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At this point it is possible that the Superbonus of 110% will end up in the economic textbooks in the future. But not in the section dedicated to sustainable growth. If something does not change, that incentive could end up in the chapter on what economists call “moral hazard”: the “moral hazard”, the possibility that operators speculate with money and waste it when it is they who can mobilize it but not they are responsible for any inefficiency and for their own errors.
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The private study
At least this is suggested by a recent confidential report of Enea, the agency for sustainable development that monitors incentives for the energy efficiency of buildings.
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Also for the undeniable correctness of the objectives, the Superbonus hardly needs any introduction: introduced by the “Relaunch” decree of the yellow-red government of Giuseppe Conte in May 2020 for expenses incurred up to mid-2022, the measure aims to accelerate building interventions that reduce carbon emissions and revive the construction sector.
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The mechanism
The second objective is already achieved, thanks to a mechanism that fully covers the cost of ecological interventions on homes and leaves room for owners to monetize their tax credits, selling them to banks in exchange for liquidity. The fact that the deduction exceeds the cost of the works means that there remains some margin to pay a commission to the banks, in order to have undergone a total compensation in cash.
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Now, however, Enea has made an initial assessment. And it is in chiaroscuro, as to the effects that the Superbonus is having in the country.
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The numbers
From the beginning of the year to 23 September, 38 thousand projects were admitted, while for the entire year 51 thousand projects are estimated, for investments mobilized of 7.9 billion and a cost for the State of 8.7 billion euros (this the latter is higher precisely because the bonus is 110%). This is a strong acceleration compared to last year, when there were less than two thousand interventions for a public expenditure of just over two hundred million.
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The comparison
Therefore, investments in construction have been reactivated. But at what costs, with what impacts and to whose benefit? To understand this, Enea draws a comparison with the Ecobonus in force in Italy from 2014 to 2020, which had a mechanism similar to the Superbonus and a difference: the deduction was only 65%; in other words, the owner of a property had something to lose if his work was done inefficiently and at inflated costs, because for a third party he had to pay out of his own pocket without public compensation. In short, the private sector was co-responsible for the good management of money. It is no coincidence that the investment with the Ecobonus was more contained, at 3.3 billion euros per year on average.
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The environmental impact
So what are the differences with the Superbonus? The first is in the environmental impact because, according to Enea, the old Ecobonus seems to have been more efficient in reducing polluting emissions. With the current measures, the environmental effectiveness is about 28% lower for every euro invested and in fact, even if spending more than twice as much as before, we only get modest additional reductions in emissions.
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The speculative bubble
Then there are the signs of a speculative bubble: some are taking advantage of the fact that less attention is paid to costs, because the government will pay so much through public debt. Enea shows that the cost for each single insulating wall, for each single frame, solar shading or new generation heating system has doubled or even tripled with the current Superbonus compared to the Ecobonus in force until mid-2020. undoubtedly due to the strong increase in demand. Perhaps, however, some force on prices and find little resistance, because the property owner knows that he will be fully compensated.
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Enea estimates that the average increase on condensing boilers is 286%, on solar shading it is 225% and on window frames 208%.
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I fondi del Recovery
These indications are likely to have consequences, because the Superbonus is financed for 13.9 billion with the European funds of the Recovery. The EU Commission will have to examine the dossier and may hesitate to give the green light to the disbursements, if it sees that the unit costs of the interventions are double or triple compared to the rest of Europe and the environmental impact is far from efficient.
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Certainly the government has confirmed that the Superbonus 110% will be extended to 2023, because its objectives remain valid. Now, however, the study prepared by Enea could trigger a reflection on how to limit the problems that have emerged so far.
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