To create conditions for the majority of Russian society to start wanting a change of power (it is hoped that the deterioration in the quality of life of Russian society will create the conditions for a change of power). This is theoretical. In addition to these goals, there was a demand from Western society for governments to take action to support Ukraine and punish the aggressor. Decisions were made.
There is no exact answer to the question of whether any sanctions could in themselves change Russia’s geopolitical course. The discussion about the effectiveness of sanctions in the first weeks of the war was left out, because at that time the general sympathy and support for Ukraine was so great that in the event of an economic analysis, the author deviated from the threefold slogan “Glory to Ukraine!” repetition, it was seen as almost a support for Putin and a betrayal of common democratic values. There is now a time when it is possible to rationally assess the consequences of sanctions and to anticipate their future effects.
It is not possible to assess the impact of sanctions on the production of modern weapons due to the secrecy of Russia. There is reason to believe that it is considerably more difficult. On the other hand, as regards the impact of sanctions on overall economic processes, the current results differ from the declared objectives at the time the sanctions were adopted.
It should be noted at the outset that even decades of economic sanctions and economic blockade do not always guarantee the expected results. The United States has maintained economic sanctions and an economic blockade against Cuba for more than 50 years. However, the change in Cuba’s domestic policy did not lead to sanctions. Changes in Cuban domestic politics began only after the authoritarian Cuban leader Fidel Castro (1926-2016) could no longer rule due to his age, and only then did the process of changing power begin and continue, leading to a gradual beginning of transformation in Cuban society.
No economic sanctions have changed the aggressive nature of the North Korean regime.
Iran has been disconnected from the interbank settlement system (SWIFT) for many years, has been severely sanctioned for oil exports, but the nation has not staged an anti-Islamic revolution.
After the Gulf War (1990-1991), a ban on oil exports was imposed on Iraq, but this did not lead to a change of regime. The replacement of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) took place only after the defeat of Iraq by US and Allied forces in 2003.
I am therefore very skeptical whether the existing or even tougher sanctions will lead to a change of regime in Russia. The debate on sanctions, the call for a strong sanctions policy, must be seen more as an internal policy aimed at the public and the electorate in several EU Member States.
Of course, the bloc of sanctions on Russia’s non-admission to high-tech products and the production of modern armaments is very important. In the long run, this will certainly reduce Russia’s ability to mass-produce state-of-the-art weapons.
On the other hand, with sanctions that apply to the economy – restrictions on imports and exports (especially oil and gas), restrictions on settlements – all authoritarian states subject to sanctions have learned to live together over time. This is currently happening with Russia. Those who were accustomed to consuming imported products, yes, the standard of living has fallen. On the other hand, a large part of the Russian population outside St. Petersburg and Moscow does not and cannot have a big change in consumption. Since the first wave of sanctions began in 2014, Russia has supported programs to achieve self-sufficiency in essential food products. In the pig, poultry and other sectors, this level has already been reached. Of course, the additional sanctions of 2022 (which have paralyzed interbank settlements) are already causing a shortage of various components in Russia’s domestic production.
Russia has its own sparkling wine, but does not have its own cork oak bottle caps (they were purchased in Portugal -100% of imports) and does not have its own wire for fixing the corks on the bottle. Ukraine is a big producer of bottles, so there is a lack of packaging, and so on. Output – the cheapest end products will be filled in beer cans. Among other things, in Germany (and not only there) it has been done for a long time, even without any sanctions.
The raw materials for tetrapacks of juice are, no color (100% import). Juice packs will be produced white, but the name of the product with the label will be printed on paper and glued to the juice packet, etc.
Therefore, one should not exaggerate and ask for what is desired. The current and even tougher level of sanctions will not lead to a revolution in authoritarian Russia with a possible change of power. On the contrary, Russia is using Western sanctions to incite xenophobia, citing the United States, NATO and the EU as the cause of both Russia’s existing and long-running economic problems. In addition, the Russian leadership hopes that the economic consequences of anti-Russian sanctions in many EU member states will be so unpleasant that over time they may cause domestic political problems, especially in the largest EU member state, Germany.
However, despite rational arguments, most EU societies are calling on their governments to punish Russia and support Ukraine, so sanctions are not expected to be reduced, but additional restrictions will be discussed.
Although sanctions are unlikely to change Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, they will set in motion an important reform process in the EU.
The biggest benefits for EU Member States from their current policies will be to reduce Russia’s influence in both the EU and Eastern Europe. Energy supplies will be diversified, and the changes that are taking place will lead to both closer EU integration and the elimination of excesses and the creation of a more rational model of economic development.
On the impact of sanctions on the ruble exchange rate and Russia’s financial stability next time.
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