“Lebanon Debate” – Abdullah Qamh
The Lebanese presidential file was lost in the background of the current developments in occupied Palestine and Gaza and the battle of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the local attention it attracted, and its regional and international character. In the face of this unfamiliar Palestinian scene, the Lebanese file has almost become secondary, or has no circumstantial value at this time.
At this point, the weekend seemed calm in the Lebanese political sense. No tours or meetings were recorded for the Qatari security envoy, Jassim bin Fahd Al Thani, “Abu Fahd,” or anyone else. Everyone devoted themselves to following up on what was happening in Palestine. It was understood that developments in Gaza outweigh other issues. At this point, we must take advantage of a Lebanese moment to “catch our breath,” which will bring everyone back to evaluate their files from where they left off, build, and wait for developments. In this regard, it was learned that the “circumstantial” withdrawal from the Lebanese file was not only Qatari, as a French withdrawal was also recorded.
It was noted that French presidential mediator Jean-Yves Le Drian, who was supposed to return to Beirut at least in the first half of this month, modified his options and did not inform anyone of the date of his visit. Communication between him and the relevant authorities has been cut off, and nothing new is expected from the French embassy.
Before that, developments on the Palestinian scene were gradually interacting. Before the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood, many rounds were recorded for Abu Fahd. It was noted that the latter narrowed his list of candidates to settle on only two names: the Army Commander, General Joseph Aoun, and the acting Director General of Public Security, Major General Elias Al-Bisari. It was reported from observers of the Qatari movement that the latter removed General Aoun to second place in terms of importance on the list, and opposite him, promoted Major General Al-Bisri to first place. Lebanon Debate had previously stated in a previous article that there were doubts about the Qatari position.
It seems that the latter realized Lebanese difficulties in marketing Aoun. I noticed a Lebanese push, albeit nominally, adopted by the group of forces towards the “third option”, which prompted a “tactical” turn, so that the Qataris began to market this possibility, and specifically singled out Major General Al-Baisari, believing that it had the ability to breach the walls of “political forces” at a certain moment. But this, despite its importance, does not mean that Qatar abandoned or backed away from the idea of “president” General Joseph Aoun.
At this point, it was noted that the Qatari delegate worked during his recent rounds to try to understand the extent of the possibility of the head of the “Marada Movement,” Suleiman Franjieh, announcing his withdrawal from the presidential race, and the extent of the possibility of the “Shiite duo” accepting this option. It seems that someone indicated to the Qatari that he should work on marketing this idea with Franjieh himself in exchange for “microphones” offered by Doha, which was not welcomed by Franjieh himself, who re-informed the Qatari envoy during their last meeting before the end of last week of his desire to continue the candidacy. , leaning on a solid bloc consisting of 51 votes in the House of Representatives.
Despite the importance of this, it does not seem that the Qatari envoy is in the process of backing down from marketing the “third option.” Rather, he believes that by introducing Major General Al-Baisari to the top of the list, there may be – if the push continues – a place for him, or he may turn into a serious candidate at some stage. Considering that Al-Bisari is a person accepted by everyone. As it has become clear, the Qataris’ choice of Al-Baisari is due to their basic desire to tempt the party specifically, given that the relationship is good between the two parties and is respected and there are no objections to it, and that the party has a fundamental role in approving Al-Bisari to assume the position of Director General of Public Security, who returns from the Shiite share. Especially since the party – according to the internal division between it and the “Amal” movement – is authorized to name the person who occupies this position. The Qataris believe that the party’s acceptance of Al-Bisari as a presidential candidate is not impossible if a certain set of circumstances are met!
Apparently, there are fundamental issues that Al-Bisri is betting on. In the Qataris’ belief, what the party requires in Suleiman Franjieh is available in Al-Baisari Brigade by virtue of the trust it placed in him when he initially accepted him to assume his current position. However, tracing the mind of the political party reveals that it does not work this way. When the Secretary-General of the party, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, announced his support for Franjieh through the media, officially, and through a clear speech, he had resolved the controversy regarding the party’s position on the issue, and had become committed to positioning himself alongside Franjieh, and nothing will change this rule except a shift that occurs at the level of Franjieh’s position itself. He is holding the paper to continue in the race, and is relying on the party’s commitment to his side as long as he continues, and it does not seem that he is about to retire from the candidacy, as evidenced by what he informed the Qatari officer on three official occasions, not two, as was previously said.
In this sense, it is out of the question for the party to think of someone other than Franjieh or to have a “Plan B,” at least not yet, and it is not out of the question to risk its credibility or put it to the test, even if it admires Al-Bisari and his method of managing public security or trusts him and the importance of cooperation. Between them. This does not mean abandoning a strategic choice or turning against a steadfast ally. The issue related to Suleiman Franjieh goes beyond the issue of political trust in him, and relates specifically to his past, present and future political position, and the nature of his personality. The party is not only seeking a president who is an ally whom it trusts, but before anything else it is seeking a strong president, who has solid positions and is able to maintain them, who “has passengers” and keeps his feet on the ground.
This may not be seen by the party through the term “third option,” whether declared by names or implicit, which remain, in the end, moderate political options that have not begun to come devoid of capabilities or are governed by something of the traditional Lebanese compromise nature, or are compromise figures to pass through stages. Not only. It does not seem that the current and emerging situation and its possibilities and challenges, from Lebanon to Palestine and beyond, tolerate this type of president.
2023-10-09 04:11:10
#Qataris #tempting #Hezbollah.. #Franjieh #AlBaisari
