ANP extension
All Dutch universities and universities of applied sciences are doing this: collaborating with institutions or scientists from abroad. But that is not without risk. China and Russia in particular appear to be interested in high-quality Dutch technology, they warn. And the Netherlands is not paying enough attention to this.
The security services and the National Coordinator for Security and Counter-Terrorism Monday notified all for espionage and theft of technology. Tomorrow, the Science, Technology and Innovation Advisory Council (AWTI) will issue urgent advice on ‘knowledge security’ to Education Minister Robbert Dijkgraaf: More awareness is needed.
International cooperation
The advisory board spoke to scientists, administrators, companies and government. “People are not sufficiently aware of the increased complexity and risks associated with international cooperation and often do not know how to deal with those risks,” the council says.
For years, cooperation with Dutch universities, universities of applied sciences and other research institutes from abroad has been stimulated and encouraged by the government. For example, education delegations regularly left for China. International cooperation is also important for the quality of scientific research.
But this collaboration also attracts parties that have other plans with the knowledge they gather here. According to the intelligence services, which warn not only about China but also about Russia, “Dutch companies, educational institutions and knowledge institutes have their own high-quality and unique knowledge competence. This makes the Netherlands an attractive target for espionage activities.”
Past incidents confirm that image: so it had been Russian spies access to Dutch high-tech companies and a knowledge institute. There were measures against Iranian students and researchers in the Netherlands to prevent them from divulging sensitive information to Iran. And it became a chair in Groningen partially funded by China. The contract even stipulated that the professor was not allowed to damage China’s image.
NOS and Nieuwsuur recently investigated Russian spies and discovered their identity and activities:
“Until recently, if you wanted to partner with China, you could raise tons of research funding from research funders,” says Eppo Bruins, president of AWTI. “And there were hardly any conditions. We were naïve and have now quickly learned that not all cooperation is good.”
Starting this year, universities and colleges that have questions about knowledge security can address a government office. “We’ve now used it several dozen times,” says Peter Weijland, director of the knowledge security program at TU Delft. “These are mainly borderline cases where we at the university cannot easily give the final verdict because it is, for example, a gray area.”
Knowledge institutions also use the China Defense Universities Tracker of the Australian think tank ASPI. “There you can see the extent to which a Chinese university is intertwined with the Communist Party or conducts research for the People’s Liberation Army,” explains knowledge security project manager Bart van den Berg of Utrecht University.
Not all shutters close
Completely ending cooperation with China is not an option. “It wouldn’t be right to build the wall against China or any other country,” said AWTI’s Bruins. ‘Science and innovation thrive on open collaboration. The idea is to collaborate where possible and not collaborate where the risks are too great.’
Weijland of TU Delft also points out that knowledge institutions need other countries for scientific research. “I would therefore like to warn that we don’t just close all the shutters.”
