by Roberto Mauriello
WHAT IS DEFECTIVE FROM THE BEGINNING CANNOT RECOVER WITH TIME.
This phrase generally refers to Legal Sciences, but, strictly speaking, it can easily be cited in other fields. The European Union, born badly, cannot improve with the passage of time.
The election of Donald Trump to the White House has made the obtuse leaders of the EU and those national governments with a strictly pro-European faith lose their sense of proportion. Attached to their few and unhealthy ideas, almost as if they were dogmas, like Don Ferrante of Manzoni’s memory, they expressed, more or less openly, disappointment and concern, not only in the context of commercial and defense relations, but also in support for the various and bizarre theories such as woke, gender, uncontrolled immigration, LGBTQ+ rights who knows what else.
In particular, the defense sector appears to be the most delicate, with the problem of the war in Ukraine and very tense relations with Russia. Trump’s election seems to herald a return to the Monroe Doctrine and, therefore, to isolationism. On the other hand, it was enough to take a look at some history texts to understand that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union, the United States would disengage from the defense of Europe. The question is why it took them so long to disengage and return to dealing with internal affairs, first of all to reconstitute that standard of living widespread among all social classes which was the basis of the American dream.
Yet Europe is by no means defenseless and in any case Trump, before a possible disengagement, the details and scope of which are not yet known, promised to put an end to the senseless and bloody conflict in Ukraine.
There are two paths for the defense of Europe. The first, not very viable, involves the rearmament of Germany under the paternal aegis of France and the European Union. This perspective is flawed and unworkable for three key reasons.
Germany could turn far to the right and become a problem rather than a solution, the control of the weak institutions of Brussels appears absolutely ridiculous and impractical, French public opinion would not approve of the actions of its pro-European rulers.
It excludes the participation of the United Kingdom, which is no longer part of the EU.
It would be unwelcome to Russia, so it would lead to a worse state of tension with the Kremlin than the current one.
The other path involves the restoration of the Franco-British Alliance and a return, in Europe, to the European Concert. England, France, Germany, Russia will once again be able to sit around a table and make diplomacy, and therefore reason, prevail over war and violence. I would like to point out that the Franco-British Alliance was the architect of the victory in 1918 and had the forces in 1940, 134 divisions against the 93 Germans on the Western Front, with 3000 tanks against 2700, to conclude the Battle of France favorably. In particular, two types of tanks, the French SOMUA S 35 and the English Matilda, were invulnerable to the guns of the German tanks, which had to use anti-aircraft artillery to stop them. It was 1940, the Tiger or the Panther were not entered into production. The General Staff, especially the French, lacked an understanding of modern warfare and the use of more effective tactics.
American intervention in Europe must be scaled back. It was deliberately magnified by complacent cinematography.
In 1918 the Americans occupied undemanding sectors of the front, allowing Foch and Petain to move French troops into the most delicate sectors to build up the maneuvering masses necessary to break through the German defensive lines. The Americans had to purchase much of their equipment in Europe, even as the French and English factories continued thanks in part to loans and semi-finished products supplied by the United States. In fact, after the victory, England and France obtained a good part of the spoils, especially the oil fields of the Middle East, with all due respect to American and Italian interests, while Japan, for a modest contribution, obtained many Micronesian archipelagos already German colonies.
In the Second World War the American contribution to the victory was greater, indeed almost exclusive, in the war against Japan. However, the intervention in Europe, much more significant than the previous one, did not have the decisive character that they wanted us to believe and, in any case, not up to the level of the Russian or English one. Overseas supplies were vital, but more for logistics than for weapons, Russian or English production was certainly superior. American tanks, especially the Sherman, nicknamed Ronson, were known to catch fire easily if hit, while the Russian or English ones were better and able to compete, especially the former, with the German ones. Same goes for planes. The strongest Allied air force and equipped with the best aircraft was the RAF, not the USAF, while Russian aviators ranked first among Allied pilots in terms of victories. It is no coincidence that the experienced German generals played their last offensive card against the Americans, not against the Russians or the English, at the end of 1944 in the Ardennes.
The United States emerged little worn out from the conflict and replaced Great Britain as the world power, while the dollar replaced the pound.
It could be argued that the UK and France are now weaker, having lost their colonial empires. These states, however, were already strong militarily before the rush to occupy non-European territories. Furthermore, they have preserved very efficient military and administrative apparatus. Their weakness, if anything, is the political class. It is impossible to go back to Churchill, but at least having a Mitterrand (light years away from the writer’s ideas) or a Mrs. Thatcher (far from the writer’s ideas) would be desirable. The leaders of this generation had the dignity, firmness and moderation to deal with Russia. Enough with these integration and destructuring projects. From their state apparatuses and ruling classes a generation of good politicians can be drawn, especially in Great Britain. The French, on the other hand, have no choice but to scrap Macron & Co. and their pro-European delusions, but these people, with such a glorious past, will find the energy necessary to do so.
It is important and urgent to get rid of the European Union, which has now become an obstacle, assuming it has ever been a resource, and of its elephantine and expensive as well as inefficient and corrupt bureaucratic apparatus, of a ridiculous, pernicious and counterproductive leadership. If Putin triumphs, as pro-Europeans fear, it will be due to the deficiencies of others and not through his own strength.
As for Italy, however, the problem is much more serious. The entire ruling class must be scrapped. Otherwise let’s sit in a corner, perhaps in the shade, to contemplate our mediocrity.
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How do historical alliances, like the Franco-British Alliance, influence current military strategies in Europe, and what lessons can we learn from past conflicts to apply to today’s geopolitical challenges?
Thank you for your interest in the World-Today-News.com website. We are always looking for ways to improve our content and reader engagement, and we believe that including guest interviews on relevant topics can be a great addition to our platform.
For this topic, we have identified two potential guests who could provide insightful perspectives on the information provided in the article. The first guest is a European Union official with extensive knowledge about the defense and security sector within the EU. The second guest is a military historian with expertise in the various alliances and conflicts mentioned in the article.
Here are some suggested questions that could be used to conduct an interview with these two guests:
1) From the perspective of the European Union, how would you assess the current state of defense and security within the EU post-Trump’s election? Are there any concerns about the disengagement of the United States from European affairs and the potential role of the UK and France in maintaining stability?
2) From a military historian’s point of view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Franco-British Alliance as a defense strategy for Europe? How did it contribute to victories in previous conflicts, and what challenges might it face today?
3) In the context of the article, the author mentions the importance of restoring the European Concert. How has the balance of power shifted among European nations since the end of the Cold War, and what role do you think Russia should play in diplomatic relations going forward?
4) The article also discusses the potential disengagement of the United States from European affairs. As a defense official within the EU, what is your response to this potential shift? How does the EU plan to maintain its security without relying on American support?
5) the author makes strong critiques of the European Union and its leadership. As a representative from the EU, how do you respond to these criticisms? Can you outline any recent initiatives or reforms aimed at addressing the concerns raised in the article?
