Supreme Court Revokes Decision on Compensation Fund Discounts

The Supreme Court revoked the sentence handed down by the Court of Iquique, which rejected the appeal for protection filed against a Compensation Fund, for arbitrarily deducting from the appellant’s remuneration the installments of a social credit given to the actor, and instead accepted the precautionary action.

The appellant maintained that the respondent filed a civil lawsuit – a process currently filed – and that, having opted to collect his credit through judicial means, he accelerated the entire credit, which was no longer represented in installments, so that it could not be The contested discounts must be made, but must proceed in accordance with the judicial collection already initiated; Therefore, partialities discounted “by spreadsheet” violate equality before the law and the property right of the actor.

In its report, the Compensation Fund urged the rejection of the precautionary action, arguing that the collection made from the remuneration is a power granted by article 22 of Law No. 18,833, in the face of credits currently payable such as that owed by the appellant.

The Court of Iquique dismissed the appeal for protection, considering that, “(…) the constitutional action cannot prosper because the fact that the debt has been subject to knowledge by a civil court, even when the procedure has been concluded and archived, does not prevent the application of article 22 of Law No. 18,833, since the aforementioned norm does not contemplate said exception, and for this reason it allows the Compensation Fund to pay its debt through a discount in its remunerations, not only because the obligation is not prescribed, but because it is a legal mechanism especially contemplated in the law for social credits.”

The decision was revoked by the highest court, after reasoning that, “(…) Such benefit, in kind, was inadmissible, as a result of the appealed party having opted for judicial means to obtain collection, so said creditor entity was not authorized to make the discounts made to the worker, but rather had to abide by what was resolved there in relation to the credit granted, or exercise the corresponding ordinary actions, thus its current decision to require payment through the special route becomes whimsical, without prejudice, as stated, to their right to pursue the obligation by ordinary legal means.”

The ruling concludes by maintaining that, “(…) this procedure of the respondent is manifestly arbitrary, since through it the Compensation Fund ignores the existence of the appropriate procedural means to obtain satisfaction of its credit, so it is appropriate that grant protection to the plaintiff, otherwise the appealed institution will obtain recognition of the jurisdiction, which affirms an abusive method of exercising its powers by a private entity that provides a public assistance service.”

In light of the above, the Supreme Court revoked the appealed ruling, accepted the appeal for protection and ordered the respondent to refrain from continuing with the discounts on the actor’s remuneration.

The decision was agreed with the vote against Minister Jean Pierre Matus, who urged confirmation of the appealed ruling considering that, “(…) this dissident has come to the conviction that the use of the collection mechanism of article 22 of the Law No. 18,833 is adjusted, in kind, to what is provided there, where no expiration period is established to exercise it, taking into account its peremptory literality when using the phrase “it must be deducted from the remuneration by the employing entity”, referring to “the amount owed for “social credit benefits to a Compensation Fund”, without any alleged non-compliance with the regulations and the circulars of the respective Superintendency that govern this type of collections.

See rulings Supreme Court Rol Nº146.969-2023 and Court of Iquique Rol Nº765-2023.