2020 marked the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at a time when they have been at their peak since the time of Sukarno. In recent years, ties between Beijing and Jakarta have grown considerably not only in the commercial and economic sphere, with China establishing itself as the main trading partner and second largest investor, but also in the cultural and defense sphere.
A key vector for the development of ties has been the convergence of interests between the Belt and Road Initiative –Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – china and the policy of the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” –Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) – Indonesia propuesta by el presidente Joko “Jokowi” Widodo en 2014.
For China, Indonesia plays a fundamental role in its ambitions regarding the maritime version of the BRI due to its particular geographical location, since it is impossible to conceive of success without significant participation from this archipelago. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 2013 Xi Jinping will announce this project in the Indonesian Parliament. Since then, Beijing has prioritized investment in this country and, under the BRI umbrella, several projects such as the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train have been developed.
For Indonesia, the BRI represents an opportunity to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country and trade, as well as being an opportunity for the development of infrastructures aimed at interconnectivity within the islands and promoting its ambition to become a strategic point for global trade under GMF policy.
The global health crisis of COVID-19, experts say, has further strengthened bilateral ties. Indonesia was one of the first countries to receive Chinese vaccines – 1.2 million – in December and has been the world’s leading importer of Chinese vaccines, with 50 million doses of Sinovac and 60 million doses of Sinopharm already purchased. Likewise, Jokowi was the first major world leader to receive an injection of a Chinese vaccine.
Natuna Islands and the South China Sea
However, despite the increase in ties, relations are faced with several problems that limit progress towards relations, in Xi’s terms, of “iron friendship.” Like other countries within the region, Chinese claims in the South China Sea (MChM) pose a great challenge to relations. In the case of Indonesia, the Chinese “nine point line” reaches at its southernmost point its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), north of the Natuna Islands.
China’s growing assertiveness in its claims has created some recent clashes as occurred in 2016, when several Chinese fishing boats were intercepted by the Indonesian Navy; or in January 2020, when in the midst of the coronavirus crisis, several fishing fleets entered Indonesian territory in the MChM with the support of the Chinese coast guard, which led to an energetic diplomatic protest before the UN.
In response to the 2020 Chinese raids, in a show of force, the Indonesian Navy conducted a four-day military exercise in July near the Natuna Islands and the country increased the number of patrols targeting what is known in Indonesia. like the North Sea of Natuna.
Anti-Chinese sentiment
The other big problem is the persistent anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesian society. Although we can trace its beginnings during the Dutch colonization in the 18th century, it had its great height during the Suharto dictatorship. The “red fear” that led to the suspension of diplomatic relations with the PRC from the late 1960s to the 1990s, also led to a ban on the teaching of Chinese, the celebration of Chinese holidays and even the obligation to adopt Indonesian names.
The culmination of anti-Chinese sentiment occurred in the protests sparked by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, one of the main targets of which was violence against the country’s ethnic Chinese minority, leaving more than 1,000 Indonesians of Chinese origin dead and hundreds of Chinese shops and factories looted and burned.
The protesters considered this ethnic group as one of the main causes of the economic crisis. The main foundation was the widespread assumption that Chinese Indonesians control 70% of the economy despite constituting only 3% of the population, that is, the presumption that Chinese Indonesians dominate business circles and hoard wealth at the expense of primuB or native indonesians.
The basis for this claim is found in a speech given by Suharto in the late 1960s in Tokyo, although there is no solid research to prove it. However, the fact that at least half of the 20 richest people in the country are ethnic Chinese is a good indicator of their strong presence in the economy.
Paradoxically, the great violence of 1998 gave way to the re-flourishing of Chinese culture. The first democratic presidents lifted the prohibitions imposed by Suharto and Chinese culture returned to the streets of Indonesia.
In the same way, with the democratic opening, the Chinese Indonesians were gradually incorporated into the public and political life of the country. Soon new political figures of Chinese ethnic origin emerged such as the ministers Kwik Gian Gie or Mari Pangetsu.
The great problem that arose – and that is still latent in society – is the questioning of the loyalty of these new politicians. With the growing rise of China, many wonder if these will please the Chinese government at the expense of national interests. This is exemplified in the fake news that circulated on the networks about the supposed Chinese origin of Jokowi as a cause of the greater rapprochement with China. This fear has been further exacerbated by the arrest of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean citizen who confessed to being a spy for China in the United States.
The reluctance has come mainly from the more conservative – mainly Islamic – sectors of society, something that was appreciated in the 2016 protests against the former governor of Jakarta of Chinese ethnic origin, Basuki Thahaja Purnama – better known as Ahok – where the Protestants they came out with Islamic black flags in response to statements calling for disregard of an Islamic precept. Another issue underlying anti-Chinese sentiment in Islamic quarters is the Uighurs issue, which has attracted growing international interest.
Following this line, the main opposition figure and the unifier of the conservative vote, Prabowo Subianto – now in the post of Defense Minister – has adopted a confrontational speech against China in the face of Jokowi’s more conciliatory position. For the moment, Prabowo’s anti-China rhetoric has not gained enough prominence in the country, as Jokowi loosely won the 2019 elections. However, generally speaking, despite growing interdependence and shared interests, the relations Bilaterals will be constrained by the difficult balance that the Indonesian president has to strike between the possibility of closer ties with Beijing and the rise of persistent anti-Chinese sentiment in society.
In the same way, both the territorial and economic size – the forecasts place the Indonesian archipelago as the fourth world economic power in 2050 -, the geostrategic importance and the desire to become an intermediate power also represent a limit to the strengthening of ties, given its aspiration to an independent foreign policy from both China and the rest of the powers. As the main country in the region, Jakarta has played an essential role in proposing the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”In response to Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) of the United States and Japan, seeking to maintain the centrality of ASEAN and, therefore, maintain a balance in the growing Sino-American competition.
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