“Strategic Counter-Offensive in Ukraine: A Western Perspective on the Challenges and Prerequisites for Success”

Since the beginning of spring, discussions about the start of Ukraine’s strategic counter-offensive have been raging in the world press. Various predictions are made about its necessity, Ukraine’s readiness, the time, place and possible outcome of the counterattack, as well as its impact on the course of the war in general. Without disputing any of these points of view (neither I nor the other commenters have and cannot have the information for a deep analysis), I would still like to help readers organize their thoughts and gain a basis for critical thinking and balanced judgments.

Assuming that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is currently trying to operate in accordance with the planning algorithms (tactical manuals) approved by NATO countries, I offer to look at the situation of launching a counterattack through the eyes of the soldiers (staff) of Western countries, in order to imagine the scope of the problems to be solved and the severity of the decisions that the Ukrainians are currently facing military and political leadership.

According to the algorithm adopted by NATO countries (for example, see “US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations”), in order to conduct a successful offensive operation, the party planning it must meet several prerequisites, some of which can be ignored, completely or partially abandoned, keeping however, keep in mind that this reduces the likelihood of achieving the desired end state (victory). So, to conduct a successful offensive operation, the commander-in-chief and his staff must ensure:

1. Moment of surprise. The place and time of the main attack must be unexpected by the opponent. The Ukrainian army managed to achieve this best in the operation to liberate the Kharkiv region. Let’s remember that shortly before the start of this operation, there were rumors about the liberation of Kherson as the main goal of the Ukrainian army at that time. Russia even moved its best reserve – amphibious troops – to the Kherson region and made a mistake. So now, when we hear often conflicting predictions from Ukrainian officials, experts or influencers about the timeline or direction of a possible counterattack, let’s take it with understanding: in the context of an information war, Ukraine is trying to ensure itself the advantage of the moment of surprise, filling the information space with “noise”, confusing the head for the enemy’s scouts – analysts.

2. Concentration of forces. Instead of a possible front break, the attacking side must ensure an absolutely overwhelming quantitative and qualitative advantage over the opponent. The deeper the opponent has dug in, the greater the advantage should be. 10:1 will not be an exaggeration. In the conditions of Ukraine, it is impossible to implement such a concentration of forces imperceptibly, without degrading the above-mentioned moment of surprise