The first scenario
Experts are still discussing the scenario in which Vladimir Putin’s regime manages to maintain control over Russia for a relatively longer period of time, regardless of the outcome of the war.
In such a case, will Russia become a vassal state of China, a supplier of Chinese resources and raw materials, in return for receiving help in stabilizing the regime and the country?
“I want to say that a middle ground is possible. Russia is of course weaker than China in comparative terms, and of course its war in Ukraine is not helping Russia grow stronger, contrary to what Putin is trying to tell his citizens. However, does this mean that Russia is not aware of the risks that rapprochement with China means? Neither is it. And Russia is trying to protect itself from these risks as much as it can,” Bērziņa-Cherenkova assessed.
She explained that Russia’s long-standing approach to relations with China has been quite arrogant and aimed at gaining benefits.
“The year 1653 immediately comes to mind, when Baikov, the envoy of the Russian Empire, arrived in Peking and was told that if he wanted to speak to the Chinese emperor, he must bow nine times. Baikov said, what a speech, of course I will bow, the main thing is that we can pronounce those points. Of course, when reporting back, he spoke with a little irony – if they want to think so badly that we are their vassals, let them think.
I think that such arrogance towards the Chinese is still preserved in the Russian “establishment” [vadības, elites] in the middle, and there is also the idea that something can be used,” analyzed Bērziņa-Čerenkova.
At the same time, the expert reminded that international relations and bilateral relations between two countries are not a zero-sum equation. It’s a more complex equation, with strengths such as the Russian Arctic, which China would like to have access to, or Russian technology that China has yet to see itself either copying or replicating.
“So I think we should not make this mistake and think that Russia will become a vassal state like in the late 17th century, but of course Russia is a relatively weaker player trying to compensate for this weakness.
By the way, my colleagues say that Putin’s possible talk about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus is not so much a fist shake in our direction, as we, of course, rightly worry, but also a small fist shake in the direction of Beijing, that, look, you can’t tell us where where we should put and where we should not put nuclear weapons,” explained Bērziņa-Čerenkova.
The second scenario
When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stops, another scenario is also possible – the collapse of the existing regime, which may be followed by a series of coups, may be the arrangement of mutual relations between different regions, possibly even the disintegration of Russia, similar to what happened with the Soviet Union. China would probably not like such a scenario.
“Putin’s regime is bad for China right now, but the status quo. Xi Jinping understands how to work with Putin, and it’s quite simple – you have a partner, he’s not perfect, but you actually share a broad vision of what’s wrong with the world.
Yes, he does things we don’t like very much, but would we rather choose someone else to take his place? Someone who immediately shakes up a structure that threatens our interests even more and may even turn against us? From China’s point of view, there is no really good scenario,” Berzina-Cherenkova assessed.
The expert assessed that in such a scenario, China would probably not try to recover some long-lost territories, such as Transbaikal or the Amur region, although there is a discussion about this among experts.
“Interestingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople are tweeting: ‘How long can you talk about the fact that we want Russian territories, we don’t want Russian territories, we have a contract signed, this issue is exhausted.'” Then the question arises that they are so actively tweeting this – what does that mean, is it a response? We understand that every discourse is a dialogue, every statement is a response to a previous conversation, so the question is which conversation is this tweet responding to?” argued Berzina-Cherenkova.
Regardless of whether it is a response to the discussions of foreign policy experts or to questions raised in domestic politics, China’s official position remains unchanged – agreements have been concluded that it is not going to break.
“But we also see what China’s position is with regard to territorial violations. So I will answer evasively. I would say that there has to be a very big change in the Russian administrative and political system to have any chance of the Chinese annexing these territories or something.
If the Chinese had the opportunity to historically claim a corner of the Arctic, maybe it would be different, but right now, should the expanses of Siberia and the Far East be included in China’s territory, I think no, that it is not a priority,” Berziņa-Cherenkova concluded.
Both geographic maps and mental maps exist at the same time, and China’s mental map actually records these territories.
Researchers have been writing for years that the Chinese body responsible for standardizing geographical names has been printing manuals saying that Russian cities in the area, such as Vladivostok or Blagoveshchensk, should be called by their old Chinese names.
“Everything is fine with the mental maps, but I think that China will not be in a hurry to redraw the geographical and political maps,” Berzina-Cherenkova assessed.
The third scenario
Then the optimistic path is still possible – Russia’s democratization and turning in the direction of Western development.
“On the one hand, the Chinese are worried about widespread public protests in Russia, and how that might affect the willingness of Chinese citizens to take to the streets and say how much they dislike the government.
The Chinese side is especially concerned about social issues. They are less afraid that the Russians might revolt against the policy, they are more afraid that the Russians might revolt against the fact that there is nothing to eat, that they have to go and die. It worries them, but at the same time they don’t believe that it could shake the system and cut off the system’s head,” admitted Berzina-Cherenkova.
She assessed that the Chinese do not believe in the voice of the Russian society, but rather are cautious and monitor the representatives of the Russian elite, whether there is a desire for change, a desire to get closer to Western societies.
“Would it be beneficial for them? It would not be beneficial for them, because from the inside out, the closer the US presence is to China’s borders, the worse it is for China, the less China will be able to develop from the Chinese point of view.
What is very interesting right now is the way Xi Jinping is linking China’s security growth and muscle-building with development. This is his new paradigm – he says that comprehensive security is a prerequisite for development. And he also believes in it,” explained Berzina-Cherenkova.
The expert explained that China considers itself an encircled country, and the only side from which it is not surrounded, the only side where it can loosen its belt a little and blow air, is the north. Which is actually extremely interesting from a historical point of view, because on the contrary, historically it has always been a place where threats have come from and dynasty after dynasty has had to protect itself from.
“But today it is the territory from which the threat does not directly come. And it is clear that China would be ready to do anything in order not to change this game to its disadvantage,” admitted Berzina-Cherenkova.
