only secondarily of achieving victory on the battlefield. Since, as mentioned above, victory on the battlefield does not guarantee overall political victory, military strategy is a subordinate, ancillary part of grand strategy. A major role in achieving victory is played by grand (political) strategy and diplomacy as part of it.
At the same time, diplomacy cannot be understood only as the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic department plays a largely technical role – the role of a large office that ensures the interaction and coordination of various power structures.
At the same time, there is both military diplomacy and legislative diplomacy, but the main role is played by political diplomacy – diplomacy at the level of heads of state, as well as leaders and members of governments.
It is at this level that the main struggle is fought, ensuring future victory for one and defeat for the other. At the same time, the success of military operations, both in quantitative (destruction of enemy troops) and spatial (occupation of territory) dimensions, is not directly related to the results of political confrontation.
For example, the outstanding successes of the Russian army (the occupation of the Danube principalities and a breakthrough in the Caucasus deep into Turkish territory) and the navy (the destruction of the Black Sea squadron of the Turks at the Battle of Sinop) only worsened Russia’s position from the point of view of grand strategy, as it stimulated Great Britain to enter the war on the side of Turkey, France, and Piedmont, with the hostile neutrality of Austria and Prussia.
Until the end of the Crimean War, Russia did not suffer a single serious defeat on the battlefield, but the failure of its grand strategy led to the need to conclude the indecent Paris Peace Treaty, which severely limited Russia’s military capabilities in the Black Sea region.
There is also an opposite example. In the first stage of the Northern War from 1700-1721 (until 1706), Russia and its allies lost all major battles and most of the minor engagements. But Peter’s grand strategy, aimed at prolonging the conflict, stretching the Swedish forces and undermining the Swedish economy, led first to a stabilization of the situation, and then to the defeat of the main forces of Sweden in the battles of Kalush, Lesnaya and Poltava, which marked turning point in the war.
The same grand strategy of creating European alliances and playing on the contradictions of the European powers prevented Sweden from recovering with the help of France and then Britain.
To be effective, a grand strategy requires flexibility and the ability to negotiate on the basis of common interests, bracketing conflicts or quickly resolving them on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise.
The unbiased observer can easily be convinced that the USA, which overestimated its capabilities after the collapse of the USSR, in the late 1990s came to the degradation of grand strategy and the exclusive stake of power. Some tend to overestimate American success in the area of so-called “soft power”, pointing to the success of “color revolutions”.
But, first, the “color revolutions” are direct descendants of the “velvet” revolutions and are the fruit of the attitudes and views that developed on the European continent (and only on it) until the end of the 20th century.
The backbone of these relations was the universal (at the level of peoples, elites and government) belief in the exceptionalism of the United States, which created the necessary prerequisites for the successful work of American diplomacy (primarily based on public /non-governmental/ organizations). That is, the success of the “color” coups was staked decades earlier, when American “soft power” defeated the USSR and the socialist camp.
This is the success of US grand strategy in the post-war years, but not the result of the efforts of Soros and Clinton in the early 2000s. The latter, relying on brute force, on the contrary, contributed to the destruction of all the achievements of the previous grand strategy of the United States.
Second, the “color revolutions” themselves became the basis for military aggression. They were to surround Russia with a crisis zone, draw it into the war along the entire line of its land border from Mongolia to the Baltic States (exclusively), and contribute not so much to the political as to the military defeat of Russia.
The Americans in this case put the cart before the horse, forcing grand strategy to serve purely military needs. It is as if the General Staff directs the Supreme Commander, making purely political decisions for him.
This situation has naturally led the United States to a geopolitical catastrophe that is unfolding right now, before our eyes. At the same time, not only Russia and China (the main rivals of the USA), but also India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, Indonesia and Brazil have retained the classical approach, which implies the dominance of grand strategy.
And the rest of the countries of the world, including American allies, are trying (even if only at the regional or national level) to ensure the dominance of the grand strategy over the purely military. The only exceptions are Ukraine and the Baltic states, which completely submitted to the interests of the US military strategy. Poland is close to joining this camp, but is holding back for now.
Against this backdrop, Putin’s meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shanfu has all the hallmarks of a grand strategy. Clearly, this was a purely technical audience. The President cannot discuss issues at his level with the Minister. For this there is Shoigu, who attended the meeting of the President of Russia with his Chinese counterpart.
In addition, just recently Xi Jinping visited Moscow, i.e. all pressing issues at the leadership level were resolved, and the visit of the PRC Defense Minister (as well as other visits by Chinese officials to Russia and Russian to China) is taking place as part of the implementation of agreements reached at the highest level.
Theoretically, Putin could not receive the Chinese minister. But with this move, the Russian president showed that the Russian-Chinese partnership in the military sphere is developing quickly, effectively and is the subject of constant attention of the top leadership of both countries.
It’s a low-key but powerful response to hysterical US attempts to pressure Russia by scaring it with a “Ukrainian counter-offensive” that’s been delayed by six months and cannot happen.
As I have already written, the Americans need a truce in the West (with Russia) to start an active campaign against China in the East, including a military crisis over Taiwan. The US is still unwilling to give up its acquired habit of relying on military force.
At the same time, they need a truce not simply and not on their own terms, so that Russia will continue to be tied down by strike groups from hostile countries, be alert and unable to significantly help China, and also maintain a springboard for resuming hostilities against Russia after China is destroyed.
Many laugh and say that the Americans cannot count on Russia, which is in an advantageous position, to accept their terms. But such an inadequate calculation is the result of the fact that, contrary to the norm, military strategy has come to dominate political strategy, and it is not the politicians who tell the military what operations to carry out and at what speed, but the military who demand from the politicians to provide them with conditions for conducting planned operations.
I think that for a country that has made perversion a social norm, there is nothing surprising in the distorted understanding of the strategy. They implement a strategy of raising children from homosexual families who are physically unable to give birth to a child. So in this case we have a kind of military-political homosexuality. American strategists cannot give birth to a “baby”, but they try very hard.
In this context, this half hour spent by Putin in a friendly conversation with Li Shanfu means more than a dozen joint exercises. They demonstrate to the Americans that their hope of breaking the Russo-Chinese alliance has failed with talk of a Ukrainian “counter-offensive across the front” (and elsewhere), as well as America’s willingness to fight China over Taiwan.
That is, Washington can capitulate right now or worsen the situation by unleashing the Taiwan crisis as well as sanctioning new war crimes by the Kiev regime.
For now, we are talking about the denazification of Ukraine only, but there are no limits to perfection, and denazification can include not only the Baltic states and Poland, but also the main stronghold of the Nazis in the world in Washington. Nobody wants to fight, but once you start, you have to finish the job.
If the United States, having provoked a war, cannot win it, then it will lose it. If they are not quick to admit defeat, then they will have to be forced.
But the longer the war goes on and the more countries are involved, the higher the Russo-Chinese costs that someone has to bear. Today it is Ukraine and its inadequate leadership. And who will be tomorrow, when the scale of the crimes committed exceeds the political weight of the Ukrainian leaders?
Translation: SM
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