Exercises with NATO or indirect arms deliveries: Markus Mäder, State Secretary for Security Policy, deals with sensitive issues. Would he like to join NATO?
Since the beginning of the year, militia brigadier Markus Mäder has headed the State Secretariat for Security Policy (Sepos).
Mr Mäder, if the federal government has its way, more Swiss soldiers should train with NATO forces in the future. Do you want to abolish our neutrality?
Such cooperation is not an end in itself; it is about Switzerland’s security. The limits of cooperation are clearly defined and ensure that our neutrality is maintained.
SVP National Councillor Jean-Luc Addor warns that in the worst case scenario, Swiss soldiers might one day have to be sent “to Poland to die”.
This is a complete distortion of the real circumstances. It is about exercises with NATO, not about participation in conflicts. Switzerland strives for a high degree of independence in its security policy. It can do many things, but not everything, on its own.
The SVP, the Greens and the majority of the SP have serious doubts that neutrality will be maintained in the future. The Council of States is discussing a ban on certain exercises this week.
The issue is whether Switzerland may participate in alliance exercises in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This issue is highly emotional.
Please explain what these exercises are specifically about.
NATO states are practicing their mutual obligation to assist one another. If one country is attacked, the others will help. But neither the Federal Council nor NATO intend for Swiss units to take part in defense exercises on NATO’s external front. That is completely out of the question.
What exactly should the Swiss army train with NATO?
We need access to certain training infrastructures abroad that we do not have in Switzerland. For example, our air force only has small training areas in heavily used airspace. Abroad, it can train in its full breadth and depth. We have a similar situation with the ground troops. In highly urbanized, densely populated Switzerland, there are only very small training areas where you can train in a larger context.
So it’s mainly about training grounds?
Not only that. We also want to understand: How do our partners defend themselves? How do they use military and other elements? Can we learn from the armies with operational experience? Armed forces that have to solve complex tasks cannot develop autistically.
Are we also practicing the worst-case scenario? Switzerland is attacked, neutrality is lost, we want to defend ourselves together with NATO forces and therefore need to be able to fight alongside them . . .
That is also an element. We have been building up our ability to cooperate with NATO for almost three decades within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. We want to deepen this. However, the demanded ban on alliance exercises is probably based on false premises.
What do you mean?
Since the war in Ukraine, NATO has been conducting more and more exercises known as “Article 5”. This is because the alliance is once again focusing on deterrence and defence capability. But within these exercises there are elements in which partner states such as Switzerland can also train. These parts are not about deterrence or defence, but about crisis management and collective security. It is therefore still in our interest to assess, if we are invited to these exercises, whether this will benefit Switzerland or whether we can use it to strengthen our own security and distribution policy. If the Federal Council decides to do so, we will take part in the selected exercise or sub-exercise.
How should we imagine such exercise elements? Please give an example.
There is an exercise that deals with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. As Switzerland, we would like to take part in certain training elements. This is the only way our experts can find out whether they are as good as our partners in the field of nuclear, biological and chemical defence or where we still have weaknesses. But if it were banned, we would have to forego the entire exercise because it falls under the Article 5 label, because at some point during the exercise, countries will train how to defend themselves together. And at this stage of the exercise at the latest, Switzerland will no longer be involved.
According to SP National Councillor Fabian Molina, Switzerland could continue to participate in selected elements if the alliance exercises were banned.
The Federal Council sees things differently; many exercises with our partners would no longer be possible. For security policy reasons, it is not advisable to impose unnecessary additional restrictions.
“It is not only Ms Amherd’s wish to intensify cooperation with our European partners,” says State Secretary Markus Mäder.
When you call NATO countries “our partners,” you are signaling a certain sense of belonging. How does that fit in with neutrality?
Switzerland takes the position of international law. The federal government’s foreign policy strategy states that Switzerland has a very clear interest in maintaining the rules-based international order in which conflicts are resolved peacefully. This is in the best interests of our security and our economic and social relations with the world. At the same time, we are neutral because we do not provide military support to any party in an international, armed conflict.
