28 February 2024, 07:16 GMT
Photo copyright: Reuters
Nikolai Ryzhkov, the last surviving head of the USSR government, died in Moscow at the age of 94.
Having learned from extensive personal experience the shortcomings of the Soviet economic model, he supported the course of reforms and renewal and became in opposition to it, convinced that “taking a little of a good plan, and a little of a good market” is possible only in theory.
Soviet business executive
Nikolai Ryzhkov was born on September 28, 1929 in the Donetsk region in the family of a miner. After graduating from the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College, he was sent to Uralmash and worked at the flagship enterprise for exactly a quarter of a century, working his way up to the general director.
In 1975-1982 he worked as First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering and First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee.
Just like Mikhail Gorbachev, Yegor Ligachev and Boris Yeltsin, he was noticed and nominated by Yuri Andropov. Subsequently, their paths diverged, but at the first stage, all four were perceived as a new generation of energetic, broad-minded and honest leaders, called upon to lead the country out of stagnation.
On November 22, 1982, 12 days after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, Ryzhkov was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the same time heading the newly created Economic Department of the Central Committee.
On October 15, 1985, he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, thus becoming the second person in the state. According to the unspoken table of ranks, Vladimir Dolgikh, another “economic” secretary of the Central Committee with experience in the Politburo under Brezhnev, had more rights to this, but Gorbachev promoted his partner and like-minded person to the high post.
Nikolai Ryzhkov played the first violin in the economic innovations of the mid-1980s: the preparation of the June 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the reform of the economic mechanism, the adoption of the laws “On State Enterprise”, “On Individual Labor Activity” and “On Cooperation”.
In the spheres of domestic and foreign policy and ideology, perestroika produced real results, no matter how you look at them. Historians of all directions unanimously assess the economic policies of Gorbachev and Ryzhkov as a chain of continuous mistakes. The standard of living of the population, already poor, decreased even more.
If in the “roaring 90s” difficulties were the price to pay for painful but necessary institutional reforms, then in the 1980s they did not take place, and the chance for a smooth evolution was missed.
“Chinese way”
Some researchers are confident that until about mid-1988, the USSR had the opportunity to follow the “Chinese path”: to carry out market reforms without affecting the political system and using the entire administrative power of the authoritarian state for reforms.
Nikolai Ryzhkov subsequently spoke more than once about the Chinese experience in superlatives.
Most analysts believe that it is wrong to reduce everything to folly, much less to suspect malicious intent. Soviet reformers faced a much more difficult task than Deng Xiaoping.
In China there was no such gigantic array of heavy, primarily military, industry, which by its very nature fits worst into the market.
Socialism lasted not seventy, but only forty years; the connection of times had not yet been interrupted; people remained who remembered their former life; the people preserved the traditions of small private business and independent management of the land.
By the time reforms began, the Celestial Empire found itself on the verge of physical starvation. In the USSR, the need for a break with the past was not so obvious to both the elite and the people.
Finally, Mao, like Stalin, intimidated his nomenklatura so that they did not dare to object to the new course, not just by action, but by facial expression.
According to a number of historians, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to start with glasnost and democratization because he had to first destroy ossified stereotypes and discredit conservatives in the eyes of society, and that the situation would get out of control, and, especially, that the reform movement would manifest itself , primarily in the form of republican separatism, did not foresee.
It seemed easier and safer to change the political system, ideology, and foreign policy that did not directly affect the vital interests of citizens and authorities.
When experience is a hindrance
As for Nikolai Ryzhkov, few people knew the problems of the Soviet economy both “on the ground” and at the highest level as he did. But he knew precisely the Soviet model, and did not think of going beyond it, believing, together with Gorbachev, that it was enough to “broaden” and “deepen” something, and “the process would begin.”
The concept of “acceleration” (that is, doing the same as before, only more intensively) and an ambitious program for the development of mechanical engineering and knowledge-intensive industries were officially adopted. Due to lack of funds, nothing came of it.
In 1988, the USSR exported 144 million tons of oil at a price that seems ridiculous today: $17 per barrel ($125 per ton). At the same time, only 80 million tons were sold for foreign currency, the rest went to socialist countries through unprofitable barter.
At the same time, 40 million tons of grain had to be imported at a price of $176 per ton. The budget was reduced to a 25 percent deficit, which was covered by external loans and the sale of gold reserves.
Objective difficulties were aggravated by subjective miscalculations, in particular, the anti-alcohol campaign that hit budget revenues.
Even the predecessors of Gorbachev and Ryzhkov recognized the importance of a balanced monetary policy. Dozens of specialists in the State Planning Committee were engaged in multiplying the physical volumes of produced and imported consumer goods and services provided by Soviet prices in order to determine how many rubles could be paid out to the population. However, the problem of the “cash overhang” existed even then.
