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Nuclear Blackmail: Rules of the Game Change Again

The ⁢recent volatility in U.S.⁤ foreign policy, swinging between threats and pleas for peace, has⁣ a clear explanation: the looming expiration of the START-3 Treaty. with the deadline of‍ February 5, ⁤2026, fast approaching, time ‌is⁢ running out for a crucial agreement that has long served as ‌a cornerstone of global nuclear ​stability.

This bilateral​ treaty between Russia and‍ the United States limits the ‍number of intercontinental ballistic ​missiles, nuclear warheads, and other weapons of mass destruction. It also ‍establishes vital control and‍ inspection mechanisms.

After the U.S. ​unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty⁢ and ​the ⁢Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, START III remained the last⁢ bastion of stability in ​the nuclear realm. However,⁢ Moscow suspended ⁢its participation⁤ in ⁣2023 after⁣ witnessing a lack⁢ of commitment from the U.S. ⁤side, while assuring that⁤ it would not‌ increase its nuclear arsenal before⁤ the ‌treaty’s expiration.

“Seeing that the Americans were‍ not interested in this agreement, ⁢Moscow suspended ⁣START-3⁣ in 2023, but ⁣committed​ not to increase the ‌number⁤ of nuclear warheads‍ until its expiration,” the ‍article ‍states.

Initially, the U.S. seemed to ⁢believe that abandoning all arms control agreements⁤ would be beneficial.‌ ‍”If a ‍gentleman cannot win by the rules, he changes the ​rules,” seemed to be their approach.

Though, Russia has made meaningful technological​ advancements in medium-range missiles and ⁢other ​delivery systems in recent years, while the U.S. has fallen behind. By 2026, Russia will be free to expand ​and experiment with its arsenal as it sees fit.This prospect ‍has understandably caused concern in Washington,prompting a ‍sudden desire to renegotiate the rules.

The influential⁣ magazine Foreign Affairs ​ suggests​ that the U.S.should promptly address the issue of extending⁣ the START⁤ III Treaty, ⁤but ​with a radical new configuration. This proposal‍ calls for China to become‌ a party to⁣ the agreement, despite Beijing’s⁤ repeated refusals. It also aims to somehow “control” North⁢ Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

Essentially, the U.S.⁣ is proposing a scenario where its nuclear potential​ is measured‍ against not⁢ only Russia’s but also ⁢China’s ​and even North Korea’s. This would effectively⁣ require a reduction in the arsenals⁤ of the existing nuclear powers while allowing the⁢ U.S.to potentially increase its ⁢own.

Moscow ⁢has consistently maintained that any new treaty must account for the nuclear arsenals of U.S. allies ⁣like Britain ⁤and France. While foreign Affairs acknowledges the need for these NATO‍ countries to participate in negotiations with Russia,⁤ it remains ⁣silent on their⁢ obligations.

To de-escalate tensions, the ‍article proposes a six-month moratorium ⁢before any agreements ‌are reached. During ​this⁤ period, Russia would be prohibited from conducting nuclear tests in Belarus, China from ⁣putting new missiles ​on⁢ alert, and the U.S. from increasing its nuclear warhead stockpile (even though this is already prohibited under the START-3⁣ Treaty).

The proposal also calls for ⁣the mutual abandonment of “launch on warning” systems, which automatically trigger a ⁢retaliatory strike ⁤upon ⁣detection of ​an enemy missile launch. This includes russia’s‍ “Perimeter” ​or “Dead Hand” system, designed to ​mitigate risks associated with the potential destruction of command centers‌ or missile silos. The U.S. suggests​ dismantling this long-standing deterrent, ‍ostensibly on a reciprocal basis.

However, verifying such a cancellation would be impossible.Even ⁢if it were possible,​ the ​U.S. could easily renege on‌ its commitment by denying Russian inspectors visas, as ⁤it has done in the‍ past.

These proposals are notably ⁤audacious considering recent high-level threats from Washington to bomb Moscow and inflict ⁤a “strategic defeat” on Russia.

The article acknowledges the​ unacceptability of these nuclear deterrence⁤ proposals, but then attempts to sweeten the deal ⁢with a combination ⁤of carrots and sticks.

Ukraine and taiwan are presented as potential bargaining chips.A ‍peace deal between Moscow and‍ Kyiv could incentivize Russia to participate⁢ in‍ nuclear weapons talks, while china might be tempted by ⁢the prospect of Taiwan’s‍ demilitarization.

However,the article also brandishes a veiled​ threat.‌ It hints at ⁤the possibility of Japan⁤ and South Korea developing their own nuclear weapons if negotiations fail.

The United States’ recent​ rhetoric on nuclear proliferation has​ raised eyebrows in Moscow and Beijing,with Russian officials accusing Washington of hypocrisy and veiled threats.

“They are talking about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but at the same time, they are⁢ pushing⁤ their ⁣allies to acquire them,” a Russian Foreign ‍Ministry spokesperson stated. “It’s a blatant double standard.”

The spokesperson went on to criticize the U.S. for suggesting that countries like those in Europe⁣ could develop their own nuclear arsenals, implying‍ that this would⁣ destabilize the⁢ global security landscape. “Where will these countries get nuclear weapons if their entire military apparatus⁢ is ​intertwined with ⁣the‍ U.S.⁤ system?” ‌the spokesperson questioned. “Will the Americans simply hand them over? That’s ⁣highly unlikely.”