According to the SVP, Switzerland is already a “war party” because we have accepted the EU sanctions. Do exercises with NATO reinforce such fears?
Nowhere in the law of neutrality does it say that one may not take on sanctions or practice with partners. It is forbidden to join a military alliance or to support a party to a conflict.
Parliament is discussing the lifting of the re-export restrictions on military equipment. The question is whether countries like Germany or Denmark can pass on military equipment purchased in Switzerland to Ukraine after five years. Up to now, this has been prohibited for reasons of neutrality. Are you in favor of relaxing the restrictions?
Parliament decides that. From a security policy perspective, one can say that it would be in Switzerland’s interest if our partners saw us as a reliable supplier of military equipment. We need a strong arms industry that can supply the Swiss army. There are already countries that are publicly saying that, under these circumstances, they are no longer prepared to consider Swiss arms products or arms companies. Germany is the most recent example of this.
Parliamentarians criticise the fact that VBS representatives like you interfere too much in political discussions.
In the end, it is politics that decides, that is clear. The federal government is calling on us to advise our bosses on security policy.
Are you just advising Ms Amherd, or are you proactively supporting her pro-European policy?
It is not only Ms Amherd’s wish to intensify cooperation with our European partners, but also the position of the Federal Council as a whole. It has already outlined this in the 2021 Security Policy Report and the 2022 Supplementary Report . . .
. . . which you support, as does the study commission set up by the VBS. Their neutrality policy recommendations read like Mrs. Amherd’s wish list.
The study commission was broadly supported by representatives from academia, the army, civil protection, business, diplomacy and the peace movement. And the creation of the State Secretariat for Security Policy (Sepos), which I head, is an expression of the realization that the security situation has become more unpredictable. In order to master it, various areas such as intelligence, cyber defense and civil protection must be included. The Sepos provides the basis for this joint task.
And did you succeed? Civil security politicians like Josef Dittli of the FDP criticize the fact that the Federal Council still lacks an overall security policy strategy.
Yes, there are. We have several bases that are still valid, such as the 2021 Security Policy Report, the 2022 Supplementary Report, or various responses to motions from Parliament. If you are prepared to read the various documents together, there is a clear plan.
That sounds a bit confusing.
You have to understand: Security policy is not simply prescribed top-down by the Federal Council in a single government document. Rather, all relevant actors are involved: the federal government, the cantons, parliament, scientists. This is a Swiss process. Finding consensus in Swiss security policy has become more difficult. Not only because of the difficult security situation, but also because billions of francs are at stake.
Left-wing politicians such as Marionna Schlatter and Franziska Roth accuse the federal government of unnecessarily unsettling the population with its threat scenarios. Instead of expensive tanks, more cyber defense and international cooperation are needed, among other things.
We are assessing the situation. And of course the cyber area is also part of strengthening defence capabilities. And international cooperation is at the heart of our efforts.
What do you say to the criticism that the federal government is basing its security policy on overly dire threat scenarios?
Are you seriously asking this question?
Naturally.
But of course we have a work and professional ethic. We do not exaggerate risks, but rather assess the security situation objectively and as realistically as possible.
What is Switzerland’s biggest security risk?
That the world is developing in a direction where the rules are no longer being followed. This would be particularly threatening for small, internationally networked states and would lead to various crises that we would have to deal with simultaneously. In order to become resilient to such risks, Switzerland needs cooperation with partners who are committed to the same rules-based world.
That doesn’t sound like we have to expect enemy tanks on the Rhine?
We are seeing an increase in hybrid conflict management, for example in the form of disinformation and influence activities. The likelihood of an armed attack has also increased as the situation has deteriorated.
Hand on heart, Mr Mäder, wouldn’t you prefer to simply join NATO like Sweden in order to protect Switzerland against the various threats?
The Federal Council and Parliament set the overarching parameters. They are not seeking to join NATO.
We ask the question differently: You are developing the security policy strategy for 2025. Will NATO membership be an issue there?
No, joining NATO is not an issue.
