“newspaper revealed”Washington PostThe American newspaper published new details of what it described as “Hamas’ plans to deceive Israel” and give it a “false sense of calm” before the October 7 attacks.
The newspaper quoted an Israeli security official, whose identity was not revealed, as saying that officials of the Palestinian movement listed on the terrorist list “provided Israel with intelligence information about the Islamic Jihad movement, to reinforce the impression that they are interested in cooperating” with Israel.
Another Israeli security officer confirmed to the same newspaper that Israeli army intelligence had collected evidence of plans for a large-scale Hamas attack “more than a year ago.”
He said that in April, the army “issued an internal warning about the infiltration of Hamas militants to target kibbutzim near” the Gaza Strip, citing “concrete evidence” that the operation would likely include hundreds of militants.
The security officer said that in August, weeks before the attack, new intelligence indicated an “imminent attack.”
He added: “The Israeli army increased its readiness and thought it had stopped it (the attack)… They now see that this was part of Hamas’s deception.”
Israel learned a year ago of the Hamas attack.. What is the issue of the “Jericho Wall”?
Israeli officials obtained Hamas’ plan for the violent October 7 attack a year ahead of time, but considered it difficult for Hamas to implement, according to documents, emails and interviews that the New York Times said it had seen.
The New York Times reported last week that Israeli officials “obtained Hamas’ plan for the attack a year ahead of time,” but they considered it “difficult for Hamas to implement it,” according to documents, emails, and interviews seen by the American newspaper.
The newspaper reported that Israeli military and intelligence officials rejected the plan and described it as “ambitious,” considering that it would be very difficult for Hamas to implement it.
The Israeli security authorities issued permits to hold the “Nova” concert a few kilometers from the Gaza border. 364 people were killed at the festival, and dozens were taken hostage on October 7.
In this regard, Rami Samuel, one of the organizers of the musical event, said: “To believe that there is information and we were not told it is more than just an oversight,” adding: “It is a betrayal. An oversight cannot cost the lives of 1,200 people.”
For many years, Hamas has claimed, in its public statements and private diplomacy, that it is more interested in building up Gaza economically than in renewing the conflict with Israel.
In September 2022, the head of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence (Aman), Aharon Haleva, said that despite Hamas’ involvement in military activities, “we see that economic stability and allowing workers to enter (Israel) offers the possibility of bringing years of calm.”
Hamas largely refrained from firing rockets at Israel after 2021. In 2022, Hamas remained on the sidelines while the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement engaged in a three-day round of fighting with Israel.
“Urgent intelligence questions.” How did Hamas militants communicate to plan the attack?
The New York Times reported, citing an unidentified Israeli defense official and American officials, that Israeli intelligence services had no advance warning of the coordinated Hamas attack on land, sea and air.
The war, which has been ongoing since October 7, broke out following an unprecedented attack by Hamas on Israel, which resulted in the killing of 1,200 people, most of them civilians, including women and children, according to the Israeli authorities. The movement also kidnapped about 240 hostages and transferred them to the Gaza Strip.
Israel responded to the attack with a sustained bombing campaign on the Gaza Strip. Since October 27, large-scale ground operations have been carried out, resulting in the killing of more than 16,200 people, most of them civilians, including women and children, according to the latest toll from the health sector authorities.
“You only see the worst”
In the final months before the attacks, large demonstrations were held at the fence in Gaza, “to get the IDF used to seeing crowds on the border, on a larger scale,” said Miri Eisin, a former senior intelligence official in the IDF.
In statements to the Washington Post, Eisin considered that the Israeli security services, and many of Israel’s allies, “were more interested in Hezbollah,” the Iranian-backed armed group in Lebanon, which announced in 2018 its plans to control the Galilee region.
She continued: “There were plans that were being taken seriously in the north with Hezbollah.”
Among the officers who warned the senior leadership of a possible Hamas attack was Colonel Assaf Hamami (41 years old), who the Israeli army recently confirmed was killed during the October 7 clashes with Hamas militants in Kibbutz Nirim, according to the newspaper.
Newspaper: How did Sinwar deceive Israel?
Before the Hamas attacks, Israel had nearly 40 years of experience dealing with the leader of the Hamas movement in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, according to the Financial Times.
On Saturday, the Israeli army changed his status from “missing” to “killed in action,” and informed his family that his body was being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
His mother, Clara, told the Washington Post that her son’s attempts to warn the army of what might come were “repeatedly rejected.”
She added: “He warned them and informed them of what was about to happen… but he was told, ‘You only see the worst…’ and then the worst came on that Black Saturday.”
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2023-12-07 06:09:42
