Julio Rios
What do the diplomatic recognition of China by Nauru, the elections in Tuvalu, Hong Kong’s decision to eliminate the visa exemption for arrivals from Eswatini or even the episcopal ordination of the bishop of Zhengzhou and the meeting in Thailand have in common? by Wang Yi and Jake Sullivan?: Taiwan.
The partial victory (yes in the presidential elections, not in the legislative ones) of the Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) in the Taiwanese elections on January 13 brings with it a long queue that could last until next May 20 when the vote officially takes place. relay in Taipei. China clearly intends to arrive at that meeting with its homework done.
The messages from Beijing began shortly after the results were known. First, the announcement that Nauru was breaking with Taipei and diplomatically recognizing Beijing. Second, Tuvalu could be next if, after the defeat of Prime Minister Kausea Natano in the January 26 elections, the appointment of Seve Paeniu, a supporter of reconsidering relations with Taiwan, is confirmed (which would mean that in the Pacific there would only be two left). allies, Palau and the Marshall Islands). Third, Hong Kong announced the elimination of the visa exemption for people from Eswatini, the only African country that still recognizes Taiwan. In parallel, in the capital of Henan, Bishop Wang Yuesheng was appointed, agreed with the Vatican – which recognizes Taiwan -, while two other ordinations seem to be already closed, fueling rumors of solid progress in rapprochement. In Thailand, Minister Wang Yi met with the US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, reiterating that Taiwan is an inexcusable part of the common purpose of stabilizing bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army broke into the contiguous air and maritime space beyond the median line of the Strait (a US warship also recently transited the area) to remind everyone and everyone of the risks of any escalation.
Messages from Beijing have more than one recipient. In addition to Taipei, Washington first but not only. US interactions with Taiwan have been increasing in recent years. The Pentagon has increased substantial military aid to the island and the presence of its troops to train the Taiwanese army provokes continental indignation. Wang Yi reminded Sullivan that Taiwan continues to pose the biggest challenge to Sino-US relations. And they are not empty words.
Beijing also sees the US’s hand in raising the tone of third parties. This is the case, for example, of Lithuania, which sent a delegation to the island after knowing the results. Vilnius goes free in the EU. The same could be said of the Philippines. Its president Marcos wanted to emulate Trump in 2016 and publicly congratulated Lai Ching-te on his victory. Beijing recalled its ambassador, without overlooking the delicate state of relations with important open fronts, especially the disputes in the South China Sea.
What happens with Tuvalu these days is of capital importance within the framework of the strategic competition between the US and China. In recent years, the White House has multiplied its political presence and, above all, security and navigation agreements in the area, together with Australia. However, Beijing has continued to gain influence with a policy that prioritizes the economy and fulfills its promises to a greater extent.
Taipei does not have its own resources to compete with Beijing. On the other hand, the US provision and its supporting regulations (known as the TAIPEI law of 2019 to reinforce the island’s international projection) seem incapable of stopping the diplomatic bleeding for the benefit of mainland China. It is of little value that his few allies proclaim their unwavering loyalty today. Tomorrow is another day. However, Taipei also recognizes the residual symbolism of its partners. Therefore, in recent years, active paradiplomacy has come to the fore, focusing on the promotion of trade, technological, political and security cooperation with relevant countries such as the US, Japan, the EU, India, etc. regardless of its official nature. The geopolitical context favors this option.
The other open front is the commercial one. In the foreground is the suspension of the AMCE (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) by Beijing but also its reverse, the attraction policy, which may experience new impulses to attract capital, technology and industrial talent from Taiwan. In an article published in the CCP’s Qiushi magazine, Xi Jinping demanded “better work to win the hearts of Taiwanese.”
The impact that this new twist may have on Taiwanese internal politics remains to be seen. For the moment, the lack of definition persists in the collaboration between the main opposition forces, the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party, the majority in the Legislative Yuan. The latter does not seem to show any interest in it. Mainland China invites you to get your act together. The first test will be the election of the presidency of the Legislative Yuan on February 1.
Reports from various analysis centers such as the American CSIS point to the probability that a new crisis will occur in the Taiwan Strait in 2024. That May 20 presidential replacement on the island and the November 5 elections in the United States constitute two reference dates to keep an eye on.
(For Public Newspaper)
