image copyrightEPA
April 11, 2024
The Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on mobilization, which over the past months has been the subject of fierce debate in the Ukrainian political environment and more broadly in society.
The main task of the law adopted on Thursday was to strengthen mobilization processes, but there is no clear opinion among observers as to whether the final document is capable of coping with it.
In any case, it formally tightens the rules of military registration, strengthens sanctions against “draft dodgers” and specifies provisions for a deferment from mobilization. The day before, a flurry of indignation on social networks was caused by the exclusion from the bill of provisions on the demobilization of already fighting fighters of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, as well as the mandatory rotation of military personnel on the front line.
Deputies adopted a law on mobilization against the backdrop of statements by the Ukrainian leadership about an upcoming large-scale offensive by Russian troops, which is supposed to begin in late May – early June of this year.
History of Ukrainian mobilization
Vladimir Zelensky announced a general mobilization in Ukraine on the first day of the full-scale Russian invasion, February 24, 2022.
Since then, the Verkhovna Rada has extended the validity of this presidential decree every three months, that is, from a formal point of view, mobilization in the country has continued continuously for the third year.
In reality, in the third year of the great war, this process is in a systemic crisis. In the first weeks and months after the invasion, queues of people wishing to join the Defense Forces lined up near the Ukrainian territorial recruitment centers (TMCs, as military registration and enlistment offices are called in Ukraine). The TCC simply could not cope with so many volunteers, and people without military experience were often simply sent home.
Within a few months the situation changed dramatically. The flow of volunteers had dried up, and the Defense Forces needed to replace losses and recruit recruits to carry out their tasks. In this situation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were forced to turn to classical methods of mobilizing recruits.
Here they encountered several problems. Firstly, the legislation on mobilization, which had not been updated for years, correlated rather poorly with the challenges of wartime.
Secondly, as it turned out, the military registration system in Ukraine was far from perfect. The TCC simply did not have information about the place of residence, the social status of millions of residents of the country liable for military service, who, contrary to the requirements of the law, did not register, thus not wanting to come to the attention of the army system. Under these conditions, incidents involving “alert teams” that forcefully deliver men of military age who are not registered with the military to the TCC have become frequent on the streets of Ukrainian cities.
There were also frequent complaints from the warring units about the quality of the reinforcements coming to them. Observers pointed out that the average age of those mobilized has recently exceeded forty years, and also that mobilization more often concerns residents of villages who are not ready for combat on a modern battlefield.
In this situation, last summer work began on a comprehensive law that could smooth out the current shortcomings of the mobilization system in Ukraine.
Work on this project was complicated by the fact that, due to the growing unpopularity of the topic of mobilization in Ukrainian society, none of the top politicians, including President Vladimir Zelensky, who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, were eager to be associated with a document designed to intensify the recruitment of recruits into the army.
At some point, the discussion about the project being prepared in secrecy began to resemble a game of “hot potato” between the military leadership, the president, the government and members of parliament.
After all, the first version of the bill to mobilize government sponsorship was submitted to parliament in the last days of December last year. After a wave of criticism of the document, this draft was withdrawn and, after revision, registered in the Rada on January 30.
Deputies submitted over four thousand amendments to it, they were considered for several weeks in the parliamentary committee on national security, defense and intelligence, and only on Wednesday the final document was submitted to the session hall.
Everyone needs mobilization
Observers agree that the adoption of the law on mobilization in Ukraine in the third year of the war unleashed by Russia is overdue and overdue, and for several reasons at once.
First of all, the situation at the front has long required the activation of conscription.
“I beg you very much, pass this law. We really need him. We are holding the front with all our strength,” General Yuriy Sodol, commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, addressed the deputies immediately before the vote in the session hall of the Verkhovna Rada.
According to him, the personnel shortage in the Ukrainian army is so strong that in some sectors of the front the Russians outnumber the Ukrainians by seven or even ten times.
Replenishing the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is especially relevant, also based on Vladimir Zelensky’s statements about the Russians preparing for large-scale mobilization and, following this, for a new big offensive on Ukrainian positions.