The leaders of the 1980s, according to economists, did not understand the role of money at all. They believed that the main thing was to allow people to receive more, and for businesses to spend funds from non-cash accounts for their needs, and the economy would work, and everyone would be in favor.
Prices and shortages
At the same time, “supplying the population at fixed state prices” remained a sacred cow, which only Yeltsin and Gaidar decided to slaughter. Even during the preparation of materials for the June plenum, economists pointed out that there is no market without free prices. They were asked a practical question: how much would a kilogram of butter cost in this case? The scientists counted and answered: six to eight rubles. “Offer anything but this,” the Politburo said.
As a result, a wave of suppressed inflation hit the country. In addition to the eternal shortage of meat, dairy products and consumer goods, shortages in bread, sugar, sunflower oil, alcohol and cigarettes were added. Not only the provinces, but also the capitals “got on coupons”.
By the end of Nikolai Ryzhkov’s premiership, every ruble in hand was provided with goods at state prices for 14 kopecks. Everything became scarce except money. Enterprises and regions began to switch to barter.
The head of government actively participated in the liquidation of the consequences of the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the Spitak earthquake: he traveled to disaster areas, energetically gave orders, and, according to eyewitnesses, sincerely let people’s pain pass through him. This greatly increased his rating, but the worsening economic situation quickly devalued the effect.
The authority of the Prime Minister was particularly hit by the “ANT cooperative case” and the miners’ strikes in July 1989, the reason for which was a shortage of soap. Ryzhkov had to abandon all his affairs and negotiate for several days with representatives of the workers’ committees, and in the presence of journalists.
Faced with attacks at congresses of people’s deputies, the prime minister, who was not used to working in conditions of political competition, lost his composure and began to helplessly complain about difficulties, for which he received the malicious nickname “crying Bolshevik” from his opponents.
In one of his last interviews, Ryzhkov said that he remained an ally of Gorbachev until 1987, and said that at Politburo meetings “there was squealing and swearing.” However, unlike many representatives of the nomenklatura, at one time he never publicly criticized perestroika and the Secretary General.
Pyrrhic victory
In September 1990, the country found itself at a crossroads. A group of experts led by academician Stanislav Shatalin and the then little-known young economist Grigory Yavlinsky prepared a reform program called “500 days.”
It is, of course, impossible to boost the economy of a huge country in a year and a half. The authors pursued a different goal: to bind the authorities with clear obligations regarding the first necessary steps and demonstrate to society that the time for hesitation and marking time is over.
The government has declared its fundamental opposition to private property, free prices and the abandonment of planning.
Mikhail Gorbachev first promised Boris Yeltsin to spend “500 days” through the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and implement the program together, then he backtracked. A conciliation commission was created in parliament, which issued a watered-down version, which was based on the government concept.
Nikolai Ryzhkov did not have the chance to implement it. Five days before the new year of 1991, the president dismissed him.
Some researchers indicate that shortly before this, Ryzhkov suffered a heart attack. Others note that his health did not prevent him from running for president of the Russian Federation six months later, and believe that Gorbachev sacrificed the prime minister to the Democrats in order to sweeten the pill of refusing “500 days.”
Ryzhkov subsequently claimed that he asked to resign himself.
His successor, the future GEC member Valentin Pavlov, held even more conservative views. In one of his first policy statements, he said that all reforms must be carried out in such a way that the possibility of returning to the old remains: they say, that’s why it’s an experiment, to abandon it if the result seems unsatisfactory.
Market supporters wanted the exact opposite – to make the changes irreversible – and went into irreconcilable opposition.
In the summer of 1991, Nikolai Ryzhkov participated in the Russian presidential elections as an official candidate from the CPSU and was considered as the main opponent of Boris Yeltsin. At the same time, the party leader did not support him, but Vadim Bakatin; radical supporters of Soviet values gave preference to Albert Makashov and Aman Tuleyev.
As a result, Ryzhkov finished second, gaining 16.85% of the votes.
At the end of August, he said that if he had been elected president, he would have behaved like Yeltsin during the days of the putsch.
Return to politics
In September 1991, the ex-prime minister headed the public council of the Pravda newspaper, which registered as an independent media outlet with the financial support of the Greek businessmen Yannikosov brothers, close to the local Communist Party, and then the board of directors of Tveruniversalbank.
A few years later, Soviet values again gained popularity among part of society, and many “former people” returned to politics.
Twice, in 1995 and 1999, Nikolai Ryzhkov was elected to the State Duma from the city of Belgorod, which belonged to the “red belt,” heading the “People’s Power” faction in the chamber: organizationally independent from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, but adhering to views close to it.
In 2003, after the reform of the Federation Council carried out by Vladimir Putin, he was appointed representative of the Belgorod region in the upper house.
In an interview with the publication “Odnako” in May 2014, Nikolai Ryzhkov said that he did not consider Donbass to be part of Ukraine, and expressed the opinion that “power was contraindicated for both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.”
2024-02-28 07:19:58
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