/ world today news/ Why did the Kyiv leadership need the story of “forcing” the Dnieper? How did the Ukrainian marines manage to capture Krynky and why is the road across the river one-way for the soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? Read about it.
On the morning of December 14, in a report from the fronts of the Special Military Operation, one of the military commanders assessed the situation in the Kherson direction near the village of Krinki with the following phrase:
Combat actions have become somewhat routine: Ukrainian formations additionally transfer personnel, which are systematically killed by artillery and aviation.
The fact that Krinki became a way to destroy the Ukrainian army was recognized today by the President of Russia. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, speaking about the results of the year, admitted:
Some time ago I said to the Chief of the General Staff: “Don’t be in a hurry to push them out of there.” It is profitable for us that they recklessly send their personnel there. Unfortunately, this is the logic of armed struggle…
Almost two months have passed since the landing of the Ukrainian armed forces in Krynky. Why did Kiev need this operation, what sacrifices did Ukrainian soldiers suffer here, and what did Zelensky and his team ultimately achieve?
Geography and Military Science
From geography lessons at school, we remember that rivers flowing from north to south in the northern hemisphere of the Earth, as a rule, have a high right bank and a low left bank. This is due to the influence of the so-called Coriolis force, which arises due to the rotation of the planet.
From a military point of view, it is convenient to defend the high bank, but not so much the low one. Because of this, firing points and defensive positions on the low bank are created further from the river bank in order to control not only the line along the river, but also the entire lowland of the river floodplain, while at the same time remaining out of range of enemy artillery .
Krinki is located right at the very edge of the flood plain on the left bank of the Dnieper:
On June 6, the wall of the Kakhovka dam was destroyed, the water in the Dnieper rose quickly by several meters and the village was flooded: the course of the Dnieper changed significantly, new islands and swampy lowlands appeared.
The already low left bank became even more difficult from a defensive point of view: Ukrainian DRGs began to make their way here through the old lakes and islands and launch attacks.
However, the territories were not captured by subversive forces. These groups were captured, destroyed, some simply surrendered… But Ukraine was objectively unable to conduct a large-scale offensive across the Dnieper in the absence of air support.
Why Kiev needs a bridgehead in Krynky
And suddenly, on October 19, Ukrainian stormtroopers from the 38th Marine Brigade decided on a larger-scale action: after a powerful artillery barrage, they crossed the Dnieper, entered Krynki and secured themselves on a bridgehead 1,200 meters long and 300 meters wide.
The VSU concentrated artillery strikes on a narrow section of the coast, the command decided to retreat a few meters into the forest plantations to protect the personnel,– the president said during a press conference on December 14.
At the same time, on October 20, a video appeared on social networks of Ukrainian infantry training crossing water obstacles with German self-propelled amphibious boats and pontoons. In the clips, all this is done skillfully and quickly. A beautiful legend was launched in the media about the upcoming expansion of the section of the Dnieper, from where the Ukrainian armed forces will enter Crimea.
But on the real Dnieper and the banks are further from each other, and the approaches and exits to the river are not so convenient, and most importantly – the Russians shoot! The Ukrainian Armed Forces failed to transfer serious reinforcements and equipment to Krinki. With the help of the Marines, they held on to this bridgehead and, despite terrible losses, began to hold it. For what?
Military experts immediately rejected the option of attacking Crimea:
From the point of view of the logistics of moving the reserves and supplying the advancing group, this operation here was simply impossible – the sky is under our control.
The goal remained to create a hotbed of tension in the southern part of the front, disrupt communications there and withdraw units of the Russian army from other strategic directions – Zaporozhye, Donetsk, Kupyansk.
A counteroffensive in minds
But there was another important goal of the Dnieper patch – the media. At the same time, both for external consumption and for internal consumption.
The time was approaching to account to the West for the money and weapons spent on the counteroffensive, but Kiev had nothing to show for it: Bakhmut was not returned, almost all Western equipment was destroyed in the Rabotino-Verbovoye section, Avdeevka and Marinka slowly began to “float away”. ..
