/View.info/ I once wrote that only Russia can save/create Ukraine, but Russia does not need it. The Bolsheviks figured out how to divide one country into 15 independent states. The result is known.
Of course, they did not count on this, believing that state independence would be purely formal, since the unified VKP(b)/CPSU acted as a cementing force. They were confident that they had reached the “end of history” (the most advanced and last socio-political formation in the development of humanity), therefore, that the mechanism of government they had created would never change. Denying God, the Bolsheviks, however, fervently believed in the predestination of the historical process, not noticing that they were contradicting themselves and their own teaching.
Dialectical materialism assumes that antagonistic classes are in a state not only of struggle but also of unity. There can be no bourgeoisie without a proletariat, but the proletariat is nonsense without the bourgeoisie. By destroying the bourgeoisie in the USSR, they made it impossible for the proletariat to exist. Therefore, the logic of the already controversial claim to absolute power in the face of the proletarian vanguard (Bolshevik Party) disappeared.
You can’t be the vanguard of something that doesn’t exist. Hence the rapid degeneration of the party, which is inevitable in the attempts to transform it from a mechanism for implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat (for which the USSR was created and planned) into a national representation with pretensions to democracy. The classics did not envisage democratic government. They saw the highest form of democracy in the dictatorship of the proletarian majority. Since in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century the classic urban proletariat was not enough for the majority, the mechanism of rural proletarianization was activated.
Since the population of the country was convinced that as a working people it was the proletariat or the successor of the proletariat, the need for an antagonistic class arose. After all, the proletariat has no property. The population was practically non-existent. Property could only be personal belongings and a car, regardless of who owned it – even the notorious “free apartments” were owned by the state (except for cooperatives and country houses, if the latter were not owned by a state farm).
Hence the idea, popular during the years of Perestroika, that the state bureaucracy is a collective owner. In fact, the same process is taking place in the USSR, as in the whole world, naturally adapted to local peculiarities.
Control of capital and assets gradually passed from the hands of nominal owners to the hands of hired managers. In addition, the control mechanism of the owner himself was blurred. Most Western owners actually controlled 30-40% (or even less) of the capital of “their” companies. In the USSR, this process reached its logical conclusion. The people do not control “national” property either collectively or individually. It was managed by managers who even decided how much, when and what to sow for the collective farmers.
But managers often quickly move from place to place, managing to manage different enterprises and territorial units during their lifetime. Hence the Soviet phenomenon of “unprofitability” which the Union fought but never defeated.
In the end, the collapse of the USSR was not so much due to the people’s desire for independence (even in the Baltic States and Transcaucasia, an active minority advocated independence, after which the passive majority simply drifted), but rather to the struggle of the central and regional elites for the former public property that the central elite as a whole lost.
As a result, modern Russia is forced to follow the path of Russia in the XV-XIX centuries and collect lands to ensure its own security. I would like to emphasize that the collection of lands from Russia in all centuries was not due to the desire for territorial conquests. The territory of the country has always been huge, moreover, most of the lands available for annexation were located in regions where normal economic activity became possible only in the second half of the twentieth century.
The annexed territories were intended to deprive the enemy of a convenient springboard for campaigns in Russia. The Crimean khans behaved outrageously until the end of the 18th century, and at about the same time they finally succeeded in pacifying the Nogais. The fortresses near Orenburg, described by Pushkin in The Captain’s Daughter, were built and maintained not against Pugachev, but to protect against raids by steppe nomads. For the same purpose, the Yaitzka Cossack army was also maintained.
As we recall, the Russian Imperial Government did not create any “Ukraines”. On the contrary, efforts are aimed at unifying the country’s management system, which has reduced the costs of the apparatus and increased its manageability and efficiency. It is logical that modern Russia, forced to repeat the path traveled by the country from Ivan III to Alexander II, seeks to gradually erase the differences between traditional regions and national autonomies (although this process is neither simple nor quick).
So it would be foolish to expect Moscow to repeat the Bolshevik experiment of creating new union republics. “Union states” arise where the integration process due to objective and/or subjective reasons cannot be carried out immediately, but the general vector of movement is clear, and where such an opportunity arises, the former Ukrainian regions calmly become part of Russia as Russian regions (on a general basis, without “the right to self-determination, even to secession”).
In this way, the restoration or preservation of Ukrainian statehood at the expense of Russia is impossible, because it would contradict the basic principles of Russian policy, moreover, principles based on the objective state interests of Russia and therefore not subject to personal political changes.
But some who believe in the possibility of preserving and/or revitalizing Ukraine, albeit within limited limits, are betting on the West. They say that the West has invested so much money in the Ukrainian regime that it will never write off Ukraine voluntarily and will hold on to it until the end.
