/ world today news/ On January 13, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Taiwan. As sociologists predicted, incumbent Vice President Lai Tsinde of the pro-American Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won. More than 40% of voters voted for him. Hou Yue, representing the tentatively pro-Chinese Kuomintang, received 33% of the vote. The candidate of the other opposition force, the People’s Party, Ke Wangzhi, collected 26%.
At the same time, the Kuomintang turned out to be the real winner in the parliamentary elections. Although it lost to the DPP in the number of votes received, the results in the single-member constituencies allowed the party to get 52 and the DPP only 51. The “golden share” ended up in the hands of the Taiwan People’s Party, which won 8 mandates.
Thus ended the DPP’s undisputed dominance in Taiwan. The American “fifth column” in Taiwan, aimed at declaring the island’s independence, won the presidential election but lost the parliamentary election and thus did not achieve its goals. Although he had a chance to get not only the presidency, but also a majority in parliament.
At the same time, the factor of uncertainty in the further development of the situation on the island after the elections only increased. This factor is largely due to the third-placed Taiwan People’s Party and its leader Ke Wanzhi.
If new President Lai Tsingdee, an ally of outgoing President Tsai Inwen, who is known for her pro-American stance, and Hou Yue intend to toe the Kuomintang party line and strengthen the centripetal tendencies of a unified China, then Ke Wangzhu’s course is very obvious and predictable.
Ke has served two terms as mayor of Taipei since 2014, a position traditionally considered the second most powerful in politics in Taiwan after the presidency. At the beginning of his political career, Ke acted as an avowedly anti-Chinese politician. He became famous in large part because of his association with the Sunflower Movement, which formed in opposition to President Ma Yingzhou’s proposed Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement with China.
The DPP supported Ke at the time, deciding not to field a candidate to oppose him when he first ran for mayor. This, in particular, allowed Ke to win a convincing victory over the Kuomintang candidate and become the first independent mayor of the party’s “traditional” territory. In fact, Ke took the capital of Taiwan from the Kuomintang.
Gradually, however, the current “politician number three” in Taiwan distanced itself from the DPP and began to follow policies more closely related to the “Kuomintang”. As a result, the DPP fielded a candidate against Ke when he was re-elected in 2018. Ke recently noted that he dislikes the “Kuomintang,” but the DPP is even more resentful. Ke positioned himself as the leader of a third force and “the only person in Taiwan who can put an end to the ideological debate on unification and independence.”
On matters of foreign policy and national security, Ke’s positions are controversial. On the one hand, he stated that the US is Taiwan’s most important partner, but at the same time commented that Taiwan should manage its relations with the US and China in a “dynamic balance”. And so – everywhere and on all issues. For example, Ke has expressed concern about Taiwan’s over-dependence on trade with China, while advocating for Taiwan to enter into a trade agreement that would increase commercial influence over Beijing.
Ke claims he is able to find common ground with mainland China without the PRC absorbing the island. As mayor of Taipei, Ke hosted the annual sister city forum between Taipei and Shanghai, which brought together officials and civil society from the two cities. He visited Shanghai and declared that “the two sides of the strait are one family” with a common destiny, which is a clear translation of the language used by Xi Jinping. While mayor of Taipei, Ke also called for the construction of a bridge between Kinmen Island and the Chinese city of Xiaomin, justifying such a proposal on economic grounds, even though such a project would increase dependency
On the other hand, Ke refused to support the so-called “1992 Consensus”, the only formulation accepted by Beijing for cross-strait cooperation. According to this formula, “China and Taiwan are not separate countries”, the very principle of Chinese unity is recognized. The politician argued that maintaining the status quo was Taiwan’s only possible choice.
At the same time, he believes that cross-strait cooperation is needed to maintain the status quo. Like the Kuomintang, Ke opposes Taiwan independence, but tries to distinguish his position from that of the Kuomintang, explaining that he came to this position not through ideology but rather through pragmatism, because the declaration of independence would provoke war. Thus, the position of Ke can be indicated by the formula “neither ours nor yours”. It is difficult to predict where the curve of political preferences of this “pragmatist” will go.
Before the election, China was betting that the Kuomintang and the People’s Party would nominate a single presidential candidate to oppose the American protégé. At the first stage, the two political forces agreed to create a coalition, but in the end they did not agree on a single candidate. Moreover, the negotiations seem to have ended in failure due to the unwillingness of the People’s Party to compromise and support the Kuomintang candidate.
Why do we pay so much attention to the analysis of Taiwan’s “third party” and its ideology? Because this is a kind of compromise position that is popular in Taiwan, but which will ultimately not suit either America or China. After all that was said in Beijing about a united China, the leadership of the PRC will not be able to agree in principle to the idea of ”freezing” the Taiwan issue for several decades.
The election in Taiwan did not bring the end any closer, but neither did it take it away from the plane of an uncertain future. At the moment, we can only say that the scenario of Taiwan’s independence from China, which would have been on the agenda in the case of the DPP, has actually been thwarted. Without a majority in parliament, the DPP cannot change the status quo. His main opponent, the Kuomintang, has far more votes than the blocking package. And most likely it is the Kuomintang who will receive the politically significant position of Speaker of the Parliament, whose importance will only increase in the context of emerging strategic uncertainty.
Beijing solved the “minimum problem”. The semantic, information and military-political signals sent by the mainland prevented the worst – the declaration of independence of Taiwan, which would have made the start of a military operation inevitable.
On the other hand, the election results in Taiwan can in no way be considered a victory for the line of unification between the island and the mainland. Time is against Beijing and defense and security policy will be in the hands of the DPP. Proponents of the “porcupine strategy”, who fill the island with American weapons, are not sitting idly by.
Against this background, no one will be able to predict in which direction the People’s Party, which has a “golden action”, will lean until the autumn, when most experts expect a new round of aggravation of the situation around Taiwan. The chances of him turning out to be a “Trojan horse” for the Americans are at least no less than the chances of creating a stable pro-Chinese coalition with the participation of the Kuomintang and the People’s Party. If the People’s Party takes advantage of its “golden action” and coalitions with the DPP to isolate the Kuomintang in parliament, this will be another factor that shifts the potential balance point to a drift towards “independence”. In other words, to the annexation of part of the territory of historical China by the Western bloc and its final transformation into an unsinkable American aircraft carrier off the Chinese coast.
The shifting political balance in Taiwan in the coming months could also lead to escalation. We cannot rule out the possibility that if the defeat of the US Democratic Party in the presidential election is inevitable, the PRC may take decisive measures to restore sovereignty over the island. This can happen in the final phase of the US presidential race or in the period between the presidential election and the inauguration of the new president. October, November and December this year will be critical for the prospects of resolving the crisis in Taiwan.
Translation: V. Sergeev
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