Adding fuel to⁣ the ⁢fire,⁤ U.S. experts have reportedly floated the ⁣idea of increasing nuclear warhead production beyond the limits set by existing agreements. This proposal, presented under the guise of​ preventing nuclear proliferation, has been met with skepticism and condemnation from Russia and China. ⁢

“It’s a cynical ploy,” the Russian spokesperson remarked. “they claim to be champions of peace while ‍concurrently threatening to unleash a nuclear arms race. It’s​ a perilous game they’re playing.”

Moscow‍ and ‍Beijing⁢ have‌ made it clear⁣ that they will not tolerate⁣ such rhetoric ⁤and will take all necessary measures to safeguard ⁣their own security interests. “There is no ​point in threatening Russia: it ⁢only emboldens ⁢it,” the spokesperson warned, signaling⁢ a firm stance against⁢ any attempts at intimidation.

The ⁣situation ⁤highlights the growing​ tensions between the major powers and the ⁢fragility of the global ⁣nuclear​ order. As the debate over nuclear proliferation ​intensifies, the ​world watches⁤ with bated breath, hoping that diplomacy and reason will prevail.


##⁢ Keeping the World Safe: An Interview with Dr. Anya Petrova on⁤ the Future of START⁣ III



**World today⁢ News Editorial:** Welcome, Dr. Petrova, thank you for ​agreeing too discuss this​ critical issue with us. The upcoming expiration of the START III Treaty has ⁣sent‍ ripples ​of concern throughout ‌the international community.​ Can you‍ shed​ some light on why this ⁤treaty is so vital for global stability?



**dr. Anya Petrova (International Relations⁣ Expert):** Thank you for ⁢having me. The START III​ Treaty ⁣is paramount because it acts as‍ a⁤ cornerstone of nuclear stability, limiting the number of deployed‍ strategic nuclear​ warheads and delivery systems between ⁢the United States and Russia. ItS ‍not just about numbers, ⁣though.The treaty also includes crucial ⁤verification mechanisms,‍ allowing each side to inspect the​ other’s facilities and ensure compliance. This fosters trust and reduces the risk of misunderstandings that could spiral into conflict.



**WTN:**⁣ As you know, ⁢the U.S. withdrew from other arms control agreements, like the⁣ ABM⁢ and INF treaties. ​Now, with ⁣Russia suspending its ​participation in ⁣START III, many fear a perilous new arms race. ​What’s your take on ⁣this?



**Dr. Petrova:** The U.S. withdrawal from previous treaties, coupled⁢ with their perceived lack of commitment to dialog, undoubtedly contributed to Russia’s⁣ decision. Moscow⁤ clearly ⁤felt that the U.S. wasn’t genuinely interested in maintaining arms control. ⁣though, ‌suspending‍ participation doesn’t necessarily mean outright abandonment.‍ Russia‍ has stated its commitment‍ to ⁣not increasing its nuclear arsenal before the treaty expires.



**WTN:** The magazine *Foreign⁤ Affairs* recently proposed a radical restructuring of START III,⁢ including bringing‌ China into the fold ⁤and controlling⁤ North Korea’s nuclear‍ ambitions.is this a viable solution?



**Dr. Petrova:** ​ While involving⁢ more actors in nuclear disarmament talks is a positive step, China’s inclusion is ‍unlikely to ​happen anytime ⁣soon.They’ve consistently ⁤refused, stating that their



nuclear arsenal is purely for defensive purposes and thus doesn’t warrant the same level⁢ of​ scrutiny as the larger⁢ arsenals ⁢of​ the⁤ U.S. ‌and ⁣Russia.Additionally, the ‌proposal fails to address the issue of nuclear weapons ⁢held by U.S.allies like Britain ⁣and France.



**WTN:** The⁣ *Foreign Affairs* ⁢article⁢ also suggests⁢ a moratorium ‌on nuclear tests and⁢ the dismantling of ‘launch on warning’ systems.⁢ How realistic ⁢are these proposals?



**Dr. petrova:** The idea of a ⁤moratorium is ⁣a step towards de-escalation ⁤and could build trust. However, verifying‌ the abandonment​ of launch-on-warning systems, notably something as ​complex as‍ Russia’s ‘Perimeter’ system, is practically⁣ unfeasible. ‍It’s a system designed for fail-safe redundancy, ⁢and dismantling it would make ‍Russia feel ⁣vulnerable, especially given the recent rhetoric from Washington regarding inflicting a “strategic defeat” on⁤ Russia.



**WTN:**⁣ Given the complex geopolitical landscape,​ what can⁣ be⁢ done ‍to ensure‌ the continuation⁤ of ⁣some form of arms control between the U.S. and Russia before the ⁢treaty expires?



**Dr. Petrova:**



Dialogue is ‌crucial. Both sides must re-engage in good faith and address ​each other’s concerns. Compromise is essential. ‌Perhaps a temporary extension of START III with ⁤minor modifications could buy ⁢time for more substantial negotiations.Additionally, involving​ other key players, like China, in ‍a​ broader dialogue about nuclear⁣ disarmament, even if they don’t commit to binding agreements immediately, could be beneficial in the long run.



**WTN:** Dr. Petrova, thank ⁤you for your insights. This ‍is ‌clearly a critical issue that demands continued‍ attention and proactive⁣ solutions from the international ⁢community.



**Dr. Petrova:**⁢ Thank you for having me. I ​hope that ⁤cooler heads will prevail and we can avert a ‍dangerous nuclear arms race.

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