“Russian UltrAnationalists Urge Kremlin to Adopt Stalinist Repressive Measures Amid Ukrainian Counteroffensive”

Russian ultranationalists continue to urge the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist repressive measures. Russian State Duma deputy Andrei Gurulyov – a prominent Russian ultranationalist in the ruling United Russia party – said Russia should reintroduce the term “enemy of the people”.

This is stated in the daily analysis of the front in Ukraine by the Institute for the Study of War.

This concept defined all opposition figures of the late Soviet leader Joseph Stalin as enemies of society. Gurulyov often shares extreme views on Russian state television, but ultranationalists’ rhetoric increasingly emphasizes the need to target and eliminate Russia’s internal enemies.

The Kremlin continues to avoid overtly repressive measures, possibly out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime. The Russian government withdrew from the State Duma a bill that provided increasing taxes from 13 to 30% for Russians who fled the country.

Russian ultranationalists have repeatedly called on the Kremlin to nationalize the property of Russians who have “betrayed” the country by fleeing, but the Kremlin appears to remain hesitant to introduce such unpopular measures. Unnamed sources told the Russian independent publication “Verska” that the Russian presidential administration does not support the return of the death penalty in Russia – another issue that has recently resurfaced in Russian political discussions.

The Kremlin could use the threat of the death penalty to intimidate Russians into supporting the war effort (or remaining passively opposed to it), but Putin is likely still hesitant to destroy his diplomatic and tolerant image. Tsar.

ISW has previously assessed that Putin relies on control of the information space to protect his regime to a far greater extent than the type of massive repressive apparatus of the Soviet Union, and that Putin has never restored an internal repressive apparatusequivalent to the KGB, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Red Army.

Former Russian officer Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin have frequently repeated similar calls to prosecute Russian officials who hope to end the war through negotiations with the West. Such attitudes show that ultranationalist communities expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand repression and commit fully to war.

Senior US and EU officials believe Russian President Vladimir Putin will be unwilling to negotiate in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive. On April 24, the New York Times (NYT) reported that a senior European official said the chances of Putin “backing down” in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive were “less than zero.”

The official stated that Putin is likely to mobilize more troops, to fight in Ukraine. US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said there was “very little evidence” to suggest Putin would change his strategic goal of subduing Ukraine “politically, if not completely militarily”.

US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told VOA on April 25 that the US is increasing security assistance to Ukraine because it expects Russia to try to go on the offensive as the weather improves.

On April 25, a Ukrainian military official claimed that Ukrainian forces were achieving “impressive results” in counter-battery fighting against Russian forces on the Russian-occupied east (left) bank of the Dnieper River.

The spokeswoman for Ukraine’s Southern Task Force, Natalya Khumeniuk, said Ukrainian forces engaged and destroyed Russian artillery systems, tanks, armored vehicles and air defense systems. Humenyuk added that the Ukrainian forces working to clear the front line on the east coast in “counter-battery mode”. Humenyuk added that Russian forces were evacuating civilians from the Dnieper riverbank area to allow Russian troops to move in, simplifying Ukrainian operations.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin refuted ISW’s April 22 assessment of limited improvement in Wagner’s relations with the Russian military ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.

ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may have partially repaired its strained relationship with Prigozhin to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to halt offensive operations before the planned Ukrainian counter-offensive.

ISW: Russian military command tries to convince Putin to go on the defensive

And Prigozhin is trying to divert Russia from the “denazification” of Ukraine

ISW also observed a dramatic change in the nature of Prigozhin’s public contacts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin as early as early April.

Prigogine said the ISW assessment was “false”, noting that he would not “trade ammunition for [своите] boys even for friendship with God”.

Prigozhin’s continued statements about his dislike of the Russian military leadership belied the change in his rhetoric, as did the sudden influx of artillery ammunition after months of hunger for shells in Bakhmut.

Russian independent publication “Mozhem da pozhnem” (We can explain) also reported that Prigozhin’s companies earned a record amount of revenue in 2022 from their contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense despite his feud with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

Prigozhin has repeatedly admitted to cooperation with troops subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense and received mobilized personnel to strengthen his flanks.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that his eldest son had fought in the war with Wagner, which ISW assessed was an information operation to improve relations and possibly increase or demonstrate Prigozhin’s loyalty to the Kremlin.

All these factors indicate that Prigozhin – despite his stated independence and pride – must retain the favor and support of the Kremlin and the Russian Defense Ministry to sustain his operations.

White House: Putin knows his army is failing

The Russian military is struggling to achieve its goals

On April 25, the Russian civil rights groups OVD-Info, Memorial and Rus Sydyashta (Russia Behind Bars) challenged the Russian censorship law against discrediting the Russian military. OVD-Info announced that her lawyers have filed 10 of a planned 20 appeals against the law in Russia’s Constitutional Court in the hope that the court will rule that the law is unconstitutional.

The complaints centered on separate cases of alleged defamation, including one case in which authorities fined a man 50,000 rubles (about $612) for holding a placard calling for peace.

On April 11, a fringe group of at least 20 mostly smaller pro-war Russian bloggers stepped up their call for the Russian government to lift censorship laws following the prosecution of a Russian medic for telling battlefield truths.

OVD-Info and other human rights organizations will likely be prosecuted under Russian censorship laws. The Russian government is unlikely to repeal or overturn these laws without direction from the Kremlin, but challenges like the one by OVD-Info show continued resistance to domestic censorship and repression.

Basic extracts

• Senior US and EU officials believe Russian President Vladimir Putin will be unwilling to negotiate in response to a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• On April 25, a Ukrainian military spokesman said Ukrainian forces were achieving “impressive results” in the counteroffensive against Russian forces on the Russian-occupied east (left) bank of the Dnieper River.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denies ISW’s April 22 assessment of a limited improvement in Wagner’s relations with the Russian military ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Russian ultranationalists continue to advocate for the Kremlin to adopt Stalinist measures of repression.
• The Kremlin continues to avoid adopting overtly repressive measures, possibly out of concern for the stability of Putin’s regime.
• On April 25, the Russian civil rights groups OVD-Info, Memorial, and Russ Sydyashta (Russia Behind Bars) sued Russia’s censorship law against discrediting the Russian military.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatovo-Kremna line.
• Russian forces have continued to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front line.
• Russian military blogs continued to publish furious denials that Ukrainian forces had established strong positions on the eastern (left) bank of the Kherson region.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to financially incentivize Russian prisoners to fight in Ukraine by offering them compensation equal to that of Russian volunteers.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reports that Ukrainian guerrillas detonated a Russian military checkpoint near Oleshki.