The main thing from an interview with Skibitsky in The Economist magazine — Тексты.org.ua

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Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence Major General Vadym Skibitsky gave an interview to a British magazine The Economist. Texty.org.ua publishes a slightly shortened translation of the material.

Vadim Skybytskyi, representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Ukraine. Photo: Vitaly Nosach, RBC-Ukraine

Skibitsky’s voice sounds worried as he assesses Ukraine’s prospects on the battlefield. According to him, the situation is now as difficult as ever since the first days of the full-scale invasion of Russia. And it can get worse.

He predicts that Russia will first press ahead with its plan to “liberate” all the eastern districts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions — a task that will remain unchanged from 2022. He says Russia has been ordered to “take something” before Moscow’s lavish Victory Day celebrations on May 9, or, failing that, before Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing a week later. The speed and success of the advance will determine when and where the Russians strike next.

“Our problem is very simple: we have no weapons. They always knew that April and May would be difficult for us,” says Skibitsky.

The immediate concern of Ukraine is its high-altitude stronghold in the city of Chasiv Yar, which is the key to the further advance of the Russians to the last major cities of the Donetsk region. It’s probably only a matter of time before that city falls, just like Avdiyivka, which the Russians bombed to the ground in February, the general says. “Not today or tomorrow, of course, but everything depends on our reserves and reserves.”

Russia has already achieved tactical success in the southwest in the village of Ocheretyne, where a recent rotation of Ukrainian troops was thwarted. Russian troops managed to break through the first line of defense and create an important bridgehead with an area of ​​25 square kilometers. Ukraine is on a certain path to stabilizing the situation, while Russia is throwing “everything” it has to achieve greater success. According to the general, the Russian army is no longer such an arrogant organization as it was in 2022, and now acts as “a single organism, with a clear plan and under a single command.”

Looking more broadly, the intelligence representative suggests that Russia is preparing for an offensive in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions in the northeast. According to him, the timing of this depends on the strength of the Ukrainian defense in Donbas. But he suggests that Russia’s main offensive will begin “at the end of May or at the beginning of June.” He said Russia had committed 514,000 ground troops to the Ukraine operation, which is higher than the estimate of 470,000 that was announced last month by General Christopher Cavoli, NATO’s supreme commander.

According to the Ukrainian intelligence officer, the Russian group “Pivnich”, based on the border with Kharkiv Oblast, currently has 35,000 soldiers, but it will be increased to 50,000-70,000 military personnel. The enemy is also “forming a reserve division” (ie, 15,000 to 20,000 men) in central Russia, which they can add to the main force.

That’s “not enough” for an operation to capture a major city, he says, a view shared by Western militaries, but it might be enough for a smaller task. “A quick operation to get in and out is possible. But an operation to capture Kharkiv or even Sumy is of a completely different order. The Russians know it. And we know it.” In any case, Kharkiv of 1.2 million, which repelled the first Russian attacks in 2022, is in for dark days.

According to the general, May will be a key month when Russia will implement a “three-layer” plan to destabilize the country. The main factor is military. Although the US Congress has belatedly given the go-ahead for increased military aid, it will be weeks before it reaches the front lines. It is unlikely that it will be able to match the Russian reserves of shells or provide effective protection against low-tech, destructive guided aerial bombs.

The second factor is the Russian disinformation campaign in Ukraine aimed at undermining Ukrainian mobilization and the political legitimacy of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, whose presidential term tentatively ends on May 20. While the Constitution clearly allows for an indefinite wartime extension, his opponents are already stressing the president’s vulnerability.

The third factor, according to the general, is Russia’s relentless campaign to isolate Ukraine internationally. “They will shake things up any way they can.”

In addition to this, the already complex process of population mobilization is complicated by political struggle and indecision in Kyiv. Military conscription largely stalled in the winter after Zelenskyy fired the heads of regional TCCs. Parliament took several months to pass a new law that extends conscription to 25-27-year-olds and obliges men of conscription age to register in a new database.

The situation has improved somewhat since December, but General Skibitsky is in no hurry to declare the emergency over. Ukrainian officials fear that the next wave of mobilized recruits will lead to unmotivated soldiers with low morale. The only saving grace, the general says, is that Russia faces similar problems. Her army is indistinguishable from the professional corps that started the war. But Russia can still throw even more people into battle, stretching Ukraine’s already depleted defenses.

General Skibitskyi says he sees no way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone. Even if it could push Russian troops to the borders — an increasingly distant prospect — it would not end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Currently, both sides are trying to take the “most advantageous position” before potential negotiations.

But meaningful negotiations can begin no earlier than the second half of 2025, according to Skibitsky. Until then, Russia will face serious “headwinds”. Russia’s military production capacity has expanded, but will reach a plateau in early 2026, he believes, due to shortages of materials and engineers. Both sides may eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other aspects, Ukraine will be the first to exhaust its possibilities.

The general says that the biggest unknown factor in the war is Europe. If Ukraine’s neighbors don’t find ways to further increase defense production to help Ukraine, they too will eventually find themselves under Russia’s crosshairs, he argues. He downplays the importance of Article 5 of the Charter of Collective Defense of NATO and even the presence of NATO troops in the countries bordering Ukraine, which, in his opinion, may turn out to be insignificant in practice. “The Russians will capture the Baltic states in seven days. NATO’s reaction time is ten days,” says Skibitsky.

Ukraine’s bravery and sacrifice have given Europe a years-long head start, removing the immediate threat from Russia’s once-fearful airborne troops and marines for at least a decade, he says. The question is whether Europe will thank you for this by leaving Ukraine in the game. “We will continue to fight. We have no choice. We want to live. But the result of the war […] depends not only on us”.

destabilization war lack of weapons gur mo attack of invaders

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