The Ukrainian military also requires increased mobilization, many of whom have been fighting on the eastern front not only since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, but also since the time of the “ATO” (that was the name of the operation of the Ukrainian military and security forces against Russian proxy forces in the Donbass, which started in 2014).
Adding fresh forces to the Ukrainian army is considered the only way to provide experienced and tired soldiers with the opportunity to rotate and rest. However, on the eve of the final consideration of the law on mobilization in the Verkhovna Rada, provisions on the possibility of demobilizing soldiers after three years of service and on mandatory rotations of military personnel on the front line were removed from its text on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Syrsky. These issues should be spelled out in a separate law.
Finally, the adoption of the law on mobilization turned into an element of a foreign policy game with the participation of Ukraine.
It is no secret that Kyiv is now entirely dependent on the financial and military assistance provided to it by its Western partners.
And among them – at least among some of them – skepticism regarding the continuation of such support has recently been growing.
In other words, representatives of the Ukrainian authorities say, some partners are trying their best to find reasons to curtail aid to the warring Ukraine, but blame it itself for this. Russian “well-wishers” continue to contribute to such sentiments with all their might, Kyiv continues.
In an interview recorded on a “national telethon” last week, Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russian propaganda was using Kyiv’s delay in passing the mobilization law to sow doubts about the advisability of further Western support for Ukraine.
“The Russians managed to raise the issue that our people are not ready to continue defending the state because of (the failure to pass) this law. They raised the question in the West in such a way that today the West asks us: if you don’t want mobilization, the parliament doesn’t want to vote, then why do you need help, why should we help?” – said Vladimir Zelensky.
In this sense, the adoption by the Rada of the long-suffering law should add arguments to the Ukrainian president in his negotiations with Western partners.
What’s in the new law?
Observers have mixed views on the law on mobilization adopted by parliament and the consequences of its adoption.
His supporters say that he will help solve almost all the problems of the Ukrainian army overnight.
More moderate commentators point out that in the conditions of total mobilization, which formally began in 2022 and has not stopped since then, one should not overestimate this document.
“Whatever the law on mobilization ultimately adopted, it will not affect the pace of mobilization, because this law is primarily not about, relatively speaking, an additional increase in the number of mobilized, but about accounting,” he said in March of this year. year, member of the parliamentary committee on national security Sergei Rakhmanin on the talk show “Ukrainian Pravda”.
The lion’s share of innovations spelled out in the new law concerns the tightening of military registration rules for Ukrainian conscripts so that the army system “sees” them, and is not forced to recruit people into the army almost blindly.
Within 60 days from the date of entry into force of the law, all Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 years (including those living abroad) will be required to update their military registration data. Subsequently, they will be required to carry their military registration documents with them throughout the entire duration of martial law and present them at the first request of TCC employees or police officers.
The concept of an electronic account of a person liable for military service is introduced into the legislation: every Ukrainian man of military age can voluntarily set it up for himself, through which his communication with the army system will take place.
Men who are not registered with the military will not be able to obtain a foreign passport or (here we are talking about those staying abroad) to use consular services.
In addition, the law limits the ability of draft dodgers to work in the civil service and allows the TCC to initiate the deprivation of driver’s licenses through the courts.
Methods of influencing potential violators of the legislation on mobilization include a significant increase – tenfold – in fines for such violations. This bill was voted on the day before in the first reading, but its adoption as a whole looks like just a matter of time.
The law adopted on Thursday confirms the previously existing right to a deferment from mobilization for fathers with many children (except for those with arrears in paying child support), single parents, adoptive parents, as well as those citizens whose close relatives died or went missing while defending Ukraine.
Reservations from mobilization will be given to law enforcement officers, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada and no more than two of their assistants each, heads of central executive bodies, and judges.
Students of universities and full-time vocational education institutions, as well as teachers working at least three-quarters of the salary, are not subject to conscription for military service.
Citizens with disabilities released from captivity, as well as young men under 25 years of age, can be mobilized only at will.
Separately, the law stipulates that all those mobilized must undergo the necessary military training.
After the law is adopted, it must be signed by the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. It is then sent to the president for signature. The law will come into force a month after Vladimir Zelensky puts his signature on it.
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