One of the favorite characters in research into the origins of Moscow’s recent foreign policy is the ardent Russian ideologue Alexander Dugin. With a long beard, sonorous voice and extroverted personality, Dugin is a telegenic orator who easily fits the archetypal Russian philosopher. He can be different things to different listeners – a modern Dostoyevsky, a right-wing Trotsky, an Orthodox monk, a second Rasputin, or an alternative Tolstoy.
Yet Dugin’s role in inspiring the Kremlin’s new aggression in general, and Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in particular, is complex. Contrary to the way he is often portrayed, Dugin is neither a philosopher with intellectual novelty nor an ideologue with direct access to the Kremlin. He likes to portray himself as both, and has been promoted as a deep thinker with ties to the Kremlin by his Russian and non-Russian followers. Strangely, some of his critics also accept these claims as true.
Dugin is an erudite polyglot who can express himself decently in several languages. He is well versed in social theory, esoteric literature, and normative philosophy. His political views encompassed a variety of approaches, from the civilizationism of Samuel Huntington to the Satanism of Aleister Crowley, from far-left syndicalism to far-right traditionalism, and from staunchly reactionary principles to explicitly nonconformist ideas.
It has been called by various names – from conservative, Marxist, imperialist, fundamentalist and geopolitician. Most of these labels are in one way or another appropriate, but in themselves inaccurate. When labeling his own ideology, Dugin invented new constructs such as “neo-Eurasianism” or “fourth political theory” designed to intrigue readers in Russia and beyond.
In addition, Dugin is a fascinating speaker and conversationalist. During conferences, talk shows and interviews, he comes across as clear, eloquent and responsive. He frankly admits his extremely nihilistic position. Dugin openly calls for a global anti-liberal revolution, constantly predicts the end of the international order, and readily explains his complete disgust with the West.
In the 1990s, Dugin even proudly presented himself as a fascist. He repeatedly praised the representatives of German Nazism and its allies. Recently, however, Dugin has refrained from publicly expressing his sympathies for historical European fascism. Instead, he now presents himself as an “anti-fascist”.
Over the past 35 years, Dugin has published a huge amount of texts. He and his entourage have published dozens of books in various languages and made hundreds of statements in various formats in a variety of Russian and non-Russian media, public places and social networks. It was the staggering quantity of Dugin’s statements—not their limited depth, dubious quality, and outlandish claims—that made him famous.
Now Dugin is perceived throughout the world as one of the most outstanding representatives of modern Russian political thought. His publicist presence, belligerent speaking and rhetorical skills have led many observers to see him as the mastermind behind the resurgence of Russian imperialism and Moscow’s anti-Western turn. For the past 15 years, Dugin has been called “Putin’s brain” and “the most dangerous philosopher in the world.”
However, Dugin’s philosophical statements and political ideas are simply Russian translations or reformulations of various older, non-Russian, anti-rational and anti-individualist philosophical discourses. Anyone familiar with classical geopolitics, integral traditionalism, international occultism, the German conservative revolution, French postmodernism, the European New Right, and other alternative schools of thought will experience constant déjà vu when listening to Dugin
Readers unfamiliar with these concepts may perceive him as an original Russian philosopher. But what he proclaims as his own “neo-Eurasian” or “fourth political” theory is largely a copy-paste of controversial and marginal theorists and philosophers from abroad. Dugin’s mixture of nihilistic fantasies, fascist dreams and totalitarian plans contains almost nothing new for researchers of non-Russian ultra-nationalism, anti-democracy and illiberalism.
A somewhat similar deception exists regarding Dugin’s often-alleged influence on political decision-making in Russia. Certainly some people in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s entourage, such as his longtime KGB associates Viktor Cherkesov and Vladimir Yakunin, have had a documented interest in Dugin’s works.
In the past, some of Dugin’s most extreme statements foreshadowed today’s rhetoric of Kremlin propagandists. In 2014, in a scandalous video presentation, Dugin called on the Russians to “kill, kill, kill” Ukrainians. In 2015, he argued that “war is our homeland, our element, our natural and native environment in which we must learn to exist effectively and victoriously.” Other older statements by Dugin also seemed scandalous at the time, but they can hardly surprise us today.
However, the growing coincidence between the philosopher’s discourse and the Kremlin’s rhetoric, especially after 2022, should not be over-interpreted. The growing proximity is obvious, but still insufficient to claim a direct causal link between Duginist ideas and Putin’s policies. It turns out that in recent decades, Dugin has had a better sense of where post-Soviet Russia is headed than many academic researchers. He was more a prophet than an instigator of these trends.
What Dugin and his followers have contributed to since the 1990s is the increasing poisoning of Russian media and intellectual discourse with dualistic, conspiratorial, and fatalistic ideas. Their accounts of the West’s centuries-old hostility to Russia, of the inevitable final battle between traditional land and liberal sea powers, of the supposed subversion of Russian society by evil foreign powers, etc. indirectly contribute to the radicalization of Putin’s regime and politics. In this, Dugin and his followers were assisted by dozens of other reactionary, fascist, racist and ultra-nationalist Russian writers and commentators.
Together they did something similar to what the German so-called conservative revolution during the Weimar Republic in the interwar period. Instead of directly influencing parties, politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats, they have created an atmosphere in which violent internal repression and armed external aggression appear natural.
Few Russian executives repeat Dugin’s ideas verbatim, and even fewer have read his books. Given Dugin’s earlier endorsement of fascism, only select Russian officials would admit to being impressed by him.
Nevertheless, the Russian far-right managed to make a decisive contribution to Russia’s anti-Western turn in 2007, the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and the large-scale aggression in 2022. For more than three decades, Dugin and his followers have tirelessly expressed openly imperialist, radical nationalist and paranoid anti-Western ideas.
When Putin announced his initiative against the West 15 years ago, annexed Crimea almost 10 years ago, and started a full-scale war almost two years ago, many Russians did not need to be explained why these actions would be necessary. The Russian far right, with Dugin as its philosophical patriarch, had already done so.
Working on the post:
2023-11-23 19:32:00
#Alexander #Dugin #light #dangerous #philosopher #world
