Giulio M. Gallarotti invokes the ‘power curse’ theory: The powerful often tend to underestimate their opponent.
“Russia has become a global pariah,” says Giulio Gallarotti, professor of government and environmental studies at Wesleyan University and adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, at the end of his interview with Kathimerini. Analyzing his thoughts on the war in Ukraine, he looks back to the academic classrooms where theories of geopolitics and international relations are studied. He invokes the “power curse” theory, which points out that the powerful tend to underestimate their opponent, just as Goliath underestimated David. The diachronicity of this paradigm finds its basis in the current war scene in Ukraine.
How is “power” defined and how has it evolved over time?
Power is defined as the influence a nation wields in the international system. I write about “soft” and “smart” power as alternatives to traditional visions of power. Traditionally people believed you are only as strong as the muscle you have: Nothing else mattered, like money, weapons, or resources. The world has changed in a way that using only material resources in an aggressive way, without thoughts about norms and fair play, is less and less practical.
Thirteen years ago, in your book “The Power Curse,” you pointed out that states that augment their power tend to choose self-defeating policies. How did you come to this conclusion?
Looking at history, nations that had great material resources and relied solely on their material resources in very aggressive ways, showed a pattern of self-defeating foreign relations. In some cases, it was alarming to see how extremely powerful nations consistently failed to obtain their objectives in situations when they had overwhelming resources. The cases of the US in Vietnam and of the US and Russia in Afghanistan are cases in point, as well as Athens in the 5th century BC. In these cases, overwhelming resources led them to disdain more important policies and strategic alternatives, softer ones that might have led them to avoid crushing defeats. As a metaphor, I use the story of David and Goliath in my book. Goliath’s superiority in conventional weapons (shield, sword, spear) led him to neglect his defenses against an inferior weapon (rock in a sling).
What are the alternative paths of influence in international relations and how does soft power serve as a foundation for modern forms of geopolitics?
‘Goliath’s superiority in conventional weapons (shield, sword, spear) led him to neglect his defenses against an inferior weapon (rock in a sling)’
Soft power yields influence through respect and admiration. Many think this a very modest way of creating influence. Indeed, the returns will not be as large in the short run as very aggressive actions (threats, invasions, sanctions). But these also do not generate self-defeating blowback responses that aggressive policies do: hatred, countervailing policies, and actions, and third-party disdain. All of these exact a price in terms of influence down the road. In parochial parlance: Nice guys may get ahead modestly in the short run, but bad guys can suffer enormously in the longer run.
The world has in fact changed in a way that has raised the value of soft power and has concomitantly reduced the viability of hard power, especially in the use of aggressive military force. First, the nuclear stalemate has limited the probability of military escalation in a conflict, so excessive military force is no longer as useful. Secondly, economic interdependence and globalization have interlinked economies so any sort of sustained violence or even something milder like sanctions is self-defeating for the perpetrating powers. Furthermore, there is a greater filter of international law (international organizations) that limits reliance on aggressive unilateral tactics, encouraging nations to cooperate without violence or confrontation. Furthermore, the growing incidence of democracy limits aggression on two fronts: One is that democracies tend to honor international law and norms of cooperation and the second is that people as a larger public are generally averse to war because it affects their economic standing, I call this the rise of the “guardian state.”
The isolation of Russia and the rapid emergence of countries such as China or India as global players raise concerns about the use of collective soft power. What is its potential impact on the global arena?
Nations can indeed combine their soft power in ways that magnify their collective power, which in the end raises their individual power. Nations have always done this in the form of international organizations. For example, the BRICS nations have increased their individual powers by forging greater collective power through their institutional venue. Indeed, this is how nations in the developing world, weaker nations, have historically competed with the greater powers in world affairs.
Many scholars argue that the war in Ukraine will lead to a revision of existing political theories. Do you think we are facing a partial or total reassessment of our political theories textbooks?
No. Theories change very reluctantly with the times. Scholars have all sorts of psychological reasons for not altering their beliefs despite compelling evidence. The two leading theories of international politics will see Ukraine as a glowing example to support their visions, even though their visions are quite opposed: Realism will see it as a shining example that the use of large-scale force and war are still important means of statecraft. Neoliberals will see these actions as no longer viable. The lessons drawn are completely different.
As a political scientist who examines international affairs and dynamics, what lessons have you drawn from the war in Ukraine?
Ukraine is the perfect example of the logic I have offered about power. The counterproductive consequences of overreliance on force as a means of statecraft are quite visible in this case. Putin might have done much better forging a softer path to security in East Europe. Trying to extract a buffer by excessive force only served to compromise the long-term security of Russia. In other words, while a softer approach promised to generate modest gains, the harder approach actually served to produce a security disaster for Russia going forward. More nations in the East and North are joining NATO.
Ukraine is now surely in the Western Alliance project. The support Putin had in Ukraine among ethnic Russians is gone. The war is pummeling the Russian economy. Putin has lost a great deal of political support in Russia. Nations around Russia and in distant places are far less likely to cooperate with Russia. Russia has turned into a global pariah. Doing absolutely nothing to secure the support of Ukraine would have produced better results, given that Putin’s course of action produced extensive self-defeating outcomes.
