The sudden explosion of anti-lockdown protests across China last week took its leaders and the world by surprise. The first demonstrations took place in Xinjiang and Shanghai, and the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has suppressed countless mass protests with ruthless efficiency in the past, was quick to respond.
Chinese authorities have now taken a mixed approach to curbing the demonstrations. It combines an increased police presence and intimidation of protesters with promises of a more refined implementation of the government’s “zero-covid” policy, which remains unchanged. Whatever the immediate outcomes of the protests, which now appear to have ended, are likely to affect policy for the rest of President Xi Jinping’s time in power.
The protests were the most politically charged public expression of discontent since the crackdown on the Tiananmen democracy movement in June 1989. People from various walks of life – university students, migrant workers and wealthy city dwellers – joined forces to denounce the inadequacies of them the tough zero-covid policy of the government. As the CCP‘s biggest fear is criticism from a coalition of several groups, anti-lockdown protests bode ill for the government.
Another factor that must concern Xi is that the protests were held simultaneously in politically important cities. In addition to Beijing, the capital, demonstrations have broken out in provincial capitals, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing, Lanzhou, Urumqi and Chengdu. The 1989 demonstrations also had a large geographical scope, although the number of demonstrators and cities involved that year was far greater.
For a regime obsessed with preserving its tough image, the political challenge of the recent protests will seem shocking. The rallies were initially sparked by allegations that a local blockade was responsible for the deaths of ten residents in a burning building in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, on Nov. 24. But some protesters quickly directed their anger at Mr. Xi and the CCP, inviting them to “resign”. No public gathering in the post-Tiananmen era has targeted the Chinese leader and his ruling party. This ups the ante. If Mr. Xi does not respond with force to such an open challenge to his personal authority, he risks damaging his carefully cultivated image as a strong leader.
The anti-lockdown protests have also revealed the limits of party surveillance. The state has failed to detect early signs of trouble even as the party has invested a fortune in systems that can monitor the movements and communications of ordinary people. Under ordinary circumstances, surveillance is quite effective because it targets a relatively small number of individuals known to authorities as potential troublemakers. But targeted surveillance is not suitable for preventing mass demonstrations triggered by ordinary people who are not on the authorities’ watch list. And once citizens had taken to the streets, facial recognition cameras, TO THE-assisted surveillance of social media and other fancy tools performed poorly to deter protesters. They simply wore masks and wore other protective clothing to disguise themselves.
Indeed, fear of government reprisals has probably kept more disgruntled people from joining the protests. But the fact that such politically charged protests can occur under pervasive state surveillance may have lessened fear of the party and its security apparatus. This means the CCP he cannot depend on technology to prevent challenges to his authority.
Mr Xi is also faced with the task of revamping his image in the wake of the protests. Their outburst comes shortly after he won an unprecedented third term as leader and filled the party’s top ranks with loyalists at his 20th national congress in October. The demonstrations can easily be seen as a popular rebuke. In a society where authority and personality are often intertwined, any public expression of anger against Mr. Xi erodes his aura as a great leader.
Regaining public support in the wake of the protests may require Xi to abandon the policies he has pursued since assuming power in November 2012. Over the past decade, the party has replaced Deng Xiaoping’s focus on economic development with the strategy of Xi. It pushes orthodox ideology, social control, assertive foreign policy and economic statism. The return of “rule politics” may have done wonders for Xi as he wanted to amass power and reassert control over a party softened by decades of economic prosperity and ideological laxity. But the costs of this change are mounting for ordinary people. Growth has slowed dramatically in the last decade, going from 9.6% in 2011 to 3.2% this year according to a forecast by the International Monetary Fund. And a slow-motion implosion of real estate wiped out a huge chunk of middle-class wealth on paper. Homes were once considered their greatest asset.
Mr Xi’s zero-covid policy may be the last straw for many. While this policy achieved initial success, the Chinese government has followed it for far too long. Officials came to the conclusion that the eradication of covid-19 was a project to demonstrate the superiority of China’s political system. This also explains why vaccination campaigns have not been considered a priority. Until recently, only 40% of people over the age of 80 in China had received a third booster dose. Officials now say the share is 66%.
Mr. Xi now faces two difficult dilemmas. The first is how to act on protesters’ demands without unleashing a wave of covid-19 that overwhelms China’s healthcare systems. The second is how he should govern in the next decade if his hardline style and ideological agenda are no longer palatable to the people of the country. He might even see the latter as the more daunting challenge.
Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in America.
