Soviet Purge in Bulgaria: Traicho Kostov and the Communist Party’s Struggle for Power

4,030 Soviet special forces enter by ship via Varna to begin the purge against Traicho Kostov

At the end of 1948, it became clear that Traicho Kostov had been hiding commercial data from the Soviet Union. The truth is that he refers to the newly adopted Law on State Secrets and refuses to tell the Soviet ambassador in Sofia Bodrov at what prices our country trades, mainly tobacco and agricultural goods, with Western European countries and at what prices with the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian tells him that this is not a phone conversation, and expects to clarify things face to face. Instead, Bodrov complained to Stalin that the Bulgarians were hiding important information from the USSR and that this was a manifestation of hostile behavior. From July to November, Kostov was the de facto leader of the party, as Georgi Dimitrov was in Moscow for treatment. At the beginning of July, the Balkan Federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia came to an end, which was a reflection of Dimitrov’s naive belief that it was time for Bulgaria to play a serious role in international politics, which he stated during a visit to Bucharest in 1947. Before the Romanian Prime Minister Petru Groza he even states that

Romania and even Hungary will join the federation in the future

From January 5 to 8, 1949, at the initiative of the Soviet Union and Romania, a closed economic conference was held in Moscow, where the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was discussed. The delegations of Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary also take part in it. The SIV protocol was signed on January 18. The Bulgarian delegation consists of Vasil Kolarov, Anton Yugov and Dobri Terpeshev, who express the official position: “Agriculture in Bulgaria is extremely overloaded. 130 people work on 1 sq. km of arable land. In the agriculture of our country there will be a surplus of 1 million labor force with a population of 7 million (a little more than those currently living in Bulgaria, b. a.), if it is mechanized.” However, then it is taken into account that the development of the village is not possible without the release of excess labor, which could be done either through emigration or through industrialization. “Industrialization is the necessary condition not only for the development of agriculture, but also for the existence of our people. It will increase the relative share of the working class and strengthen its defensive ability”, not only the Bulgarian leaders, but also the agents of the GRU consider.

In reality, all previous plans for the village have collapsed. Production was projected to increase by 56 percent over 1939, but growth was only 8 percent. A growth of 20% was set for grain, but it turned out to be only 5. Cultivable areas grew by 15 percent. Things are also not going well with the reorganization of the army. The insistence of the Russians is that it be reformed and become a fighting army. This was also the desire of the then Minister of Defense Georgi Damyanov and the Chief of the General Staff Ivan Kinov, but in the Politburo of the party, which actually leads the country, their requests were left without consequence. The moment he realizes that Traicho Kostov is hiding information, Stalin angrily states:

“You want to are you fighting Will be overcome This the Bulgarians soon painfully I will understand

It is obvious that he does not particularly believe in the oaths of his native party leaders for eternal and unbreakable friendship and assigns the chief Russian military adviser in Bulgaria, Lieutenant General A. V. Petrushevski, to describe the situation in our country. The general with his 46th Army took part in the Battle of Kursk, which together with the Battle of Stalingrad turned the tide of the war, then he was one of the leaders of the Iași-Chisinau operation and the capture of Vienna and Prague.

Petrushevski stated that in Bulgaria there were “unhealthy phenomena” both in agriculture and in industry. Weak development of the cooperative movement and the limitation of the “kulaks” – large and medium-sized owners, due to the low level of education of the grassroots cadres and the weak explanatory work about the party’s policy in the villages. In industry, there was a lack of interest among workers due to low wages.

Some people pointed out that the role of the Soviet Union was not so great, because Bulgaria carried out the coup with its own forces, as the general called it, on September 9, relying on the partisan movement for such a claim, Petrushevski wrote in his analysis.

Russian aid after 1944 was expensive, the Bulgarians claimed,

not all materials obtained from there were of high quality.

Here is the place for an exact quote: “I can assume that the persons leading these sentiments are: in the government: the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Traicho Kostov and the Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Yugov.

In the army: the head of the political administration, lieutenant-general Boyan Bulgaranov, the head of the special department, colonel Ignatov, the deputy head of the rear, colonel Bogdanov (Stefan, brother of those shot in the trial in 1942 along with the poet Vaptsarov Petar Bogdanov, b. a.), the commander of the First Guards Division in Sofia, Major General Slavcho Transki, and the commander of the Third Infantry Division, Colonel Djurov (Dobri, future Minister of National Defense, b. a.)

What basis do I have for these assumptions, asks Petrushevski and answers: “About Kostov and Yugov: 1. Kostov and Yugov are Macedonians by nationality, i.e. born in the country, the fate of which has so far been an unsolvable issue between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

In Bulgarian Macedonia, the work of the Yugoslav agency is now particularly developed. 2. The two persons named by me have very little connection with the USSR. All their activities took place in Bulgaria under the leadership of the small partisan movement, which influences its exaggerated importance in the liberation of the country from fascism on 9. XI. 1944

a) Kostov and Yugov should not be trusted.

