by Dario Rivolta * –
It is still early to be able to state with certainty what really happened in Russia with the march on Moscow by Wagner’s troops. However, after the speech that the Belarusian president Lukashenko gave to his generals, I think it is possible to offer an interpretation that is already a little more likely than those put forward by various commentators immediately after the start of the events.
Let’s start from an observation: no authoritarian politician has ever enjoyed a unique and indisputable power. Even the apparently strongest and most confident dictators in their power have always needed collaborators to help them translate their orders into deeds. Whether they were presumed (or real) numbers two, three or four of the hierarchies, the management of everyday life and the position formally held by them has always contributed to giving them some power which, at least in part, represents the space of a power personal. It is still a question of some limited power compared to that of the “boss in the head”, but it nevertheless opens up spaces for action that escape the theoretically meticulous control of whoever put them in that position. The main concern of the “dictator” (or of the autocrat) is to check that, under him, coalitions between subordinates cannot form such as to cast doubt on his power. To overcome that danger that was materializing, Mao even came to invent the Cultural Revolution.
How to avoid the risk? The solution adopted by most is the famous saying “divide and conquer”. In other words, it is a question of pitting the highest subordinates against each other and making each of them feel in direct and privileged contact with the “boss” but, at the same time, fear the “colleagues” and try to belittle them or denigrate them in front of the “maximum reference”. Berlusconi even did it in the company, despite the fact that the “company” legally belonged to him in every respect. Rizzoli junior and Giovanni Agnelli underestimated this technique and one found himself with Tassan Din who “emptied” the company almost completely and the second with the attempt (thwarted) by De Benedetti to “climb” the property on the Stock Exchange.
It is intuitive to imagine that Putin applied the principle with his closest subordinates. Especially in times of war, the power of the generals and of those who command them directly (Chief of Staff and Defense Minister) tends to increase and it is therefore understandable, according to the logic mentioned above, that Putin has deliberately accepted, if not favored, the heavy criticism that Prigozhin addressed to Shoigu and Gerassimov. Unfortunately it can happen that someone, perhaps misunderstanding the wishes of the “boss”, exaggerates and thinks they are authorized to “do more”. It is possible that this is exactly what happened to Prigozhin. The man, charismatic with his own and puffed up by his successes on the battlefield and popularity with a large part of the population, probably not even endowed with great political intelligence, thought he could help Putin downsize or even eliminate those who Putin himself in the press conference had defined (referring generically to some not named) “living room generals”.
In reality, it is difficult to imagine a man as shrewd as Putin believing that an operation such as the one undertaken by Wagner on Russian territory could really push him to replace Shoigu or his main collaborators. Even unintentionally, it is possible that a Minister of Defense in office could count on a good portion of the army ready to obey the orders of the authority closest to them and the possible and natural consequence of that “march on Moscow” would almost certainly could have turned into a civil war. It was therefore obvious that Putin immediately distanced himself, alluding to Prigozhin’s action as a “betrayal”.
At this point it would have been inappropriate for Putin himself to speak by telephone with the “rebel” since this could have implied some understanding between the two. He then asked some of his close collaborators but, since some higher and more credible authority was needed, the task was assigned to Lukashenko. We don’t know what they actually said to each other and the Belarusian told his generals that he had to threaten the head of Wagner that they would “squash him like an insect” and only at that point did Prigozhin agree to withdraw. That this official version was the most formally acceptable goes without saying but, between ourselves, it is unlikely that a man who had said a few hours earlier that thousands of his soldiers were ready without batting an eye to all die for “the Fatherland” would have frightened by unproven threats. It is much more realistic to think that Lukashenko made him understand that, instead of helping him, that action had created enormous difficulties for Putin and that it was necessary to remedy.
In return, impunity was offered for him and his men, and perhaps even a substantial cash donation. To help Putin it was also necessary to demonstrate that he was totally extraneous to the incident and this “had” to be achieved by bringing some of Wagner’s personnel into the official army. Furthermore, heavy weapons present in Russian territory had to be returned to the Armed Forces. Nobody talked about the future of Wagner and her staff outside Europe.
Now the question arises: is Putin politically stronger or weaker than before? Instinctively one would think that, somehow, he almost had to “justify” himself with his other collaborators since everyone knew the relationships he had had in the past with Prigozhin and the latter’s “header” showed him weak and passable. However, we will only see in the coming weeks if his decisive interventions against the attempted “coup” have sufficiently convinced everyone of his extraneousness to the facts and have thus confirmed his power or if, after all this, he had (or will have to) negotiate a new type of relations with Shoigu and others. Personally I tend to believe that he, quite cleverly, has long held so many cards in his hand that he will not be the victim of blackmail by one or another of those around him.
Nothing major should happen immediately, but over time we will see if there will be changes in the hierarchies and what they will be. Not that he matters much, but also what Medvedev’s future will be could help us understand more.
* Former deputy, he is a geopolitical analyst and expert in international relations and trade.
