/ world today news/ The Israeli army surrounded Gaza, which is considered one of the most densely populated areas on Earth. In addition, even during the march, the Israeli army suffered significant losses: at least 29 soldiers and special forces were killed, 24 armored vehicles were destroyed. According to the IDF, two more soldiers (from the reconnaissance unit of the Nahal Brigade and the 162nd Armored Division) are in critical condition.
The American publication Axios estimated the strength of the invasion at about 20 thousand people. The number of Hamas fighters (Al-Qassam Brigades group) is 40 thousand people. Fighting continues in the suburbs of Gaza, as does the siege of Beit Hanoun.
Israeli troops failed to capture another town, Khan Yunis. The Palestinians also thwarted an Israeli amphibious landing attempt on Rafah Beach.
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant said the ground operation in the Gaza Strip would last months. Moreover, official propaganda stubbornly avoids the word “invasion”, using the nice-sounding “operation” and “assault”. However, whatever you call it, the essence will not change.
Hamas fighters have learned many lessons from recent events in Ukraine (including the battles for Mariupol), the American Modern Warfare Institute (MWI) concludes.
Furthermore, the Palestinians have extensively studied the tactics of fighting in cities of comparable population density: Baghdad in 2003, Fallujah in 2004, Mosul and Marawi in 2017.
Tzahal does have experience conducting ground operations in Gaza and against Hamas. The last time Israel invaded the Strip was during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. For this purpose, it was necessary to mobilize 75 thousand reservists, and 3 divisions entered Palestinian territory.
The main goal of the IDF then was only the destruction of the network of underground tunnels (and not the complete elimination of Hamas, as now), but the operation dragged on for almost two months. The Israelis lost 536 soldiers wounded and killed.
MWI believes that the operation in the Gaza Strip will largely determine the shape of the urban war for years to come. American experts describe its approximate parameters as follows.
First: the active use of missiles even in densely built-up conditions. Back in 2003, during the battle for Baghdad, Iraqi WMDs destroyed a US Army brigade command post right in the city. A surface-to-air missile shot down an American A-10 Thunderbolt II attack plane over the Dzhumhuriya Bridge.
Hamas has an arsenal of rockets estimated at several thousand. Israeli Merkava IVs were shot down by Yasin-105 ATGMs in the battles for Beit Hanun.
Second: the use of drones is even more widespread than missiles. Neither the Americans in 2003 nor the Israelis in 2014 had to deal with such a number and variety of UAVs: from kamikaze drones to commercial quadcopters modified to drop ammunition.
Hamas has released numerous videos of its forces using drones, including large ones similar to Iran’s Shahed-136 (similar to Russia’s Geran-2).
Now, in all urban battles, drones will be actively used to strike targets, cause indirect fire and record troop movements, MWI said in the report.
Third: the extensive use of tunnels and underground fortifications. ISIS fighters in Mosul spent two years digging tunnels that they used to move between buildings and fighting positions.
During the battle for the city, which involved more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers, the city had to be almost completely destroyed to be cleared of enemy forces. Underground communications are actively used by the armed forces of Ukraine – in Mariupol (technological premises of Azovstal) and Bakhmut (salt mines).
In 2021, during Operation Wall Guardian, Israel, according to official reports, destroyed almost 100 km of tunnels under the Gaza Strip. It should be expected that Hamas, as in 2014, will use tunnels offensively to maneuver attackers underground, concealing them for surprise attacks, and defensively to move between fighting positions to avoid airstrikes. Tzahal hits.
Fourth: active use of anti-tank weapons. To enter the city, the armed forces must have well-protected engineering vehicles and tanks. In 2014, the IDF was fired upon by a whole arsenal of ATGMs: “Malyutki”, “Konkursi”, “Fagoti”, “Cornet”, as well as RPG-7 and RPG-29.
These and other portable but effective weapons are easy to transport and conceal. In the 2004 Battle of Fallujah, a US battalion engaged in breaching enemy defenses lost six M1A2 Abrams tanks to multiple rocket launchers.
During the defense of Mariupol in 2022, units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces used Kornet, NLAW, Javelin.
Fifth: the participation of supports and snipers. Hamas will seek an active defense based on close combat. These tactics are based on strong points (concrete and steel buildings, often with basements and tunnels) and snipers.
In 2014, Hamas deployed 2,500–3,500 fighters to defend Gaza using mortars, anti-tank rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns and small arms, mostly from well-protected positions.
The history of urban warfare shows that it can take weeks or even months to clear a structure that serves as a fortress.
During the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942, the four-story building known as Pavlov’s House was captured by a division of Nazi troops for almost two months. In liberating Marawi, the Philippine military took weeks to clear several isolated buildings of militants.
* “Islamic State” (IS, ISIL) was recognized as a terrorist organization by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on December 29, 2014, and its activities in Russia are prohibited.
Translation: SM
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