Home » World » The deal with CEZ brought a serious problem for Borisov’s reputation – 2024-08-02 11:42:14

The deal with CEZ brought a serious problem for Borisov’s reputation – 2024-08-02 11:42:14

/ world today news/ Paradoxically, the scandal united the governing coalition GERB-“United Patriots”, says political scientist Georgi Kiryakov

– Mr. Kiryakov, if the “CHEZ – “Inercom” case is a test of management, what did it show?

– Neither the rulers nor the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov personally predicted that this case would grow in such a way and develop to such an extent. They overestimated their own capabilities and underestimated the situation. They believed that during the European presidency, attention would be focused on more important topics such as the Western Balkans, Boyko Borisov’s foreign policy initiatives, rather than on a topic presented as harmless relations between two private economic entities. Perhaps this underestimation did not allow them to react adequately.

– Where did the greater underestimation come from – from the state and its structures or from the governing political factors?

– There was certainly a catalyst to the process, and it came from both political and economic players that this deal made losers. They wanted to participate but lost the battle to acquire these assets. There are two companies that participated in the auction, close to political headquarters and business interests, which were rejected. The possibility of society reacting in this highly critical manner was vastly underestimated. This is also the second and more important factor that showed that the rulers underestimated the case.

– And what is behind the changed position of the authorities – for the state to acquire a share of CEZ?

– The whole scandal went through three distinct phases. The first was the phase of denial: there is no such thing, we do not interfere, we do not know what is going on, the decisions are made in another country under other laws, we have no right to interfere. The second phase of reaction was retreat. On all fronts, the rulers tried to escape from the social tension that had arisen. Prime Minister Borissov denied having any involvement in the deal, shifted the blame to “these bastards”, looked for an external enemy: Russian-Georgian interests. And he tried to buy time to regroup inside the party and in the government to find the right response to the public reaction. The third phase is the counteroffensive. After pulling themselves together and overcoming the initial shock, they also found the right formula to get out of the situation.

– What was that formula?

– First, all institutions were harnessed to demonstrate determination and a decisive reaction. The second line included proposals to satisfy public sentiments – they suggested nationalizing the share acquired by “Inercom”.

– Isn’t this decision contradicting itself, since it was the first cabinet “Borisov” who sold the last shares of the state in CEZ? And in fact, a decision is being made, for which the Bulgarian taxpayers will pay.

– The debate on the case was distorted to such an extent and the relations between two private entities were problematized that the state had to make a decision that endangered the rulers as little as possible. Once the public wishes to somehow regain control of a defining enterprise or strategic infrastructure, the Prime Minister is required to make a decision.

– Is the company taking back control, or political brokers who will appoint their own people to the board of the company?

– On the surface it looks like society will take back control. But beneath the surface, it is clear that any state-acquired control over assets will enable yet another brokering by the political elite in order to acquire influence, either financially or electorally. In this case, both. Still, party functionaries or people close to power will enter the board, they will be in high positions, with large salaries, and they will have to thank for all this. But on the surface it seems that the state will take better care of the management of strategic assets important for national security and for nearly 3 million subscribers in Western Bulgaria.

– Did the BSP, as an opposition, succeed in exploiting the weakness of the government, or is it complicit in blurring the debate?

– The BSP took its public focus and brought it into a parliamentary framework – a battle between the ruling party and the opposition. Because in this situation society turned out to be in opposition to the rulers. The situation had the potential to topple the administration. BSP does not have the potential and capacity to be publicly recognized as a real opposition to the government. Not least because the leaders of the left are vulnerable to their past. Cornelia Ninova can be attacked very easily. Things that GERB have been talking about for years now came out of Ginka Varbakova’s mouth: “How can a young lady from the village of Krushovitsa acquire Technoimpex at the age of 28”. That is why the BSP easily loses battles that have been dragged into the parliamentary ruts.

In all this opposition, however, the figure of President Rumen Radev appeared. It turned out to be really recognized as an alternative. Public expectations for building a clear alternative to the administration of Boyko Borisov will revolve around him, although he does not have such an opportunity, institutionally he cannot play this role. But as a person, societal expectations are to enter it. It was also seen during celebrations on Mount Shipka – Kornelia Ninova glued to President Radev. BSP is trying to gain from the situation around CEZ through the authority of the president.

– How will these quantitative accumulations of scandals in management affect its qualitative change?

– Paradoxically, the situation around CEZ united the ruling coalition between GERB and the United Patriots. The patriots would suffer the most from the fall of the cabinet, that’s why they also categorically stood behind GERB in this scandal and quite tactfully withdrew, leaving the initiative to control the negative effects of the party to Boyko Borisov. The other paradox is that GERD has not yet overcome the public distrust created by this situation. My personal sociological surveys of the sentiments of people around me show that they firmly believe that Boyko Borisov is behind the deal with CEZ. This reputational problem, which the prime minister created for himself with the scandal, will be very difficult to overcome – regardless of whether the country will enter CEZ or not. In all cases, in terms of image, Boyko Borisov is the main loser. Such a belief in people cannot be so quickly changed. Not only are you not at fault, but you are not part of the deal. In the short and medium term Borisov personally will suffer electoral losses because he failed to answer the questions of who is really behind this deal and because he did not do everything possible to prevent it despite all doubts.

– Where will these electoral fluids go?

– With the BSP – unlikely, with the president – temporarily. With a third new political player that may appear – very likely. I don’t want to mention names, but it is possible that because of the situation, the political engineers will create a new entity to sweep away all the negativity. We see the elections in Italy, where political gridlock and chaos in public consciousness are channeled into new forms of political participation. In my opinion, if after the EU presidency, GERB does not go for early elections, the litmus test for a new political situation will be the elections for the European Parliament.

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* Georgi Kiryakov is a political scientist. He graduated from SU “St. Kliment Ohridski”. He specializes in organizational development of parties and electoral practices.

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