How did Army Major General Chun Doo-hwan, who trampled on the ‘Seoul Spring’, succeed in a coup?
Security commander Chun Doo-gwang (Hwang Jung-min) in the movie ‘Spring in Seoul’. Provided by Plus M Entertainment
The movie ‘Spring in Seoul’ deals with the military rebellion led by the new military regime, including Chun Doo-hwan, on December 12, 1979. This film focuses on the nine-hour struggle between the new military government that staged a coup and the suppression forces trying to stop it from the evening of December 12th to the early morning of the 13th. How was Chun Doo-hwan, who was only a major general in the Army and the commander of security forces at the time, able to carry out a coup? This question can be answered with the keywords ‘security commander’ and ‘Hanahoe’. Since the 1960s, the Korean military has had double and triple measures in place to prevent coups. Since former President Park Chung-hee himself came to power through the May 16 coup in 1961, he created thorough safety measures to prevent a recurrence of the coup. The core mission of the Security Service, of which Chun Doo-hwan was commander, was the mission of counter-attack. ‘Overthrow’ refers to a coup. Simply put, the mission to subvert is to prevent a coup. The concept of the security company’s anti-subversion mission is not to find and eliminate threats of subversion, but to detect signs of subversion and eliminate them in advance, or to find and manage conditions in which subversion threats may occur, thereby preventing the formation of threats themselves. In order to nip coups in the bud, the security agency meticulously monitors the official and unofficial contacts and trends of major military commanders. Wired and wireless calls of major military commanders are also intercepted 24 hours a day. Former President Park Chung-hee appointed a truly trustworthy person as security commander. Chun Doo-hwan, who served as commander of the Army’s 1st Division, was appointed commander of the Security Command in March 1979. This is because Captain Chun Doo-hwan was selected by General Park Chung-hee immediately after the May 16 coup in 1961 and was a close confidant of Park Chung-hee early on, serving as the civil affairs secretary in the office of the chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. If a coup occurs despite the security agency’s coup prevention measures, the Capital Security Command stationed in Chungmuro, Seoul at the time in 1979 or the Special Operations Command in Songpa-gu, Seoul, suppress the coup forces that entered Seoul. These units are also called anti-tank mission units. This coup prevention and suppression system existed on December 12, 1979, but it failed to prevent the military rebellion of the new military government. This is because Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan, who was supposed to prevent the coup, was the coup leader. In ‘Seoul Spring’, the security agency eavesdrops on the military communication network and closely monitors the movements of the suppression forces to respond. The new military government misused the authority to wiretap military communication networks granted to the security agency to prevent a coup. It was like entrusting the fish shop to a cat. Some commanders of the Special Forces and Defense Forces who were in charge of the anti-tank unit took on the role of commanders of the military rebellion. While trying to suppress the military rebellion, Special Forces Commander Jeong Byeong-ju’s subordinates, 1st Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Park Hee-do, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang, and 5th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Jang Ki-oh, betrayed themselves and pointed their guns at their immediate superiors.
The main forces of the new military government, including Chun Doo-hwan (fifth from the left, front row) and Roh Tae-woo (fourth), who succeeded in the coup on December 12, 1979, took a commemorative photo celebrating their victory at Boansa Temple the next day. <제5공화국전사>
The reason they were able to carry out a coup, ignoring the normal chain of command and mission, was because they were tightly connected to a private organization called Hanahoe. In 1963, under the leadership of the 11th class of the Korean Military Academy, including Chun Doo-hwan, Jeong Ho-yong, Roh Tae-woo, and Kim Bok-dong, a private organization within the military called ‘Hanahoe’ was formed. At the time of December 12, 1979, the main members of the security forces, special forces, and security forces were Hanahae. Hanahoe originally claimed to be President Park Chung-hee’s personal guard organization and grew into power under President Park’s protection. President Park and Hanahoe had a relationship like a host and parasite. When President Park died on October 26, 1979, Hanahe, a parasitic organism, launched the December 12 military revolt to take over as the host. As soon as President Kim Young-sam took office, he began to eliminate Hanahoe. On March 8, 1993, 11 days after his inauguration, President Kim changed the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander of the Defense Security Command, and purged Hanahoe, Yulgok corruption, personnel corruption, and preparatory measures for those involved in the December 12 military coup. . This process of eradicating Hanahoe was sarcastically called a ‘surprise show’, but civilian government officials refute that it was an inevitable measure under the circumstances at the time. “In the winter of 1979, the December 12 incident occurred when the plan to send Security Command Commander Chun Doo-hwan to the East Sea Security Command was leaked. President Kim Young-sam could not help but care about this. Among the military generals appointed during the Roh Tae-woo administration at the beginning of its inauguration, there were very few that President Kim could trust. “If the civilian government did not compromise and live together with Hanahoe, it would have no choice but to take the sword without any time to catch its breath in the early days of its administration.” President Kim Young-sam also revealed in a media interview in August 1999 after leaving office that the resolution of Hanahae was a life-or-death approach, saying, “If we hadn’t done this, there would have been no civilian government and no Kim Dae-jung government. “It’s obvious it was a coup,” he said. In the summer of 1993, when the civilian government was launched, rumors of a coup began to spread among intelligence agencies, the military, and the Blue House. Rumors began to spread that some generals belonging to Hanahoe, who had been pushed out of their posts, were preparing for a coup by taking on different roles, such as raising funds and mobilizing troops. As the rumor of the ‘Hanahoe coup plot’ spread, the government closely monitored the movements of the generals and people around them who were likely to lead the coup, wiretapping them, and searched bank accounts to find out where the coup was financed. Although it ended up being nothing more than a rumor, the coup theory hovered over Seoul like a ghost until the end of 1993. Until the mid-1990s, when the political situation became unstable, the possibility of military intervention arose. Various opinion polls around this time showed that the military was considered the most influential group in Korean politics. However, a coup is considered impossible in Korean society after 2000. Above all, this is because Korean society has changed. Korean society has become diverse and mature politically, economically, and socially. The situation for the military to play a leading role has passed.
On August 26, 1996, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo wore shrouds and waited for their first trial sentencing hearing on charges of the December 12 Military Uprising. <한겨레> File photo
Even if, by chance, some political soldiers stage a coup and succeed in taking power temporarily, they cannot take power permanently and will be punished after completing their term. During the Kim Young-sam administration, the prosecution stated regarding the December 12 military uprising, “A successful coup cannot be punished.” As public resistance against this intensified, the National Assembly passed a special law on the May 18 Democratization Movement in 1995, and Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were indicted. In April 1997, the Supreme Court’s final ruling sentenced Chun Doo-hwan to life in prison and Roh Tae-woo to 17 years in prison. A precedent was set that even successful coups would be punished. There is no private organization within the military that can carefully plan and execute a coup, even violating the official chain of command, like Hanahoe did in the past. After the civilian government, the principle of civilian control of the military became mainstream. Civilian control is a method in which the political power (president) and civilian bureaucrats (minister of defense) elected by the people lead and decide on security policies, and the military, a group of security experts, supports this with military operations. The Democratic Army is a group of security experts who focus only on the military’s original mission under the premise of political neutrality. ‘Spring in Seoul’ reminds us again that democratic forces and coups are incompatible. Reporter Kwon Hyuk-cheol nura@hani.co.kr
