Are we on the way to a new Palestinian Nakba that is more terrible than the old one? Are we facing a new chapter in the long and bitter conflict in which Yahya Sinwar replaces Yasser Arafat, and Hamas replaces Fatah? Is Hamas betting on taking the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and imposing its color and preferences on the Palestine Liberation Organization? Is the purpose of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” to turn the page on the “Oslo Agreement” and the process of Palestinian and Arab normalization? Many questions were raised by the choice of “Hamas” Al-Sanwar, who is based in the tunnels of Gaza, as the head of his political office, and the expectation of “Iran’s response” and “Hezbollah’s response.”
This happens sometimes. A man makes a difficult decision that leaves his mark on his people and the region. Sinwar was six years old when a guerrilla named Yasser Arafat made a decision that changed the course of action against Palestine and put it on the agenda of the region’s priorities. That was in March 1968. The Israeli government decided to control fighters who left Jordan to invade the country and carry out attacks. Israel’s Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, considered the matter just a joke, especially after the defeat of the Arab armies the previous year.
Jordanian intelligence received information that Israeli forces were preparing to attack the town of Karama. Jordanian Major General Mashhour Haditha Al-Jazi gave the information to the leaders of the existing Palestinian groups, including Yasser Arafat. It was highly unlikely that the Palestinian factions would be able to repel the attack with their small arms. The logical decision in such a situation was for the Palestinian fighters to withdraw from Al Karama to avoid defeat.
Arafat decided to sail on the other side of the stream. With his high political awareness, he realized that the Palestinian revolution needed a baptism of fireto assert its legitimacy and acquire an aura that had retreated from the forces due to the lose He decided to keep the forces in Karama. At dawn on March 21, Israel carried out a landing operation on the hills surrounding the city, and Dayan almost achieved what he dreamed of, if the artillery of the Jordanian army had not intervened with precision and professionalism. , and the attackers suffered losses in life and vehicles, which had prompted the Israeli side to request a ceasefire 18 hours after the start of the battle and withdraw to previous lines.
I heard from Ahmed Jibril that he told Arafat before the attack began that Al-Karama was “militarily useless” and was not allowed to be located inside. Arafat refused to withdraw, and the result was the death of about a hundred people. The day after the Israeli withdrawal, Arafat was saying again, “This is huge … this is huge.” The lyrics are from Gabriel.
The Battle of Karama sparked Arab street enthusiasm. Thousands volunteered in the Fatah movement and aid poured in. Arafat made a costly decision, but he succeeded in bringing about a revolution in the Palestinian situation. The Battle of Karama opened the doors of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s office for him, which he took with him to the Soviet Union, and later Arafat’s keffiyeh became the most attractive place in the region.
In the beginning, Arafat dreamed of what Sinwar is dreaming of now, which is “getting back every inch of Palestine.” ” But after what Abu Ammar heard in Moscow, Cairo, and many capitals, and as a result of long battles and many sacrifices, he decided that the Palestinians must deal with reality and the balance of power, and therefore the dream for the establishment of a Palestinian state side by side. Israeli crystals.
Did Sinwar, through the “Al-Aqsa flood”, find a legend similar to the one Arafat found in the “Battle of Dignity”? Was the “flood” a prisoner exchange project or a war project that would bring the conflict back to its roots when it started? In 2011, Hamas agreed to release the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, whom it had held five years earlier. The release came within the framework of an exchange agreement under which Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including a violent prisoner named Yahya Al-Sinwar. The question that arises is why Sinwar did not plan to detain a bunch of Israeli soldiers to force the Netanyahu government to release thousands of Palestinian prisoners? Detaining one or more Israeli soldiers would not have given Netanyahu the opportunity to launch a devastating and genocidal war.
Did Sinwar forget that the events of the “Flood” would surely lead to war, or was he looking for a major earthquake, whatever the costs? Did he expect, for example, that the earthquake would lead to a quick revolution in the West Bank that would destroy what was left of the Palestinian Authority born from the Oslo ink? Did he think that the earthquake will quickly turn into a full-scale war on the Lebanese front that would require Iranian intervention? Did the surgeon of the “flood” expect that his events will accelerate the publication of the “main strike,” that is, a shower of missiles on Israel from several maps, including Iran? Was the “flood” a project of a long war of deception with the help of the allies in the “axis of resistance”? Is it concern about this war of deception that makes Netanyahu invoke the specter of a regional war to impose a ceasefire on both sides after the destruction of Gaza, which is the Palestinian side of the “axis of resistance”?
The politician preceded the “general” in the person of “Abu Ammar.” The “general” is clearly ahead of the politician in the person of Sinwar. Then came the “flood” in a world different from the one in which the “Battle of Dignity” took place. American destroyers are on alert to respond to any attack on Israel. Iran does not want a regional war. How does the Hamas General return from the war, knowing that a cease-firea is more severe than shooting?
#general #politician #AlSanwar #Abu #Ammar
2024-08-13 08:24:05