Georgi Dimitrov knows little about people and it is unnecessary to trust people like Kostov and Yugov.

b) It is desirable to replace the Minister of Internal Affairs, Anton Yugov, with any of the reliable Bolsheviks as soon as possible.

c) Kostov and Yugov support the nationalist sentiments of the generals and officers of the Bulgarian Army.

d) Kostov and the Minister of Trade Dobrev talked about the fact that the goods we send from the Soviet Union are expensive and that there is nothing much to learn from the Soviet Union.

e) In the Central Committee and the Politburo, the issues of building the army and preparing the country for defense do not receive the necessary development, because the proposal of Damyanov and Kinov is not accepted.

One of the most attuned it is nationalistic the commander of the First guards infantry division in Sofia major general Slavcho Turnski

candidate member of the Central Committee of the BRP (k), a prominent partisan commander in Bulgaria, closely connected with many Yugoslav workers, including the former Yugoslav military attaché Lt. Col. Filipović, expelled from Bulgaria for his brazen anti-Titish work, enjoying great support in Central Committee.

Already in October 1948, the chairman of the Club of Patriotic Industrialists Kiril Slavov was arrested. Owners of factories and enterprises nationalized by the law of 23.XII.1947 are members of the club. The idea of ​​the BKP is to help them increase production and thus solve the food problem with basic necessities for the population. It is an admission that the Communists do not have trained people in the production sphere and must learn. After nearly two years, the club was disbanded after it was decided that the “students” proved diligent. In 1948-1949, Slavov’s people were appointed to key positions in the economic and political life of the country. Because the economy is not working, it is they who are blamed. After the torture, Kiril Slavov allegedly admitted what he had to – that the proceedings were being sabotaged. The charges against Traicho Kostov are also being graded. Soon, 12 more people were arrested and in their “testimonies” the two were connected in their destructive activity.

On June 8, 1949, Likhachev and Shvartsman – both from the Special Department of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, headed by Colonel-General Victor Abakumov – flew from Moscow to Sofia. They must assist in the investigation. On June 16, they met with Anton Yugov and told him that Traicho Kostov should be arrested. On June 18, Protocol No. 34 for the arrest of Traicho Kostov was published. On July 31, the two Russians reported that he confessed to his enemy activity, and with the task accomplished they left. During their report in Moscow, they tell Viktor Abakumov that the Bulgarian investigators have little experience and that is why they have not yet arrested Finance Minister Ivan Stefanov and BNB Governor Tsonyu Tsonchev. Schwartzman returns to Sofia with the message to launch a new version – the criminal connections of Traicho Kostov’s group with Tito, but he also makes his own contribution – secret connections with the Yugoslav embassy in Sofia.

An allegedly objective investigation begins, and more than 80 people will be arrested by October. Traicho Kostov was charged with all the blame – from anti-Soviet activity, through secret connections with Tito, conspiracy to kill Georgi Dimitrov and service of the British intelligence. Meanwhile, General Petrushevski proved to be a good prophet. After the death of Georgi Dimitrov on July 2, Vasil Kolarov became the head of the government and the Minister of Defense Anton Yugov was replaced by Rusi Hristozov. Valko Chervenkov became the second person in the party. Due to the “proper” conduct of the investigation and the upcoming trial, Abakumov’s deputy, General Sergey Ogoltsov, also arrived in Sofia in October. The task set for him in Moscow is

ensuring safety in the country during the trial against Traicho Kostov

and helping with the purge in the army. At that time, there were more than 100 Yugoslav officers in leading positions in the Bulgarian army.

On October 17, Ogoltsov and Chervenkov talk about the purges in the army and the Russian says that he does not trust the Bulgarian army. Then it was decided that a regiment of the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of State Security “Spetsnaz” would arrive in Bulgaria. On October 21, 23 and 25, his fighters, a total of 4,030 people, docked in Varna, and from there they found themselves at all key locations, including in front of the Central Committee of the BKP.

Thus safety, as Russians understand it, is ensured. Traicho Kostov, the only one of all the accused, was the scapegoat for all the mistakes of the BKP, the army was reformed, and from then until 1989 no one tried to contradict decisions made in Moscow. On December 16, 1949, Traicho Kostov was hanged.

On December 11, Dimitrov’s mausoleum was opened. In this connection, Valko Chervenkov proposes that 13 Russians, who worked on its construction, be awarded with Bulgarian orders. Among them are the father and son Zbarski, Boris and Ilya, who did the embalming. While discussing the awards, Boris’s wife said that instead of an order, she wanted her husband to be given a Buick car. Valko Chervenkov, however, immediately notified Andrey Gromiko, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. A reply follows from Moscow that they consider the awarding of several Russians incorrect, and for the idea of ​​Academician Zbarski’s wife, they write: “In Moscow, we consider it inexpedient to present a Buick to Academician Zbarski.” Valko Chervenkov performs, Boris Zbarski and his wife get away with the Buick.