The shocking events and global upheavals of the past year have put regional Russian politics on the back burner. Many Russian voters are apparently unaware of (or have simply forgotten about) the death of one of the biggest and most enduring figures in Russian politics for decades – the leader of the LDPR party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky – according to party officials, writes the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Mikhail Vinogradov, founder and president of the Foundation for Politics in St. Petersburg.
Events in Russia’s regions rarely made headlines last year, with the exception of anti-mobilization protests. However, in 2022, several stereotypes about regional politics emerged that have little to do with reality and deserve clarification.
The first stereotype is that the role of governors has increased sharply. This view gained popularity after the declaration of partial mobilization and partial martial law. It has become commonplace to draw comparisons to the pandemic, suggesting that governors had greater powers.
In reality, the pandemic has not greatly enhanced the role of governors. Regional officials informed the public about the COVID restrictions and monitored compliance, but in most cases it was the federal authorities who initiated the changes, while the regions were simply responsible for implementing them.
In 2022, governors also failed to increase their political influence for a number of reasons. First, they lack mediation. For many of them, the position of governor is only a step on the career ladder, even a break, after which they will be returned to the federal center. Therefore, stretching political muscles in the regions may even prevent their return.
The second reason is that district chiefs do not control the conscription services and the police. Regional officials try to establish horizontal communication with security structures, but often without success. Governors cannot really influence law enforcement directly; they can only reach ad hoc agreements.
Governors neither set political priorities. All instructions regarding war and related matters are transmitted from the federal center. Regions are charged with additional responsibilities, such as supporting the newly annexed territories, and local officials are not so enthusiastic about such tasks.
However, there is some cause for optimism for governors beyond 2022. The number of criminal cases brought against high-ranking officials fell significantly last year. Unlike the 2010s, when a wave of gubernatorial arrests swept the country, the 2020s have seen only two senior regional leaders arrested so far. Governors are also changing less frequently recently. In 2022, only Tomsk, Kirov, Mari El, Saratov and Ryazan regions lost their senior officials, most of whom did not want to be in office anyway.
However, all these are just indications that regional developments are temporarily out of the limelight. The trends since 2022 in no way signal decentralization or refederalization. The Russian central government adheres to a simplified version of the Soviet model, which includes a rigid vertical of power.
The second stereotype is that the regions are the main driver of patriotic fervor in Russia right now. In 2022, much was said about the contrast between Russia’s major cities and the rest of the country in terms of support for the war against Ukraine. Big cities have shown little public support for displaying pro-war symbols, leading many to conclude that the Kremlin’s main cheerleaders are concentrated in the provinces.
However, there was little difference in the number of private cars displaying the pro-war “Z” symbol in Moscow and the regions. By the end of the year, such symbols became very rare and many regions gradually removed the symbol from their public buses.
Both politicians and sociologists were surprised by how easily Russian society accepted the mobilization wave in the fall, but it would be an exaggeration to call the Russian provinces hotbeds of militarism. The same applies to regional authorities.
It is true that several regional leaders flaunted their hardline positions, but in the absence of a federal requirement for such views, others were limited to routine gestures. Even previously outspoken leaders of regions near the front line, such as Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh, chose to act as cautious crisis managers once hostilities began.
The third stereotype is that regions are being drained of their last resources. In fact, another surprise from last year was the stability of the Russian economy in the face of sanctions and a major crisis. In general, the regional budgets look set to receive the expected revenues in 2022 and will probably do so in 2023 as well, so the government will continue to pay its social obligations. Some more rural regions may have been more affected by the wave of mobilization, but so far they show no signs of significant labor shortages.
In essence, regional economies responded to the challenges of 2022 just as they did during the crises of 2008 and 2015. Regions with developed industrial sectors – automotive, aviation, services, construction and to some extent the oil and gas industry and enterprises with global brands – found themselves in boiling water. They entered a new period of decline, but it turned out to be less catastrophic than expected. As for the regions with more conservative economies, they are struggling to survive as they have in the past.
The federal center has postponed several potentially controversial decisions until 2023. Among them are personnel changes in regions whose governors’ terms are expiring. Khakassia leader Valentin Konovalov, who won the 2018 election against Moscow’s will, may be allowed to run in the next election, where he is expected to lose to the candidate of the ruling United Russia party.
The competition in the regions of Yakutia and Krasnoyarsk looks quite fierce and their respective leaders, Aysen Nikolaev and Alexander Us, will have to use their skills and experience to stay in power. The position of the governor of Chukotka, Roman Kopin, who has been in office for almost fifteen years, seems unstable. The same applies to the communist governor of Oryol Region, Andrey Klichkov, and the governor of Voronezh, Alexander Gusev.
The future of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, who is likely to run for office again this year, looks more secure. He is much stronger than he was in 2013, when opposition leader Alexei Navalny nearly forced a runoff. His efforts against COVID and restraint on the mobilization drive in largely pacifist Moscow added to his political weight and public experience.
Another important issue in 2023 will be the situation in economically weakened regions, especially those with a developed oil and gas sector. It is not yet clear whether the shift of some exports to Asia will outweigh possible declines in production amid price constraints and a lack of access to foreign technology.
Russian regions in 2023 will be an indicator of successes and failures in the country’s domestic, economic and social policy. The regions may start to play a bigger role, but they are not ready to significantly increase their autonomy. However, the omnipotence of the center is a thing of the past, and this fact will be hard to ignore completely.