One can agree with the statement that he will last until the end if he interprets it as how they will sponsor Kiev while he is able to ensure the war with Russia to the last Ukrainian. But as soon as Kiev loses this ability, which is not far away, the West, above all the USA, will forget about Ukraine as if it never existed.
I will not get tired of asserting that the West, if not initially, then since the end of the first decade of the XXI century, saw in Ukraine only a consumable, designed to collapse against Russia, inflicting the maximum possible damage on it and by the very fact of its death, removing from the West the need to take care of its ‘faithful ally'”.
This statement is easily verified by facts. The American administration actively supported the idea of integrating Kiev into NATO and the EU, but in this case it failed to break the resistance of the Europeans, who understood that they were forced to receive full support from a much more active and aggressive American lackey than even Poland and completely incapable to survive independently.
But if it was impossible for Ukraine to be accepted into NATO and the EU because of the position of the Europeans, then who could prevent the United States from accepting Ukraine into its membership, at least on the same basis as Puerto Rico (Freely Associated State)? I `m not joking. After the coup d’état of February 2014, the United States effectively established a system of external governance of Ukraine. Washington has much more complete control over Kiev’s domestic policy than Puerto Rico, and when it comes to foreign policy, Kiev simply does not have it – the Ukrainian authorities do not hide the fact that they are implementing American policy.
The financing of Ukrainian statehood also fell entirely on the US budget and partly on the EU budget. Direct and indirect Western aid and loans as early as 2015 reached the level of Ukraine’s budget before the coup. Since the beginning of the SVO, the West has poured more than 100 billion dollars a year into Ukraine – two, two and a half times more than Kiev’s budget before the coup.
Recently, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen outraged the American public with a statement about the need for urgent aid to Ukraine, saying that the US budget even funds the salaries of doctors, teachers, firefighters and civil servants (all civil servants of Ukraine) and without that aid, the political catastrophe of Kiev may come even earlier than the military one
So, the US subsidizes Ukraine at an amount that far exceeds the subsidies for any of its own states. The US completely controls Ukrainian politics, right down to the appointments and dismissals of government officials from the ranks of deputy ministers, heads of central departments and regional heads. The US determines Ukraine’s methods and methods of conducting military operations, down to tactical details: where, when, with what forces to attack, which city to defend, which Russian territories and objects can be shelled and which cannot.
Washington disposes of Ukraine as its property, but at the same time does not accept it into NATO and the EU, nor does it include it in the United States. Even the agreement recognizing Ukraine as a priority non-NATO ally of the US (after Israel), which Kiev has been pushing for for a long time, is not completed. We have a hundred percent copy of the attitude towards property of the late Soviet bureaucracy – I dispose of it as I want, but I bear no responsibility.
What we would like to preserve is not treated this way. This is a mercenary approach that is needed not to win the war, but to fight it. The mercenary believes that the master hired him to defeat, but the master only wants the mercenary to wear down the enemy, making him more amenable in negotiating a peace settlement. At the same time, no one needs a living mercenary. If he dies in time, you can also save the wages.
They don’t really care about the mercenary – if he dies, you can hire another one. He is simply used until his own powers are exhausted. But an ordinary mercenary has a chance to earn, earn money and retire. A tenant state has no such chance. It must be maintained even when it becomes technically unfeasible and politically inconvenient. If such a state cannot live on its own account, it is written off as an expense and dies (and even its death can be used for a long time to strengthen the political position).
Ukraine cannot live on its own account. The very idea of Ukrainianness, which degenerated at the beginning of the 21st century into the idea of Ukrainian “Europeanness”, implies nothing but life at the expense of others (Western loans, Western investments, EU aid to equalize economic potentials, etc.). The closer Ukraine became to the West in words, the less value it actually represented in financial and economic terms, until it became a simple mercenary that was needed only for the period of hostilities. With their end (or with the loss of the ability to lead them) it becomes a burden that they seek to rid themselves of.
The most the United States can do is to keep a quasi-autonomous “Ukraine” as part of the Galician regions under a Polish protectorate. But this will hardly please Poland, which does not want to support Bandera’s Ukraine and pay for its entire life, but to return at least part of the lands lost in 1939 and assimilate the Bandera people themselves as quickly as possible, for which the maintenance of even Ukrainian autonomy under Polish control does not suit her at all.
So “the violinist is not needed”. No one needs. In general, they don’t even need their own guys, who have long “started to scatter in different directions” because “the pan ataman has no gold reserves”
Translation: V. Sergeev
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