Demonstration in October 2019, in London. – James Veysey / REX / SIPA
- The divorce between London and Brussels will take place this Friday evening, although negotiations will continue during the year 2020.
- Brexit represents a “historic” and “symbolic” break between the UK and Europe, said Robert Frank, a specialist in international affairs.
- But it is mainly part of a British comings and goings which does not date from yesterday.
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We made it this time. More than three years after the referendum “leave” victory on Brexit, the
UK tell good-bye, this Friday, at
European Union. Fruit of the long negotiations between London and Brussels – and repeated procrastination across the Channel – the divorce will be made in the evening. A half-century-old page will therefore turn, while the
separation details will be discussed at least until the end of 2020.
Is this British exit, however spectacular, surprising in terms of history? In other words, are the British (were) Europeans like the others? To answer, 20 minutes met with historian Robert Frank, professor emeritus at Paris-I Panthéon Sorbonne University, specialist in Europe and international relations and author, in particular, of the book To be or not to be European *.
Does Brexit, signed on January 31, represent a real historic break?
It has to be. And it is also very symbolic, since there will be spectacular demonstrations of this departure, with parties organized by the supporters of Brexit. In practice, however, this exit will not change much: the United Kingdom will no longer be in the European institutions, but will still be in the customs union and the single market, and will have to follow the rules until that an agreement is reached… wherever that No Deal be noted. So this is a historic break, but where we have to qualify this point is that the comings and goings of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis Europe are not new.
In your book, you show that this relationship is punctuated by reversals…
It has been going on for three centuries. One might ask: are the British Europeans? And the answer makes it possible to understand their behavior: the British are European, but apart. I don’t think it’s related to their insularity. For example, Scottish, who are part of Britain, voted against Brexit. Likewise, the Irish in the Republic of Ireland want to stay in the EU.
Instead of geography, we should therefore look at history. The English, more than the Scots or the Irish, are attached to their past imperial greatness. There is a nostalgia for this lost Empire. This is where the Brexiters played. When they are outside Europe, the British are often uncomfortable because they feel European. And when they’re in, they’re looking out. Hence this back and forth.
What past examples can illustrate this?
This feeling of unease dates back to long before the European construction of theafter 1945. From the 17th century, the “European system” was formed: the great powers sought a balance to prevent war. For example, in 1815, during the
Vienna Congress, it is the British who are at the helm. But a few years later, when the Austrian Empire, Prussia and France wanted to intervene in Spain after a revolt against the Bourbons, the British did not intervene.
Another example: at the start of the 20th century, two European blocs clashed. England ends up with France and Russia (the Triple Entente), facing the German Empire, Austria and Italy. After the Sarajevo attack throughout July 1914, the British refused to commit. And it was finally the invasion of Belgium, a neutral country, which pushed them to declare war on Germany.
The guiding thread of the British can therefore be this European identity “apart”, but also a very pragmatic political culture, which focuses on the present without always anticipating the future. The perfect illustration was in 1959, when the United Kingdom launched theEuropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in response to the common market of the six[the
European Economic Community, EEC]. Two years later, he realizes that he trades much more with the other market, and requests his membership. Such reversals are likely to occur in the future.
Is a return then possible, taking into account this “pragmatism” of the United Kingdom?
This pragmatism can be, paradoxically, unrealistic. And since 2016 in the United Kingdom, this unrealism goes very far. The social and political crisis – which we find across Europe – makes the British sensitive to fake news, to a certain self. Anything bad goes to Brussels. Many Britons do not seem to face reality, hence the contradictions.
Example: the electorate who voted for Brexit looks a little, on the continent, like a populist electorate: people who are rather seduced by the withdrawal of identity and anti-globalization. So there may be, at some point, a gap between the UK’s globalist elites and this electorate. In summary, Boris Johnson is a globalist, his constituents not. We don’t have this contradiction: Marine Le Pen is not a globalist, neither is Viktor Orban. Difficult to predict the future, because Boris Johnson is unpredictable. His interest would be to be careful and make a fairly Brexit “ soft ‘. Because in case of “ No Deal », this would mean, for the United Kingdom, a trade war with its main supplier and its main customer. The harder the Brexit, the more likely it is that Scotland will become independent.
Who has been most weakened by this interminable Brexit soap opera? The United Kingdom or the European Union?
The Union’s 27 were fairly united. But there could be disunity because we are entering the hard part of negotiations, and the devil is in the details. If the EU is disunited, paradoxically, it will not be good for Boris Johnson, because unanimity will be difficult to find.
On the British side, the kingdom is rather disunited, especially on the Scottish side. This raises the question of identities. Each European has three: regional, national and European. In most countries, national identity is the strongest. And of the three, among all Europeans, it is the weakest European. But that doesn’t mean it doesn’t count. Many Scots hesitate and say to themselves, “If the English force us to choose between British and European identity, maybe this time we will take the second one.”
In Europe, there is the image of a “profiteer” United Kingdom vis-à-vis the continent. Is this a historical reality?
There is a bit of truth, and it comes back to pragmatism. The British conceive of democracy for themselves, and the others do what they want, it’s not their problem. It’s the difference with democracy in France and in United States. French and Americans do it for them, but also think they can be a good example for others. In Europe, it’s a bit the same. The British say to themselves: “We take what is good for us. The euro, we don’t want it, so we stay out. ” But neither should the British contribution be underestimated. If the European community – and then the European Union – has become so economically liberal, they have something to do with it. On the other hand, the British, like the French, are concerned with European security, with the military aspect.
You are French, born in Scotland. Have you questioned your identity through Brexit?
As soon as we talk about identity, there are two postures that seem to me open to criticism. The first is to say that it should not be talked about, that it is a dangerous subject, that it is the extreme right … I do not think so. The second is to consider identity as something set in stone. But identities exist and are moving. All those who see a unique and sectarian identity are mistaken.
* To be or not to be European, the British and Europe from the 17th century to Brexit, Belin editions, October 2018
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