The enemy announced a major counteroffensive, but nothing happened. The last attempt was… to break through to the left bank of the Dnieper and secure an advance towards the Crimea,Putin said at the press conference.
Second, no matter how much Ukrainians deny the Soviet past, in the very formulations “forcing the Dnieper”, “predmostie”, “Dnieper petachok” one hears the echo of the salutes in honor of the victories during the Great Patriotic War. For such an expectation of victory in the minds of the citizens, the Zelensky regime was ready to pay dearly.
How much is VSU’s Krinki really worth?
Although marines of the 38th brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces crossed the Dnieper, they failed to transport with them armored vehicles, serious air defense systems and engineering equipment. Only small arms, hand grenade launchers, anti-tank systems, MANPADS. There’s also no way to carry a lot of ammo on boats under fire.
An attempt to make a significant advance without armored support is unlikely to succeed, especially in conditions where the enemy can easily deploy armored vehicles,– noted an independent conflict analysis intelligence group at the very beginning of the Dnieper bridgehead saga.
Despite active artillery support from the right bank and an abundance of attack drones, the Ukrainian marines had a very difficult time. They found themselves in a sack of fire and were struck with everything that was in the arsenal of the Russian army at that time – “Cities”, “Sunset”, FAB. All attempts to expand the beachhead were immediately crushed, but the Ukrainian armed forces were not completely ejected from Krynky. Why?
Maybe then Putin recommended “not to hurry”? In Krinki there was a systematic destruction of the enemy under very favorable conditions for us.
Our military practically suffers sanitary losses: two or three days ago six people were wounded,– said Vladimir Putin.
As for the enemy’s losses, the figures for them are very approximate.
We provide stable about 15-20 per day “200”s. They try to hide in the houses that are successfully “dismantled” by our MLRS,
– wrote in November the military expert Evgeny Tishkovets about the situation in Krinki.
That is, an enemy company was essentially destroyed in Krinki in four days. It turns out that in two months in Krinki, about two battalions of marines of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were killed.
But then it got even harder. Despite the decent speed of the boats with which the Ukrainian armed forces transported reinforcements, ours managed. About half of them have been sunk along the way by drones. Especially when the drones were equipped with night vision cameras.
Dozens of Ukrainian “spets” sank to the bottom, their corpses froze in the icy banks of the Dnieper. The smell of carrion hung like a cloud over Krinki. After all, when there is no way to evacuate even the wounded, no one will think of removing the corpses.
These are not just military. This is the elite. Stormtroopers, from the special forces. In fact, they are not that many at all. If you calculate these losses for a month and a half, you can imagine how sensitive they are. I think this is stupid and irresponsible on the part of the country’s political leadership,Putin said at a press conference.
“A one-way ticket”
The Dnieper bridgehead in Krinki, which the Kiev regime established as “showcase of the successes of the armed forces of Ukraine”may as a result bury Zelensky.
The Ukrainian command commits a crime when it sends troops to cross the Dnieper River,– this was stated by the observer of the completely legal Odesa edition “Dumskaya”. Nikolai Larin.
Publications appeared in the Ukrainian press about the senseless massacre of VSU soldiers in Krynky, which for them is “A one-way ticket”.
The obscurity of attempts to expand the Ukrainian bridgehead in Krynyi has transferred to the political plane – a number of media outlets associated with Petro Poroshenko and other poles of the opposition to Zelensky began to actively publish materials about the senselessness of the deaths of Ukrainian military personnel here and the need to withdraw beyond Dnieper and to consolidate there,– writes the columnist Yury Baranchik.
That is, now Krinki has become a trap for the Kyiv regime. A vivid example of how power destroys its citizens.
We, Russia, can and have prudently withdrawn from Kherson, and Kiev will not dare to destroy its bridgehead – otherwise Europe will become firmly convinced of the idea of stopping aid: blood transfusion of a dying body is useless. I think that the turn in the situation will happen unexpectedly loudly, with a bang. Ukraine will simply stop resisting and that’s it.– says military correspondent Alexander Sladkov.
We’ll wait and see.
Translation: ES
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